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INTRODUCTION
We did not choose to be absent from Mexico; it is not by mere adventurous spirit that we
have settled in a strange land where our homes are, although that could change at a
moment’s notice when the conditions that brought us disappear. But understand: it is not
our homeland that has forced us to leave, it has been those who, calling themselves
saviors of Mexico, who have created a miserable situation which has already existed for
many years. We have gone to strange lands in search of tranquility and guarantees, we
who wanted to devote our best years and energies to the Homeland.1
Jesús María Dávila was a local leader of the McAllen, Texas chapter of the Unión
Nacional Sinarquista (UNS or National Synarchist Union) in 1939. He explained his perspective
on the displacement of many Mexicans, expressing discontent in the postrevolutionary
government of Mexico.2 His statement was an autobiographical one – he fled his home country
for safety in the United States as a member of Mexico’s Catholic resistance, seeing little future
for him as an openly religious person in postrevolutionary Mexico.3 Dávila’s sentiments also

“No es por gusto nuestro que nos háyamos ausentado de México; no es por mero espíritu aventurero que hemos
fincado en tierra extraña nuestros hogares, que aunque no se crea, tienen la semejanza de tienda de campana listas
para levantarse cuando las condiciones que nos lanzaron al extranjero desaparezcan. Pero entendedlo bien: no es
nuestra patria la que nos ha corrido, han sido los que, auto-llamandose salvadores de México, crearon una situación
desgraciada que y a lleva muchos años de existir. En busca de tranquilidad y garantías hemos ido a tierras extrañas,
nosotros que hubiésemos querido entregar nuestros mejores años y energías de la Patria.” Juan Ignacio Padilla,
Sinarquismo: contrarrevolución (México: Editorial Polis, 1948), 157-158.
1

2

Mexico was an one-party state for seventy-one consecutive years. It was first the Partido Nacional Revolucionario
(PNR or National Revolutionary Party) from 1929 to 1938, then the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM or
Party of the Mexican Revolution) from 1938 to 1946, and finally the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI or
Institutional Revolutionary Party) from 1946 to the present moment. This dissertation utilizes the terms “Mexican
government,” “Mexican state,” “postrevolutionary government,” or “postrevolutionary state” to encompass those
changes.
3

Dávila was a leader in the McAllen branch of the Asociación Católica de la Juventud Mexicana (AJCM, or the
Mexican Catholic Youth Association) prior to joining the UNS. “Mother’s Day Meet Planned at Mission,” El
Heraldo de Brownsville, May 7, 1937; “Catholic Youths Select Officers,” The Brownsville Herald, September 6,
1937.

1

2
reflected that of other sinarquistas who resented the Mexican state and believed that the nation’s
leaders were misdirecting the country.
The UNS held an inherently counter-revolutionary vision of Mexico. The political
organization did not develop in isolation, but grew out of decades of political and religious
conflict in the country, centering on the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the “new” Mexico
after the revolution. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 to 1920 was a prolonged and violent civil
war, resulting in the deaths of roughly a million Mexicans. The conflict begain with the
overthrow of dictator Porfirio Díaz and ended with the creation of a new government of political
elites. The Mexican Constitution of 1917 that emerged from the revolution, targeted the historic
privileges of the Church by stripping it of any rights in the Mexican public sphere, restricting its
impact on education, worship, property, and legal standing.4 Both lay Catholics and clergy
fought two wars – the Cristero Wars – in the Bajío of Western Central Mexico against the
government from 1926 to 1929 and 1934 to 1938 to defend what they saw as attacks on
Catholicism. The UNS developed in 1937 as the next iteration of Catholic resistance against the
state, embracing politics while actively touting itself as nationalistic, moral, anti-communist, and
dedicated to bringing Mexico back to its glory with Christianity as a main element. Even the
organization’s name drew from the ancient Greek word “synarchy” meaning “with authority.”
The UNS, as such, was conservative as it advocated for restoring previously dominant forces like
the Catholic Church. By the group’s height in the early 1940s, its membership was around half a
million, drawing predominantly from the core of Mexico including the states of Guanajuato,

4

David C. Bailey, ¡Viva Cristo Rey!: The Cristero Rebellion and the Church-State Conflict in Mexico (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1974), 23-24; Jean A. Meyer, The Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People Between
Church and State 1926-1929 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 14.

3
Michoacán, and Querétaro. With such numbers, the UNS was the largest opposition force to the
5

postrevolutionary state since its founding.
The forces that emerged against the UNS – the press, political left, and both the U.S. and
Mexican governments – characterized the organization as fascist. Scholar Robert O. Paxton
argues that fascism is composed of “mobilizing passions.” These include a sense of never-ending
crisis that traditional solutions could not resolve, prioritization of national group identity over the
individual, embodiment of anti-liberalism, advocacy for a pure community, embrace of violence,
and the cult of personality around a male leader.6 Supporters of the postrevolutionary Mexican
state and the media painted the sinarquistas as more than simply arising out of the Mexican
church-state conflict, but as also materializing through connections with European-based
fascism. Fascism responded to a rapidly changing region through the impact of World War I, the
hardening of nation-states, and the success of the communist Bolsheviks in the Russian
Revolution of 1917. Fascism in Italy emerged gradually over the course of the 1920s with Benito
Mussolini, Germany represented a rapid shift towards fascism in 1933 with Adolf Hitler, and the
Nationalists under Francisco Franco won out against left-wing opposition in Spain by 1939. With
the onset of World War II by the late 1930s, fascism was at its peak. Sinarquismo’s embrace of
nationalism, patriarchy, hierarchy, and anti-communism echoed similarities with fascism. The
UNS also took on a symbolism of particular salutes, flags, marching, and uniforms that the

5

Mario T. García, Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology, and Identity, 1930-1960 (New Haven & London:
Yale University Press, 1989), 168. Numerous newspapers from 1941-1944 mention this number as well.
6

Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 41.

4
movement’s opponents latched onto. Soon, the opposition to sinarquismo argued that Nazi
Germany funded the group and the Falange Española coordinated its expansion.7
Although the UNS shared many similarities with concurrent fascism in Europe, the group
was not fascist in the exact image of the movements across the Atlantic. The organization grew
out of a long-standing admiration and support for the Catholic Church rather than having roots in
political and paramilitary organizations. Sinarquistas did not publicly embrace violence like
movements abroad, although members did partake periodically in incidents within the context of
Mexico, but not in the United States.8 Sinarquismo did have exclusively male leaders, but a cult
of personality never emerged around one leader as was the case with Benito Mussolini or Adolf
Hitler. Lastly, despite consistent accusations by the UNS’s opponents that the organization was a
puppet for totalitarian fascist regimes in Europe, no evidence existed that this was indeed the
case.
The UNS operated both at home in Mexico and in the United States, largely because of
the massive emigration of Mexicans in the years before. The movement stemmed from Central
Mexico and sought to encompass all Mexicans within and beyond its borders. The Mexican
Revolution, coupled with the Cristero Wars, forced many Mexicans into exile in the north
towards the Southwestern U.S. and beyond. Mexico’s Great Migration during and after the

See Betty Kirk, “Fascist Hand Seen in Mexican Fracas.” The New York Times, June 18, 1939; Kirk, “Sinarquista
Rise in Mexico Seen as Totalitarian Plot,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 7, 1941; Kirk, “Unrest in Mexico,”
The Washington Post, June 28, 1941; “CTM Regional Congress to Combat Sinarchists,” Mexican Labor News,
March 14, 1941; “CTM Forms Committees to Fight Nazifascism,” Mexican Labor News, April 10, 1941; “Phony
Anti-Nazis Take Line of Masks; Adopt Fascist Line,” Mexican Labor News, June 26, 1941; Marshall Hail, “Hate An
Easy Life…Love Discomfort and Death,” The Burlington Daily Times-News, October 10, 1941.
7

8

Gema Kloppe-Santamaría, In The Vortex of Violence (Oakland: University of California Press, 2020), 25 and 5659; Thomas Rath, Myths of Demilitarization in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1920-1960 (Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 2013), 64.

5
revolution consisted of the largest emigration from Mexico to the United States by this point.
Between 700,000 and one and a half million Mexicans migrated to the United States between
1900 and 1930.9 A significant portion of those who fled following the revolution were not in
agreement with the ever-increasing left-leaning politics of the postrevolutionary Mexican
government, which embodied anti-clericalism, a strict separation between church and state,
secular education, and land reform, thus aligning them with counter-movements such as that of
the UNS. Although sinarquismo and its supporters existed elsewhere in the Americas such as in
Cuba and Guatemala, the vast majority were either in Mexico or the U.S.10
Those sinarquistas who fled Mexico to the United States became part of a growing
community in the country. Mexicans found economic opportunity in agriculture and industry,
and forged community through political and social organizations. They also encountered
discrimination in the U.S. Mexicans were barred from employment in certain professions, faced
segregation in housing, and were subject to deportation. Nonetheless, Mexicans survived and
thrived despite the limitations placed upon them north of the border.
Sinarquismo gained hold in the United States for some time as the organization sought
influence and stability in the north away from its base of support in Central Mexico. One of the
precursor movements to the movement – Las Legiones (The Legionnaires) – established
branches in the U.S. in 1936. Those networks led to the creation of sinarquista chapters the

9

Benjamin C. Montoya, Risking Immeasurable Harm: Immigration Restriction and U.S.-Mexican Diplomatic
Relations, 1924-1932 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2020), 9.
10

In regards to Cuba, see Collection CHC5339, Enrique Ros Papers, University of Miami Cuban Heritage
Collection. In regards to Guatemala, see “Alerta guatemaltecos: el pueblo ya no soporta la carestía de vida,
sinarquismo está causando graves daños a patria y poniendo en ridículo juventud,” Item 13, Revolution and
Counterrevolution in Guatemala, 1944-1963, The Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of
Texas at Austin (UT Austin).

6
following year. The UNS established its first committee in the U.S. in Los Angeles, California in
November 1937, followed shortly by one in El Paso, Texas as an outgrowth of the Ciudad
Juárez, Chihuahua regional committee. Other chapters emerged in Southern California,
California’s Central Valley, Texas’ Rio Grande Valley, the El Paso metropolitan area and
Chicagoland. The organization distributed its newspaper, El Sinarquista, in those areas as well as
beyond, across the entire United States. The lead-up and entry into World War II brought about
suspicion of politically-tinged outsiders in the United States, particularly of an organization that
had nationalist, and supposedly fascist, sympathies lying outside its boundaries. Pre-existing
nativism, as well as fear of fifth column – or internal enemy – elements in the United States,
eventually made it difficult for the UNS to freely operate as an organization in the country.
Historiography and Argument
Historians who study the Unión Nacional Sinarquista are limited in their scope. From the
1940s onward, a variety of studies by Mario Gill, Albert L. Michaels, Hugh Campbell, Jean
Meyer, John W. Sherman, and Friedrich E. Schuler emerged, debating whether or not the
movement was fascist.11 Others like Servando Ortoll and Héctor Hernández García de León
provide large national studies of the organization.12 Pablo Serrano Álvarez, Daniel Newcomer,

11

Mario Gill, Sinarquismo, su origen, su esencia, su misión (Mexico: Comité de Defensa de la Revolución, 1944);
Albert L. Michaels, “Fascism and Sinarquismo: Popular Nationalisms Against the Mexican Revolution,” Journal of
Church and State 8:2 (1966): 234-251; Hugh Campbell, La derecha radical en Mexico, 1929-1949 (Mexico City:
Secretaria de Educación Pública,1976); Jean Meyer, El sinarquismo: un fascismo mexicano? (Mexico: Editorial
Joaquín Mortiz, 1979); John W. Sherman, The Mexican Right: The End of Revolutionary Reform, 1929-1940
(Westport: Praeger, 1997); Friedrich E. Schuler, Mexico Between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations
in the Age of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998); Jean Meyer, El
sinarquismo, el cardenismo y la iglesia: 1937-1947 (Barcelona: Tusquet Editores, 2003).
Servando Ortoll, “Catholic Organizations in Mexico’s National Politics and International Diplomacy (19261942),” PhD Dissertation (Columbia University, 1987); Héctor Hernández García de León, Historia política del
sinarquismo, 1934-1944 (Mexico City: Miguel Angel Porrúa, 2004).
12

7
13

and Jason Dormady delve into regionally-specific accounts of the movement. The issue is that
the majority of scholars of the UNS describe the organization only within the context of Mexico,
however the movement was transnational from the very beginning. Only a couple of scholars
like Oscar Lozano and Julia G. Young consider sinarquismo in the context of the United States,
although neither details the organization at length in its entirety nor do they focus on opposition
to the movement.14
Beyond UNS-specific work, this study of the sinarquistas engages with three other fields
of literature – postrevolutionary Mexican, Western, and Mexican American history. First, the
majority of the extensive literature on postrevolutionary Mexico takes on political movements
within the national context. Historians including David C. Bailey, Marjorie Becker, Jean Meyer,
Ben Fallaw, Robert Curley, Robert Weis, and Gema Kloppe-Santamaría demonstrate how proCatholic movements contested the Mexican state within Mexico’s borders. They examine the
church-state conflict either regionally or on the national level, focusing frequently on domestic
violence and state formation that developed through this process. With the exception of work by
Julia G. Young, academics do not consider the Mexican Catholic resistance beyond the
boundaries of the nation.15 This dissertation also diverges from viewing the postrevolutionary
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Mexican state as purely antagonistic to the UNS, but instead embraces a perspective that the
government was accommodating to the movement. For instance, the government worked
alongside the organization to see through its colonization project of northern Mexico in the early
1940s. As such, this work joins a growing literature on state hegemony in the period such as by
scholars such as Paul Gillingham and Benjamin T. Smith, which characterizes the Mexican state
as compromising when necessary to maintain the veneer of political control over the nation.16
Secondly, Western – particularly borderlands – scholars contemplate the political
contestation of the United States-Mexico border over time. The scholarship by Benjamin H.
Johnson, Elliott Young, Gerald Horne, and David Dorado Romo examines the Mexican
Revolution, with political actors transcending and contesting the border.17 While Verónica
Castillo-Muñoz argues that the border between California and Baja California hardened the
divide between the two nations, Geraldo Cadava believes that the boundary during the postWorld War II era between Arizona and Sonora was a place of cultural, political and commercial
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exchange. However, little borderlands history hones in on World War II and none recognizes
the role that the UNS played in the West and along the borderlands.
Third, Mexican American historiography intersects with the study of the sinarquistas in
the United States. The literature focuses on identity adaptation and the maintenance of a
hyphenated identity. Mario T. García, George J. Sánchez, David G. Gutiérrez, and Douglas
Monroy emphasize the notion of belonging as a unique group – as both Mexican and American –
within the context of the United States.19 They do not take into consideration Mexicans like the
sinarquistas who did not consider themselves to have a hyphenated identity as both Mexicans
and Americans, but instead held onto their mexicanidad (Mexicanness). The sinarquistas were
Catholic Mexican nationalists residing outside of their nation of orgin, who had a contested
relationship with the U.S. government and opposed the dominant Protestant Christian faith.
Zaragoza Vargas does include the sinarquistas into his work on Mexican American workers in
the twentieth century. In describing the situation in Los Angeles in the early 1940s characterized
by the Sleepy Lagoon incident and Zoot Suit Riots, he oversimplifies them as fascists who were
seeking to undermine the Mexican community by infiltrating youth gangs.20 Rather, this
dissertation shows that the ethnic Mexican left in the region utilized the power of the state to
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repress the UNS. Lastly, this work engages with Mexican American historiography in regards to
politics and especially conservativism in the community, and more broadly the Latinx
population, taking into account recent works by Benjamin Francis-Fallon and Geraldo Cadava.21
Their scholarship looks at the post-war era and at Latinx participation in United States politics,
whereas this work examines both a different time period and a transnational politics. It also
explores ties between ethnic Mexican conservatism in the United States and American
Catholicism.
This dissertation seeks to explore three themes in particular. First, the UNS sustained
nationalism away from the nation. Sinarquismo not only existed, but thrived for a period of time
in the United States in the mid-twentieth century, composed of individuals devoted to a vision of
a strong, Catholic Mexico. The UNS as a Mexican nationalist movement maintained a
membership of fellow countrymen and women who were away from their country of origin.
Sinarquistas viewed themselves as exiles from Mexico, even though most arrived before the
organization started, because they were displaced from their home due to civil unrest. They did
not shed their identity, but rather held onto it dearly in the United States. Separation from
Mexico fortified their allegiance to the nation and what it could be. A study of the UNS shows an
example of why and how conservative migrants organize in the United States to transform policy
back home.22
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Second, the UNS was not monolithic and it changed over time negotiating between being
a political and religious movement, with these transformations reverberating in the U.S. There
were differing interpretations of who the group was, even from its foundation in the precursor
group, Las Legiones. Manuel Romo de Alba and later Salvador Abascal sought for a highlystructured militaristic – and even authoritarian – movement that would bring about an integralist
Mexico, unifying church with state. Alternatively, Antonio Santacruz envisioned a more
moderate social and religious movement that would work directly with the Mexican Catholic
Church to regain the historic privileges that it once had. Initially, Las Legiones began as a
militant movement under Romo de Alba and was later reformed by Santacruz to be more
religious. Santacruz maintained power behind the scenes during the beginning of the UNS, even
as it shed some of its public religiosity. When Abascal served as president from 1940 to 1941, he
brought back the militant faction, alienating Santacruz and leading to the characterization of
sinarquismo in the public eye as authoritarian with similarities to fascism. Following 1941,
Santacruz reclaimed power and sidelined Abascal, but he soon found himself in conflict with
Manuel Torres Bueno who believed that the UNS should be a political party. These divisions and
different visions of the UNS and contributed to its downfall in the U.S.
Third, the United States and Mexican governments, Mexican American left, and the U.S.
media mobilized against the UNS in the U.S. and ultimately took away its safe harbor there. Just
as sinarquismo’s nationalism was transnational, so too was the fear of fascism. The Mexican
labor confederation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM or the Confederation
of Mexican Workers), initiated rumors as early as 1939 that the UNS was an internal enemy. The
rumors only grew in the years that followed, crossing the border to the north. They drew the
attention of the U.S. press, left-wing organizations, and governments on both sides of the U.S.-
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Mexican border, whom picked up on the notion that the UNS was fascist. The sinarquistas could
not maintain their presence in the U.S. without being seen as a threat. Researching sinarquismo
provides insight on the manifestation and effects of fear and sensationalism in the U.S. against a
particular enemy, which plays out time and again in the country’s history.23
This dissertation explores the rise and fall of the Unión Nacional Sinarquista in the
United States between 1936 and 1966. The individuals who became sinarquistas found refuge in
the United States from the church-state conflict in Mexico. The organization’s leadership
therefore envisioned an expanded Mexico wherever its members were – in and beyond the
country’s borders. The UNS mobilized and gained financial support from Mexicans in the United
States to ultimately attempt to destabilize the anti-clerical postrevolutionary Mexican state back
home. Some conservative American Catholics amplified their cause, seeking to sway and hearts
of minds of Americans, and ultimately the United States government, against the Mexican state.
The UNS created a transnational conservative community among Mexicans in the U.S. that was
eventually brought down through the combined efforts of the political left, media outlets, and
both the United States and Mexican governments. The Catholic-influenced Mexican nationalism
that drew the community to the movement in the United States ultimately led to its demise. Not
only were there differing notions of what the UNS was, but opponents perceived the movement
to be a fascist enemy.
Context on Mexicans and Catholics in the Early Twentieth Century United States
The sinarquistas rose to prominence in the midst of pre-existing Mexican and Catholic
communities in the United States. Mexicans in the U.S. formed community, as well as faced
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marginalization in the country. Mexicans resided in what is now the present U.S. Southwest –
distant from the center of Mexico far to the south. Nonetheless, they established settlements via
pueblos and ranchos in the north. As a result of the Mexican American War of 1846-1848, the
United States acquired the region from Mexico. Mexicans residing in the region became
American citizens under the provisions of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848, however
newly-arrived white Americans largely disregarded their rights.24 White disenfranchisement of
Mexicans continued over the following decades into the turn of the twentieth century, even as
more migrated to the United States because of economic opportunities and railroad networks.
The upheaval of the Mexican Revolution and the First Cristero War in the 1910s and 1920s
brought even more Mexicans to the U.S.25 These individuals found homes not only in the
Southwest, but the Midwest, settling in agricultural regions like California’s Central Valley and
Texas’ Rio Grande Valley, as well as growing industrial centers such as Los Angeles, El Paso,
and Chicago. By the 1930s, however, Mexicans faced increasing scrutiny from white Americans
due to rising xenophobia in the 1920s paired with the Great Depression of 1929. These factors
led to a series of deportations targeting Mexicans over the course of the decade.26 The U.S. was
at once a place of belonging and alienation.
During the 1930s, the Mexicans that remained in the country or those who returned
encountered difficult conditions and sought to do something about them. The U.S. continued to
deny them their civil rights. In addition, they faced a lack of employment and education, poor
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health, and crime within their communities throughout the U.S. As a result, Mexicans within
the country founded organizations like the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)
and El Congreso de Pueblos de Habla Español (El Congreso or the Spanish-Speaking People’s
Congress). These groups advocated of behalf of civil and political rights for the population.
Mexicans who later would be sinarquistas would interact and clash with such politically-minded
groups in California, Texas, and Chicagoland.
California was indeed a hotbed of Mexican politics, particularly progressive activism.
Not only did community members respond to social conditions within the country, as was the
case with El Congreso, but they were part of a larger legacy of revolutionary and labor activism.
Within Los Angeles, the exiled and anarchist Partido Liberal Mexicano (Mexican Liberal Party)
organized alongside the International Workers of the World in Los Angeles of the 1910s for
class-conscious, inclusive, industrial unionism. In the city in the 1920s and the 1930s, Mexicans
were involved in the Confederación de Uniones de Obreros y Campesinos Mexicanos
(Confederation of Unions of Mexican Farmers and Workers), continuing on such labor activism.
The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) was a larger tent labor federation, but
nonetheless focused on issues of the community with its Committee to Aid Mexican Workers.28
Beyond cities like Los Angeles, Mexicans were less organized politically, especially in
agricultural regions of the state.29
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In Texas, Mexicans asserted their presence in the state in the 1930s, resisting decades of
racial violence. White terror in the state towards Mexicans would result not only in groups like
LULAC, but other forms of organizing as well. Working class Mexicans asserted their place in
agriculture and industry in the state. The Fabens Laboring Men’s Protective Association
organized cotton pickers near El Paso, whereas Tejana domestic, cigar and garment workers
orchestrated a series of strikes in El Paso as well as in San Antonio.30 Mexican middle-class
immigrants and Mexican Americans advocated on behalf of the community at large. Rómulo and
Carolina Munguía disowned postrevolutionary Mexico in favor of Texas where they pursued
careers in media and Mexican American community uplift. Emma Tenayuca saw societal issues
lying in poverty and discrimination, first embracing communism and later labor activism,
coordinating the 1938 San Antonio pecan shellers strike.31
As for Chicagoland of the 1930s, the Mexican community was relatively young, dating
only back to the 1910s. Although there were generations who grew up in the United States, such
as those who migrated north from Texas, the population was largely from the Bajío. As a result,
Mexicans brought with them their politics – and their political divisions from their home
country. Transnational Mexican liberals, conservatives, and radicals made up the political arena,
organizing societies and coalitions.32 The Confederación de Trabajadores de México –who
would openly and frequently oppose the UNS – helped organize a Popular Front against the rise
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of fascism not only in Mexico, but among radicals in Chicagoland. Mexican radicals as well as
working-class conservatives were active in the CIO as was the case in Los Angeles.33
Not only did Mexican communities in different parts of the United States shape the
sinarquistas, but so too did American Catholics. From the very founding of the U.S. in the late
eighteenth century, Protestants dominated the American sociopolitical project. Although
Catholics were present in the U.S. from the nation’s beginning, they were a small religious
minority. A major point of contention among Protestants in the country was where did the
loyalties of Catholics lie – were they dedicated to American democracy or rather the pope in
Rome? By the early twentieth century, that question persisted with the influx of migrant
Catholics to the U.S.34 American Catholic clergy sought to assert their growing power within the
nation. The National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC) would be such a force.
The NCWC began as the National Catholic War Council in August 1917 during World
War I to counteract Protestant hegemony. Reverend John J. Burke, C.S.P. was involved in
various U.S. Catholic efforts including The Catholic World and Catholic Press Association, but
wanted to consolidate national Catholic power in the U.S. during the war.35 He believed that the
Catholic Church of the United States needed to have an equivalent to the Protestants’ Federal
Council of Churches’ war effort. After reaching out to the American hierarchy, the prelates
recommended that he became the general secretary of the council, which he did. At the war’s end
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in November, council member Bishop J. Muldoon pushed for a permanent organization, which
formed in September 1919, with the title of National Catholic Welfare Council (becoming
Conference in 1923). Burke continued his leadership and led what became the official voice of
the U.S. Church.36 The NCWC not only cared about bringing American Catholics into the fold of
the U.S., but concerned itself with supporting Catholics across national borders. The NCWC
would play an instrumental role in the transnational Mexican church-state conflict, as well as
serve as a vital ally to the UNS.
Context on the Transnational Mexican Church-State Conflict
The Mexican Revolution of 1910 to 1920 redefined the Mexican national community,
who was part of it and who would no longer be considered welcome. The revolution occurred
because of resentment building against Mexican President Porfirio Díaz, who served in office
from 1876 to 1911. His administration favored foreign investment and large landowners
(hacendados), while allowing the Catholic Church – a political and religious force in Latin
America since colonization in the sixteenth century – relative leeway in operating as it pleased.
The functioning constitution of the time, the Constitution of 1857, removed institutional
privileges and promoted sale of Church property, yet Díaz simply did not enforce the document.
Instead, the Church grew more powerful with more clergy, property, schools, associations and
publications.37 After multiple decades in power, Díaz signaled that he was open to political
opposition, leading to a power vacuum and the Mexican Revolution. The decade-long conflict
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was a civil war that pitted various factions against one another with different visions of Mexico –
conservative, liberal, and anarchist among others. All levels of Mexico’s class structure – elites,
middle class, working class and farmworkers – all partook in the revolution. The revolution was
a total war across all of Mexico that completely uprooted the social and political fabric of the
nation. Near the end of the revolution, the faction under Venustiano Carranza won out and
rewrote Mexico’s constitution. Among the privileged interests of the Díaz administration, the
Catholic Church in Mexico became a target of the revolution, and the Mexican Constitution of
1917 codified the sentiment against the Church.38
The Constitution of 1917 sought to transform Mexico, restricting the systemic power of
the Catholic Church in Mexico. The constitution targeted the historic privileges of the Church
through several articles. Article 3 made all education secular, preventing any religious education.
Article 5 outlawed the establishment of monastic orders. The constitution’s Article 24 banned
worship in public outside of Church buildings. Article 27 empowered the Mexican state to
expropriate property for what it saw as the good of the nation. The article denied religious bodies
like the Mexican Catholic Church the right to obtain, hold, or oversee property. It allowed the
Mexican government to break up large-landholdings, many of them owned by individuals
invested in the Church. Lastly, Article 130 denied the Church of any legal personality. It gave
the government the power to intercede in internal matters of the Church. The Church needed
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permission from the government to open new houses of worship. Priests had to be Mexican by
birth and could not criticize the government. The article stated that religious publications could
not speak on politics and banned any political group associated with a religion.39 Together, these
five articles essentially stripped Catholics and the Catholic Church of any rights in the Mexican
public sphere. However, the Constitution of 1917 initially proved to be more of a symbolic threat
to the Catholic Church in Mexico, rather than a real one as the early postrevolutionary
government did not enforce the document for several years.
Nonetheless, Catholics within Mexico sought to secure the institutional role of the
Church during and after the revolution through the creation of Catholic resistance organizations
such as La Unión Católica Mexicana (La U).40 La U was active during the 1920s, however an
auxiliary bishop from Morelia, Michoacán, Luis María Martínez, founded the organization in
1915 with the support of local Catholic hierarchy. The association’s goal was to secretly
organize Catholics in the political landscape of the country through a hierarchical cell structure,
defending Catholicism, as well as supporting Catholic seminaries, schools, unions, and press. La
U’s ultimate objective was to destroy the postrevolutionary state. Among the secret society’s
members were not only Martínez (later to be the Archbishop of Mexico City), but also Adalberto
Abascal (father of sinarquista leader Salvador Abascal). Abascal would go on to direct the
group’s activities, particularly in raising funds and developing networks of Catholics throughout
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the country. Word of La U made its way to the Vatican, and despite its defense of Catholicism,
Rome was wary of overt politics. The Vatican preferred diplomacy rather than underground
activism.41 By the mid-1920s, the Mexican government decidedly shifted the focus of Catholics
towards being on the defensive.
The presidential election of 1924 brought Plutarco Elías Calles to the presidency, and
within a couple of years, the government did indeed pose a threat to the Mexican Church. He
wanted to fulfill and act on the articles stated explicitly in the constitution. In large part, the
federal government under Calles wanted to weaken the Catholic Church in Mexico as an
institutional competitor within the nation.42 Soon after his presidency, he ordered local
authorities to surveil priests’ activities during Holy Week of 1925. They had the authority to
make sure that clergy did not exceed their proper functions, per the constitution. As a result,
government representatives acted on their duty, going into churches.43 In 1926, Calles announced
and enacted penal code reforms known collectively as the Ley Reglamentaria (Regulatory Law,
also known as the Ley Calles or Calles Law). The law prohibited not only faith-based education
in primary schools, but all religious orders and all religious vows. It also placed penalties upon
clergy involved in politics, banned religious political parties, and prohibited religious acts
outside of churches.44 Peaceful resistance that year against the Calles administration, however
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they did not prove successful. The Liga Nacional Defensora de la Libertad Religiosa (National
League for the Defense of Religious Liberty or La Liga) formed and focused on a campaign of
mobilization, supporting legal pathways and economic boycotts, but these actions did not affect
the government as it responded with military force.45 The Mexican state put the Catholic Church
in Mexico on notice.
The Vatican responded to the developing situation at the end of 1926. Pope Pius XI in
his encyclical, Iniquis Afflictisque, came out publicly denouncing the situation in Mexico. He
declared that the Mexican government did “away with the liberties of the majority and in such a
clever way that they have been able to clothe their lawless actions with the semblance of
legality.”46 The pope recognized the vast numbers of Catholics in the country and how the Calles
government was acting against the interests of its own people. He articulated that “the truth is
that the clergy and the great majority of the faithful have been so strengthened in their
longsuffering resistance to these laws by such an abundant shower of divine grace that they have
been enabled thereby to give a glorious example of heroism.”47 The pope supported the active
participation of Catholics in defending their faith, but he was never explicit regarding forming a
stance on the emerging use of armed rebellion in Mexico. Rome never came out fully in favor or
against church-state violence.48
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Violence soon escalated between Cristeros – who consisted of primarily lay Catholics
and some clergy – and the Mexican government in the Bajío in the First Cristero War between
1926 and 1929. The Cristeros, which included La Liga, emerged in reaction to the Calles
administration’s hardline policy regarding the constitution. Consisting of conservative, proCatholic Church Mexicans, they wanted to preserve the religious institution that they believed
was an essential part of the social fabric of the nation. They also opposed government-led land
reform, breaking up the land that many of them owned or had connections to. These individuals
moved from social activism towards taking up arms against the state.49 The government called
them “Cristeros” for their battle cry of “¡Viva Cristo Rey!” (“Long Live Christ the King!”). The
Cristeros ultimately sought to overthrow the Mexican government.50 Cristero organizing and
fighting against the state was concentrated in Mexico, but the movement’s struggle spanned
across the country’s boundaries.
Large waves of migrants left Mexico for the United States in the 1910s, and the First
Cristero War only contributed to the movement north, where Mexican Catholic resistance
pursued their cause from across the border. The revolution ravaged the country, displacing many
Mexicans, which was only aided by transportation networks to the north and work opportunities
in the United States. By 1926, the emigrants of the First Cristero War followed suit by heading
north. Entire municipalities in the states of Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Michoacán completely lost
their populations as a result.51 Catholic organizations in the U.S. such as the Knights of
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Columbus and the Catholic Extension Society worked with the United States Immigration
Bureau and Catholic hierarchy to place and provide assistance to migrants throughout the
country. They were directed to cities with significant Mexican populations including El Paso,
San Antonio, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Local organizations based in parishes in these cities
cultivated spaces where Mexicans could discuss issues relating to the relationship between the
Catholic Church in Mexico and the Mexican state.52 Cristeros also utilized the press to
disseminate their points of view through papers such as San Antonio’s La Prensa, Los Angeles’
La Opinion, and El Paso’s Revista Católica. Their articles criticized the Calles administration,
but also provided a platform for prominent Catholic political exiles including La Liga leader
René Capistrán Garza.53 This press added to creating a sense of belonging and a shared identity
among the Cristero diaspora in the United States. These migrants were not alone, but part of a
larger community abroad with a specific cause.
The National Catholic Welfare Conference and its general secretary Burke were invested
in the conditions of Mexican Catholics both in Mexico and the U.S. Through his position as
general secretary, Burke took a position on the situation in Mexico, writing Mexican Catholic
hierarchy that “the behavior of the Church in Mexico in the present crisis is forcefully related in
an intimate and important way with the position, the intelligence, and well-being of the Church
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in our country. Between both there is a very real solidarity of interests." Both he and his
organization sought to defend the interests of Catholics across national borders.
The First Cristero War reached a resolution in 1929, and this was not possible without the
mobilization of Mexicans in exile, nor without the involvement of American Catholic support.
The NCWC’s Burke and its Legal Department Director William F. Montavon were critical in
bringing about an end to the war, mediating discussions between Calles, the Mexican Church,
and the U.S. Department of State.55 Montavon, in particular, had spent a considerable amount of
time in Latin America. His department monitored changes in state and federal law and worked to
represent the NCWC nationally, but he was especially concerned about Catholics abroad.56 Both
Montavon and Burke aided U.S. Ambassador Dwight Morrow in brokering a deal between the
Mexican government and the Cristeros. The Catholic Church in Mexico would be able to regain
the use of former religious buildings. It would also now have the right again to conduct religious
instruction in places of worship. Lastly, the deal provided the clergy with the same political
rights as any other Mexican citizen to appeal for changes in the laws of the country.57 The
violence of the First Cristero War officially came to an end; however, the Mexican church-state
conflict was not yet over.
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Three years later in 1932, Pope Pius XI commented on the situation in Mexico once
again, this time in the encyclical, Acerba Animi. As of 1928, Plutarco Elías Calles was no longer
officially president of Mexico, however he was still in control as “el Jefe Máximo” (the
maximum leader) of the nation until 1934, institutionalizing political power of Mexico through
the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR, or National Revolutionary Party). Despite the peace
brokered at the end of the First Cristero War in 1932, the Mexican government continued
practices from before by targeting Catholic clergy once again. Pius XI denounced the
government for betraying the terms of the agreement, by ignoring Church hierarchy, and instead
continuing to require that priests registered with the government. The Mexican state under Calles
continued to criminalize clergy, did not restore their residences, and publicly attacked them
through the press. The papal encyclical also condemned the secularization of education in the
country as the government banned any form of religious instruction.58 In response to these issues,
Pius XI pushed forward the concept of Catholic Action, encouraging the involvement of lay
Catholics in influencing Mexican society. It would revive the Church by encouraging religious
observance, education, and practice. Catholic Action existed since the late nineteenth century,
however Pius XI institutionalized the movement, channeling lay activities under centralized
leadership, while strictly banning any involvement in political parties. The Vatican believed that
Catholic Action not only applied to Mexico, but that it pertained to the entire world, as a reaction
to what it perceived as radical movements such as socialism, secularism, and fascism.59 Pius XI

58

Pius XI, Acerba Animi,The Holy See, September 19, 1932. http://w2.vatican.va/content/piusxi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_29091932_acerba-animi.html
59

Pius XI, Acerba Animi; Andes, 3, 147 and 154.

26
re-empowered a wave of resistance in Mexico amid remaining repression against the Catholic
Church.
Armed Catholic rebellion re-emerged in Mexico with the Second Cristero War between
approximately 1934 and 1938 in response to the rising concern over the growth of both
government-led secular education and land reform in the 1930s. In July 1934, Calles mandated
socialist education, taking Article 3 in the 1917 Constitution on the secularization of education to
the next level by focusing on eradicating the “fanaticism” of Mexico’s youth. Many Mexican
Catholics perceived government education as an affront to religious-based teachings, advancing
atheism. They also believed that agrarian reform went squarely against the “natural right” to
private property. This opposition to land reform largely came as a result of ties between
landholders and Catholic priests and lay leaders through kinship, affinity, and clientelistic
connections.60 The Second Cristero War differed from the first one as Catholic rebels were less
structured, more involved in guerrilla warfare, and more locally-based.61 They attacked federal
schools, teachers, as well as ejidos (communal land holdings created through land reform). These
attacks appeared through violence committed by landowners attacking agricultural reform, in
addition to violence perpetrated by young adults and children against instructors.62 The
resuscitation of violence necessitated solutions.
Pope Pius XI published the last of his three encyclicals on the situation in Mexico in
1937, Firmissimam constantiam. He wrote that Mexicans needed to continue to resist attacks on
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the Mexican Catholic Church. Nonetheless, he took a stance on Catholic rebel violence,
articulating that “care must be taken to guard against either making violence legitimate with the
pretext of applying a remedy to the ills of the people, or admitting and favoring those rapid and
violent changes of temporal conditions of society which may lead to effects that are more
harmful than the evil itself which is intended to be corrected.”63 Instead, Pius XI advocated for
Catholic Action once again as a solution, in preparing “Catholics to make just use of their rights,
and to defend them with all legitimate means according as the common good requires.”64 In
order to end prolonged warfare, Mexican Catholics needed to pursue peaceful, civic-minded
approaches towards shaping their influence upon society.
The Mexican government ultimately ended the Second Cristero War. In 1934, Mexicans
elected Lázaro Cárdenas as president, and despite breaking away from Calles, the new president
took several years to help remedy the church-state conflict in the country. A clash in the state of
Guanajuato involving Catholics that left dozens dead in March 1936 compelled Cárdenas to take
action. He encouraged the Supreme Court to slowly nullify anti-clerical legislation on both the
federal and state level. Finally, in January 1938, the president allowed Catholic schools to
operate under the law, which no longer made socialist education the only choice for Mexican
youth.65And with that, both Cristero Wars were over.
The Mexican church-state conflict was evolving over the course of the 1930s. Catholic
activism persisted both through violent resistance and civic action through the Church-
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sanctioned Catholic Action. Although some Catholic resistance organizations like La U dropped
off in the 1920s, new ones emerged in the 1930s with limited support from Rome.66 The
influence of the Vatican would remain relevant in the years to come, as would U.S.-Mexican
connections that formed during the First Cristero War. In fact, these transnational connections
between Mexican Catholic resistance in the two countries proved decisive in establishing the
UNS as a force to mobilize more people against the Mexican state.
Chapter Layout
This dissertation builds off of this historical context by starting with the first chapter
documenting the creation of transnational organizational structures in 1936 up to 1940, the UNS
expanded into the U.S. Individuals who were part of one of the precursor secret societies to the
UNS, Las Legiones, expressed differing notions of what the movement should be early on.
Nonetheless, they created and maintained ties with clergy and lay Catholic leaders in the NCWC,
even as they organized the UNS in May 1937. Within months of the movement’s founding in
Mexico, committees opened up in the U.S. Speeches from Mexican nationals, paired with
sinarquista propaganda and regular correspondence, sustained organizational ties in the United
States. However, the expansion of a pro-Mexican Catholic nationalist organization like the UNS
in American Southwestern cities and towns soon fed into the growing fear of fascism in the
country and would be a subject of suspicion of the U.S. government.
Chapter two is situated between the Mexican presidential election of Manuel Ávila
Camacho in July 1940 and the United States entry into World War II in December 1941 when
the movement established a foothold in the U.S. New sinarquista president Salvador Abascal
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transformed the organization and further facilitated the movement of its institutional culture
across the U.S.-Mexican border. The group increased distribution of its newspaper, El
Sinarquista, disseminated pamphlets purveying its values, created new traditions such as songs,
and solidified its stance on a variety of issues. The sinarquistas established more committees in
California and Texas, both in urban and rural communities. The UNS also grew beyond just the
two states, expanding into the Midwest through setting up a committee in the Chicagoland and
selling its newspaper across the region. The movement continued to benefit from its relationship
with the NCWC, all the while building new connections with conservative American Catholics
elsewhere in the country. No longer was sinarquismo an emerging transnational movement
during this period, but instead became a mainstay among conservative Mexicans in the U.S.
Nonetheless, reports that the UNS was a fascist movement were spreading. American media
outlets identified the group as connected with the Falange Española and Nazi Germany,
threatening the security of the U.S. The government built off of the media reports, surveilling the
organization.
As sinarquismo was at its height in 1941, chapter three details how organizational
leaders, with Salvador Abascal at its helm, envisioned putting rhetoric into action with the
development of colonies in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. The UNS rejected the Mexican
government’s use of “revolution” and instead pursued a plan based on “organization,”
establishing from the ground-up places to live out the movement’s ideals in “colonies,” obtaining
control of regions in the less-populated north of Mexico. Disciplined sinarquista members
emulated the Spanish conquistadores who they admired by settling and populating the colonies.
Colonization allowed for the sinarquistas to develop societies completely from scratch, centered
on their Catholic faith as well as ownership of property. The colonies epitomized Abascal’s
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leadership, putting organization and discipline into practice. Sinarquista members from the U.S.
were vital in making colonization a reality. They donated money and materials to make the
colonies possible. Sinarquistas in the U.S. even envisioned themselves as returning to Mexico via
the colonies. Sinarquista families, with the large majority being upper middle-class families,
established and populated the colonies. The largest and most publicized of the colonies was
Santa María Auxiliadora in Baja California Sur. The sinarquistas established a secondary colony
which they called Villa Kino de Santa María de Guadalupe in Sonora. The UNS established
other colonies in the north of Mexico including San Miguel Arcángel in Durango, Santa María
del Refugio in Tamaulipas, and San José Opodepe in Sonora. External opposition combined with
internal logistical issues eventually led to its demise in 1944.
From the U.S. entry into World War II in December 1941 to the Zoot Suit Riots in June
1943, the fourth chapter details the beginning of the end for the UNS in the U.S. The UNS could
no longer operate freely without scrutiny. The group experienced its height between 1940 and
1941 and advanced its ambitious project to colonize the north of Mexico in the years that
followed. The war, however, placed the movement under scrutiny. Advocates on behalf of the
Mexican community in the U.S. wanted to address the social issues that the population faced for
decades, known colloquially as the “Mexican problem.” The Mexican American left, the U.S.
press, and U.S. and Mexican governments spread the rumor that the UNS was going to feed upon
such issues to sway the population in favor of the Axis. The Sleepy Lagoon murder and
successive trial at the end of 1942 highlighting Mexican American youth delinquency led to
speculation about the group’s involvement. Eventually, this resulted in the California UnAmerican Activities Committee led by California state politician Jack B. Tenney to investigate
the UNS as one among other fascist and communist movements in 1942. The Zoot Suit Riots in
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early June 1943 led to further scrutiny and another such investigation of the sinarquistas. The
media, government, and the political left targeted the UNS more than in previous years. The
UNS pushed back against the opposition. The UNS made use of ties with conservative U.S.
Catholics more than ever to amplify the organization’s presence – and narrative. Some American
Catholics even sponsored a tour of sinarquista leaders to college campuses around the U.S. The
UNS believed that there was still time to convince hearts and minds that its cause was a just one.
The fifth and last chapter covers the end of the UNS in the U.S., facing a multi-decade
downfall between 1943 and the mid-1960s. Overwhelming negative sentiment built up against
the organization as a fascist fifth column. Opponents on the political and in the press called on
the U.S. government to eliminate the organization, which the state took note of implementing
further investigations and censorship. Conservative American Catholics also started to turn their
backs on the organization, denouncing sinarquismo. These factors combined with the growing
internal split in the movement led to its eventual decline in the U.S.
The dissertation in the pages that follow depicts how sinarquistas in the United States
sought to bring change to the political situation in Mexico in the first half of the twentieth
century. The Unión Nacional Sinarquista resisted and threatened the postrevolutionary Mexican
state with its membership transcending national boundaries into the U.S. Its leaders encountered
a variety of internal struggles as well as difficulties of how to define the movement. Ultimately,
the organization could not shake off the reputation that it gained over time of being a fascist fifth
column. Nonetheless, this transnational study of the Unión Nacional Sinarquista challenges and
transforms how we look at Mexicans – and more broadly migrants – in the U.S. No community
is a monolith and the sinarquistas certainly demonstrated that.

CHAPTER ONE
THE SPREAD OF SINARQUISMO AND FEAR OF FASCISM, 1936-1940
In California you still hear the clamor of the bells of our peoples, you Mexicans, who
have half of your soul nailed with a dagger, forever longing for the sanctuary where [the
Virgin of Guadalupe] greeted Juan Diego with a smile; you, Mexicans, who are happily
sent everywhere and will always be Mexicans, to feel and always feel in your heart the
enthusiastic heartbeats of those in Mexico who are determined to rebuild the heroic glory
of Mexico.1
Salvador M. Velasco spoke to a crowd of Mexicans in Los Angeles in October of 1937,
representing the Central Sinarquista Organizing Committee of León, Guanajuato. The committee
sent him to spread “oral propaganda” to the city’s residents.2 Not only that, he sought to draw the
explicit connection between Mexicans at home and Mexicans abroad in the United States.
California formerly belonged to Mexico, and he expressed that Mexicans there never completely
lost their ties to their homeland. Although Mexicans now resided in the United States, they had a
duty to ensure that Mexico was on the right course for the future, while not losing sight of the
past.
The Unión Nacional Sinarquista embodied nationalist, pro-Catholic, and anti-communist
sentiments both at home in Mexico and in the U.S. The movement stemmed from Central

“Que en California escuchais todavia el clamoreo de las campañas de nuestros pueblos vosotros, mexicanos, que
traeis clavada en mitad del alma, como un puñal, la nostalgia infinita del Santuario en que se espera la sonrisa que
acaricio a Juan Diego; vosotros, mexicanos que por estar felizmente condonados a ser en todas partes y para siempre
mexicanos, sentir y sentirse siempre en vuestras entrañas las palpitaciones entusiastas de los que en Mexico estamos
resueltos a reconstruir el heroico Blason Mexicano.” Salvador M. Velasco, “Speech on ‘Sinarquismo,” Los Angeles,
CA, October 30, 1937, Rómulo Munguía Papers, 1911-1980, Box 16, Folder 4, Benson Collection, UT Austin.
1

2

Velasco, “Speech on Sinarquismo.”

32

33
Mexico and sought to encompass all Mexicans. It held a holistic vision of the Mexican nation
within and beyond its borders. Mexicans existed in the American West prior to the U.S.
colonization of the region, however religious and political conditions uprooted Mexicans and
pushed even more northward. The Mexican Revolution, coupled with the two Cristero Wars,
forced Mexicans into exile in the north towards California and Texas. A significant portion of
those who fled were not in agreement with the left-leaning politics of the postrevolutionary
Mexican government, thus aligning them with counter-movements such as that of the UNS.
From the creation of transnational organizational structures in 1936 up to 1940, the UNS
worked towards creating a transnational community of Mexicans between Mexico and the U.S.
Individuals who were part of one of the precursor secret societies to the UNS, Las Legiones,
created and maintained ties with clergy and lay Catholic leaders in the NCWC, even as they
organized the group in May 1937. Within months of the movement’s founding in Mexico,
committees opened up in the U.S. Individuals like Velasco were instrumental in helping spread
the movement across the U.S. Speeches from Mexican nationals, paired with sinarquista
propaganda and regular correspondence, sustained organizational ties in the U.S. Pro-Catholic,
nationalist Mexicans built a community across the northern border right as the specter of fascism
was spreading internationally.
International fascism emerged as a growing force in the world during this period,
particularly in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Falangist Spain, and as a result, so did fear of
such politics in the U.S. Xenophobia contributed to this perceived threat as Americans grew
increasingly concerned about foreign political movements within the boundaries of the U.S.
Especially with the build-up to and start of World War II in 1939, the U.S. government perceived
these “fifth column” elements as undermining national security from within. American political
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leaders also drew the distinction between fascism and pan-Americanism – one as a detrimental
ultranationalist foreign force and the other as a forward-thinking U.S.-led policy to unite the
Americas. Fascism ran counter to the Good Neighbor Policy established by Franklin Delano
Roosevelt which was an effort to extend U.S. influence and build a coalition against fascism in
the Americas. Mexico too feared fascism in the late 1930s. It was the connection that the
Mexican political left made between sinarquismo and fascism that ended up influencing the U.S.
government. That connection started to make the UNS a subject of U.S. government
surveillance.
This chapter examines these two parallel processes between 1936 and 1940 – the spread
of Las Legiones and ultimately sinarquismo in the United States, as well as the rising alarm
around the spread of fascism. The expansion of a pro-Mexican nationalist organization like the
Unión Nacional Sinarquista in U.S. Southwestern cities and towns soon fed into the growing fear
of fascism in the country and would be a subject of suspicion of the United States government.
As the movement grew across national boundaries, so did the beginning of the opposition to it.
The Establishment of a Transnational Unión Nacional Sinarquista
The Unión Nacional Sinarquista emerged as a movement as part of the Mexican churchstate conflict of the 1920s and 1930s – a struggle over hearts and minds transcending borders.
Although it took place largely within the confines of Mexico’s boundaries, the conflict was never
limited solely to the Mexican nation. The same was the case with UNS. One of the precursor
secret societies to the movement, Las Legiones, had ties with the NCWC starting in 1936,
sustaining connections that existed between Mexican Catholic resistance and the institution from
the First Cristero War. The founding of the UNS in 1937 not only led to the establishment of the
organization’s platform, but the dissemination of it through the growth of committees on both
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sides of the U.S.-Mexican border. The UNS claimed a stake in Mexican communities throughout
the American Southwest. The formation of a transnational, conservative community strengthened
the movement against the Mexican government.
“Social Justice,” Las Legiones, and Their Relationship with the NCWC
In 1931, the Vatican took a stance on the state of world politics. The encyclical,
Quadragesimo Anno, was Pope Pius XI’s response to Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 circular letter,
Rerum Novarum, which discussed the situation of the world’s working classes, denouncing
socialism as well as unregulated capitalism by favoring both private ownership and labor
unions.3 Pius XI, like Leo XIII before him, also sought harmony between classes. Following the
effects of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, politics throughout the world were becoming
increasingly polarized. On the left, socialism and communism appealed to the disenfranchised
working class, whereas on the right, fascism sought to bring order to societies perceived to be in
disarray. Quadragesimo Anno took a middle ground between the two political extremes. Pius XI
articulated for a particular notion of “social justice” that he defined as “to each, therefore, must
be given his own share of goods, and the distribution of created goods” because of the “huge
disparity between the few exceedingly rich and the unnumbered propertyless, must be effectively
called back to and brought into conformity with the norms of the common good.”4 He
encouraged closing the gap between the wealthy and the poor through cooperation, navigating a
place in the middle of individualism and collectivism. Pius XI also made a point of defending
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private property, by arguing that when states bring private ownership into harmony with the
common good, they thereby secure private possessions and private property rights.5 He sought
up to uplift the masses, without completely undermining capitalism. Quadragesimo Anno left a
major influence on how Catholics worldwide would pursue a Christian social order.
Las Legiones represented this push for Pius XI’s “social justice” as a militant Catholic
organization. Manuel Romo de Alba, a teacher from Guadalajara, Jalisco founded the
organization in 1934. Similar to La U before it, Las Legiones served as an underground Catholic
movement based on cells. Romo de Alba sought early on to combine men and women together in
a giant hierarchical organization that he sought would resist the postrevlutionary Mexican state.
In doing so, he hoped that Las Legiones would restore the rights of the Catholic Church and
Catholics in Mexico. The movement brought in former Cristeros, as well as professionals who
were devout Catholics such as the rector of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
(National Autonomous University of Mexico or UNAM), Manuel Gómez Morín, who would
later form the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN or the National Action Party).6 Sharing the
sentiments of Quadragesimo Anno, Las Legiones’ goals were to restore “Christian social order”
and for freedom of thought, teaching, press, and assembly. Las Legiones had six action-oriented
strategies focused on government infiltration, a plan to generate “intense propaganda,” the spread
of home schools to counteract socialist schools, the infiltration of labor groups, aid to workers in
acquiring property, and the creation of a party run secretly by the organization. Of the six
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strategies, the party would concentrate on ending the church-state conflict, as well as promoting
the right to property, freedom of education, and a cooperative society.7 Although Las Legiones
was a clandestine group, it still sought to eventually enter the public political arena.
Las Legiones believed that Mexican Church-approved Catholic Action alone was not the
answer for Mexico. A 1936 document, the “Brief History of The Legionaries in Mexico,”
articulated that Mexico’s Catholic Action needed to be “wide and vigorous like that of the U.S.
with an adequate press, with her schools, colleges, and universities.” It proclaimed that “Catholic
Action, such as we are allowed to have is not enough to save Mexico. The enemy has large daily
newspapers, we have a few sheets of propaganda issued weekly; the enemy conveys his message
in the plaza, the theatre and by radio, Catholic Action must use the small reference room; the
enemy has thousands of public schools, Catholic Action must use small home schools.”8
According to Las Legiones, Catholic Action was more or less symbolic, but did not have real
power in Mexico.
From the beginning of Las Legiones – and even into the development of sinarquismo –
there existed a conflict between two factions. One faction led by Manuel Romo de Alba sought
for a hierarchical militant organization that would take Mexico towards integralism, bringing
together church and state as one. Catholicism would be fundamental to public law and public
policy. Salvador Abascal as the son of La U’s founder Adalberto Abascal, followed in the
ideological line of Romo de Alba. He was a lawyer from Morelia, Michoacán, involved in more
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militant Catholic activism over the course of the decade. He served briefly as a judge in Jalisco,
but became disillusioned with how the postrevolutionary Mexican state operated.9 Another
faction led by Antonio Santacruz aimed for a social-religious movement. Santacruz was a
chemical engineer in Mexico City, who owned various pharmaceutical laboratories and
properties in the city. He was entrenched in Catholicism and worked closely with the Mexican
Catholic Church.10 His latter faction won out – known as La Base (The Base) – and was initially
composed of a secret council of Santacruz, José Antonio Urquiza, and Gonzalo Campos. Urquiza
and Campos were cousins, close to the order of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), and members
of a prominent landowning family in Querétaro.11 Not only would the secret council evolve in
the coming years and transcend into the advent of sinarquismo, but so too would definitions of
what the movement would be.
In September 1936, Las Legiones’ representatives, brothers José Antonio and Carlos
Urquiza, and Salvador Abascal, arranged a meeting with the NCWC’s Reverend John J. Burke,
C.S.P. through the Catholic hierarchy in Mexico.12 The Archbishop of Morelia and Apostolic
Delegate to Mexico, Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, wrote an introduction letter on behalf of the
Urquiza brothers and Abascal to Burke, explaining in advance the purpose behind their visit.
Their group’s aim was “not to take up arms or overthrow the Government, but constrain it, by
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the means of the force of public opinion, to have the social justice law as a standard to meliorate
the proletarians.” Ruiz clarified that the men “are looking for the sympathy of Washington” and
“that they don’t want to mix Religion in politics, but cannot miss Religion as the ground of their
action.”13
The Urquiza brothers and Abascal ending up meeting with Burke and William F.
Montavon, director of the NCWC Legal Department, at the NCWC’s offices in Washington,
D.C. The three men explained the clandestine nature of the group and its focus on granting
Mexicans religious rights. They also talked about infiltrating official labor unions and the main
party of Mexico, the PNR, and their goal of replacing “Bolshevists” within these organizations.
The Mexican men presented themselves as having the moral support of Catholic bishops in
Mexico. Burke responded to the men, sharing that he sympathized with the movement, but
expressing some concerns. He disliked the clandestine nature of the organization, arguing that it
needed to be public to make a real difference in Mexico. Additionally, Burke believed that the
group was too Catholic, and that Las Legiones instead needed to be focused on patriotism,
standing for “Christian principles” against “Bolshevism.” The meeting ended by Burke stating
how he and Montavon “endeavored, in the past ten years, to make known the true conditions in
Mexico, and of how we have made a change in public opinion in the United States.”14 As Pius XI
opposed atheistic communism, Burke followed suit. The NCWC had shown its dedication to the
cause of Mexican Catholics in First Cristero War in supporting them against the
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postrevolutionary Mexican state, which it perceived as communist-minded. Burke aimed to assist
Las Legiones just as his organization had aided Cristeros in the past, particularly in shaping
public opinion in the U.S. in favor of the organization. Las Legiones agreed to send men once
every three months from then on to check in on the progress of the endeavor.
Later in 1936, Salvador Abascal traveled north and throughout the U.S.-Mexico
borderlands where he found support for Las Legiones in communities populated by Mexicans
who fled the religious violence in the Bajío because of the Cristero Wars. Cities he visited
included Matamoros, Brownsville, McAllen, Reynosa, Piedras Negras, Eagle Pass, Presidio,
Ciudad Juárez, El Paso, Cananea, Nogales, Mexicali, and Tijuana. He founded branches of the
movement in Los Angeles and Bakersfield, California where Mexicans “arrived to lend their
brave services.” Through this process, Abascal met, and would sustain contacts with Pedro
Villaseñor of Los Angeles, as well as Porfirio Rivera and José Cleofas Rojas in Bakersfield who
would later be involved in sinarquismo. These men migrated to the U.S. because of violence in
Mexico due to the First Cristero War. They previously supported the Cristero cause, and Las
Legiones was a natural extension of that movement. Villaseñor, in particular, migrated from
Coeno, Michoacán after being jailed for his pro-Church activities. The priest in his town wrote a
letter to the priest of La Iglesia de Nuestra Señora la Reina de los Ángeles (Our Lady Queen of
Angels Catholic Church) in Los Angeles at the center of the city’s Mexican community. He not
only set up a new life as a shopowner in Boyle Heights, but continued his pro-Catholic activism
as the founder of the Comité Popular de Defensa Mexicana (Popular Committee of Mexican
Defense).15 In addition to forming a relationship with the NCWC, Las Legiones knew that
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Mexicans at the literal edge of Mexican society in both the border region and within the U.S.
itself were invaluable not only to expanding, but strengthening their cause. Although much of the
church-state conflict took place in the Bajío, it was important for Las Legiones to acquire as
much support as it could receive to resist the Mexican state under Cárdenas.
Into 1937, the Urquiza brothers kept in constant contact with the NCWC, despite the
passing of Burke in October 1936 soon after they met. Reverend Michael Joseph Ready, who
was formerly assistant general secretary of the NCWC replaced Burke as general secretary,
however it was Montavon who would interface with the men. Montavon noted how the Urquiza
brothers’ plan of Catholic cooperation in Mexico appealed to Burke, and he wanted to maintain
that line of communication. The Urquiza brothers were fearful that any letters that they sent
would be censored by the United States Post Office Department, so they planned to visit again as
they had promised.16 The brothers simply sent Montavon news clippings of the situation in
Mexico, rather than letters detailing him of what was happening with the movement. As the
months passed, it appeared that a visit would no longer be possible as discussion began about
when Montavon would visit Mexico City instead. José Antonio reiterated how appreciative Las
Legiones was, expressing, “you mean to us a great deal, for you are a great moral support to
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us.” Indeed, the contact between the NCWC and Las Legiones did not wane, especially
17

between William F. Montavon and José Antonio Urquiza.
The Start of the UNS and Its Spread in the U.S. Southwest
While José Antonio Urquiza exchanged correspondence with Montavon during mid1937, he was in the midst of forming the public face of Las Legiones – the Unión Nacional
Sinarquista.18 Members of Las Legiones’ council decided that they did not want the movement to
divide nor disappear, so they decided to move out of the shadows, going public. Urquiza met in
secret with seven other leaders of Las Legiones including Abascal, José Trueba Olivares and
Manuel Zermeño in León, Guanajuato on May 23, 1937 and created the new, public
organization.19 The name “sinarquista” derived from the Ancient Greek word “synarchy”
meaning “with” and “authority,” demonstrating that the group was distinct from – and the
opposite of – anarchism.20 This new organization therefore set itself apart from the Mexican
state, and particularly that of President Lázaro Cárdenas, of whom its leadership perceived as not
legitimately ruling Mexico. The new movement was led publicly by José Trueba Olivares, yet
controlled by the now-sinarquista secret council headed by Antonio Santacruz.
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The following month on June 12, 1937, the UNS released its manifesto, putting forward
the group’s ideology as one focused on individual sacrifice on behalf of the Mexican nation. It
argued for the “restauration of the fundamental rights of each citizen, whose main purpose is the
salvation of the country.” Instead of an utopian society without laws, sinarquismo “wants a
society governed by a legitimate authority, coming from the free democratic activity of the
people.” The sinarquista “asks nothing for himself; he must always be willing to give himself to
any work that results in collective benefit.” The group asserted that it was instead positive,
advocating for freedom, and thus happiness and progress. The document closed with the
movement’s motto: “MOTHERLAND, JUSTICE, AND LIBERTY.”21 The manifesto
concentrated on dichotomies – the individual versus the nation, anarchy versus authority, and
self-interest versus the collective good. The organization created a one-page flyer distillation of
its manifesto that it disseminated to the public.22
Whereas the manifesto was quite general in content, the organization also released its
“Sixteen Basic Points” that honed in on specific issues. Among them, the UNS stated the
importance of each and every Mexican to save Mexico, ignoring class distinctions in favor of the
nation. The class distinctions that did exist needed to be narrowed, bridging the gap between rich
and poor. The nation, therefore, was above all else, especially communism and internationalism.
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The Mexican nation’s emblems also stood apart from those of communism and Nazism.
According to the UNS, there existed no political left nor political right, but only “Mexicans” and
“anti-Mexicans.” Mexico needed to value liberty of the individual, as well as economic liberty.
Ultimately, the Mexican government needed to implement the strong rule of law with the
Mexican people as the reason for which it stands.23 These points demonstrated where the UNS
placed themselves regarding issues affecting both Mexico and the world at the time. The
manifesto in combination with the sixteen points showed that the UNS as a new organization
signaled a break in the postrevolutionary Mexican church-state conflict. The UNS embraced
Mexican nationalism at its core identity, rather than Catholicism in contrast to Las Legiones and
other predecessor movements.
Prior influences – many of them transnational – were clear in the new movement,
especially in its manifesto and sixteen points. The UNS chose to be a movement rather than a
party. Although Las Legiones originally wanted to organize a public-facing party, the 1926 Ley
Reglamentaria or “Ley Calles” under Mexican President Calles prohibited religious parties.24
Additionally, UNS secret council leader Antonio Santacruz envisioned a social-religious and not
an explicitly political organization. The NCWC also had an impact on the UNS. The newlyfound movement embraced the suggestions that the NCWC’s Burke made to the Urquiza
brothers and Abascal while they were part of Las Legiones the prior year. Burke believed that
the group needed to be public to be successful, and he also commented that it was necessary for
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Las Legiones to downplay its Catholic identity in favor of anti-communist patriotism. The men
25

heeded his advice, and the documents reflected a whole-hearted embrace of nationalism as
counter to communism. The sinarquistas believed in a Mexican exceptionalism which placed
Mexico above and ahead of others. Communism represented an external force pushing for
international solidarity, in addition to an imposition of collective ownership on the economy.
Relating to economics, the influence of “social justice” as laid out in Pope Pius XI’s 1931
encyclical, Quadragesimo anno, was also evident. He supported the right to private property, as
well as the need to close the disparity between rich and poor in the world. The sinarquistas’
sixteen points echoed the sentiment, advocating for a regulated capitalism – without communism
– in Mexico that benefited all of its citizens.26 The UNS adopted ideals that would gain them
support and traction among Mexicans – both in Mexico and in the United States.
Shortly after the release of these documents on June 26, 1937, conservative-leaning San
Antonio-based La Prensa published a piece supporting the “El Partido Sinarquista” to its
Mexican readership in the Southwestern U.S. The article was one of the first that appeared in the
U.S. about the sinarquistas, and openly declared the UNS to be a political party that would rival
the PNR of President Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1940 presidential election. The piece contrasted the
sinarquistas with the PNR, which it identified with voter suppression and corruption. It
mentioned how it will be “the perfect party” as it was opposed to anarchism and sought for a
social equilibrium in Mexican society. La Prensa commented that if the sinarquistas succeed,
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they would benefit Mexico for the better. Although the UNS chose consciously not to be a
political party, La Prensa saw its political power and deemed it as such. The newspaper, one
notoriously against the postrevolutionary state in the 1920s and 1930s, reaffirmed its stance by
backing the UNS.
This new movement took hold within a matter of just a few months in the Southwestern
U.S. Right as the UNS established committees in the stronghold of Mexican Catholic resistance
in the cities of León, Querétaro, and Guadalajara in the Bajío, the movement opened up branches
in Los Angeles, California and El Paso, Texas.28 El Paso and its neighboring city, Ciudad Juárez,
already had Las Legiones chapters in their respective cities. Abascal had visited both of them as
part of a tour of northern Mexico and the borderlands the previous year. He was also
instrumental in establishing a chapter in Los Angeles at the same time. The new sinarquista
committees in the U.S. Southwest built off of prior support for Mexican Catholic resistance.
In 1937, the UNS inaugurated a committee in Los Angeles, a city that had long been a
destination of exile for Mexicans in the revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods. The Central
Organizing Committee of León, Guanajuato sent Salvador Velasco to speak on behalf of
sinarquismo in Los Angeles on October 30, 1937. In addition to drawing the connection between
Mexicans in the U.S. and Mexico as the same people, Velasco referred to many of the points
brought up in the group’s founding documents, critiquing the contemporary situation in Mexico.
Velasco complained about Mexico’s overreliance on capital from outside the nation. He believed
that a minority of people were exploiting the masses. Ultimately, he focused on how he believed
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that the Mexican government desired to be communist. Velasco emphasized communism as the
main force of evil in the world, conflating it with despotic leaders and the “international Jewry,”
building off anti-Semitic rhetoric commonplace among conservative Catholics at the time.
Through the leadership of men and the support of women, Velasco argued that sinarquismo
would bring to reality the ideals of order and social peace, promoting “liberty” instead of what he
perceived as communistic tyranny. He made a point to distinguish the UNS from German
Nazism and Italian Fascism, emphasizing that there was no connection between the two as
sinarquismo was intended by and for Mexicans.29 Velasco’s sinarquista propaganda had an
impact on the population, and two days later on November 1, the UNS established the California
Regional Organizing Committee in the city.30
Later in November 1937, sinarquismo arrived in the Texas-Chihuahua borderlands. Both
El Paso and Ciudad Juárez received an influx of Mexicans as a result of the Mexican Revolution,
and were defined by both those who supported and opposed the revolution, including the UNS.31
The sinarquistas held an assembly in front of 400 people at the Sociedad Ignacio Zaragoza in
Ciudad Juárez November 7. Samuel Abasolo essentially reiterated the talk Velasco gave earlier,
denouncing communism and advocating for “social justice.” He distanced the sinarquistas from
the doctrine of Nazi Germany, arguing that sinarquismo was “not fascist or Hitlerist, but a
supporter of a true democracy, with a strong and respected authority that guarantees the rights of
all.” The audience applauded him with enthusiasm, and the address ended with the Mexican
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national anthem. The meeting closed by addressing the desire of residents across the border in El
Paso to form a committee. The chief of the Juárez committee, Herminio Mendoza, discussed that
his committee was only provisional at the moment. Once the Juárez committee obtained
permanency, local sinarquista members would start work on an El Paso committee.32 Later in the
month on November 26, Mendoza hosted another assembly at the Sociedad Zaragoza,
announcing that the UNS central committee approved the El Paso committee as an offshoot of
the Juárez committee. The UNS leadership chose Martín Ramirez as president, Julian G.
Quintanar as secretary, and Miguel Salazar as treasurer.33 The Los Angeles and El Paso
committees served as the foundation for future expansion elsewhere in the U.S. in the years to
come.
Over the course of 1938, the UNS national committee headed now by president Manuel
Zermeño solidified its function and ideology. The sinarquista headquarters, now based in the
capital of Mexico City instead of León, disseminated a series of bulletins to its branches in
Mexico and the U.S. One bulletin explained the hierarchical structure of the organization that
was emerging on the ground. The national committee was at the core of the group, regional
committees existed in large cities representing Mexican states or broad areas of influence, and
local committees served smaller towns. The national committee was led by a president, whereas
the regional and local committees were led by chiefs.34 Another bulletin laid out the format of
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each meeting. The regional and local committee meetings met on a weekly basis and dealt with
themes introduced to them by the national committee. Each reunion needed to result in action
steps for the following week, as well as items to report back to the national level.35 Among a
variety of themes, these internal communications also discussed the need to establish affinity
groups among women and children, how the sinarquistas valued farmworkers, as well as
recapitulated the movement’s stance against communism, anarchism, and liberalism in favor of
want they saw as “social justice.”36 These bulletins ensured that all committees, including those
in the U.S., were in alignment with the national organization.
The California Regional Organizing Committee out of Los Angeles released its own
pamphlet to recruit potential members, focusing on beliefs and member incorporation. The
document featured the UNS manifesto, as well as a “sinarquista doctrine” reemphasizing prior
sentiments of nationalism, but honed in on the family as the fundamental base of Mexican
society. It explicitly mentioned religion, acknowledging that “sinarquismo considers religious
liberty as absolutely necessary not associated with persecutory acts or laws.” The Los Angeles
regional committee tailored the pamphlet to its residents noting that “Mexico should be the
Motherland loving of all of its children” including those outside of the country.37 In addition to
laying out sinarquista beliefs, the pamphlet articulated four steps to entering sinarquismo,
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encouraging involvement in smaller local committees in the state beyond Los Angeles. First, any
interested person needed to bring the brochure with them to a local organizing committee, and if
they did not understand any of the points, they needed to consult the chapter’s leadership.
Second, if the person had any doubts about entering, they should not join. Third, the interested
individual had to fill out a card requesting membership, as well as a letter describing why they
wanted to join. Fourth and lastly, the interested person needed to be Catholic, as well as have the
means to monetarily sustain the local committee. Beyond the local committees, the goal of the
California Regional Organizing Committee was to form committees wherever there existed
Mexicans in the state. Sub-committees could be created with a minimum of ten members and
with the approval of local committees. The regional committee also did not lose sight of women,
and like the nationally-disseminated bulletins, it emphasized that women were an indispensable
factor towards the three main goals of motherland, justice, and liberty.38
Not all of these communications were about structure and beliefs, as committees sought
to build solidarity among themselves across national boundaries as well. For example, around the
one-year anniversary of the organization in May and June 1938, chiefs from throughout Mexico
sent a variety of letters to the San Antonio sinarquista committee. These leaders from Nuevo
Laredo, Tamaulipas in the north to Mérida, Yucatán in the south wished the San Antonio
committee the prosperity on the organization’s first year anniversary. They commented on how it
was a year of learning, as well as an opportunity to reflect on the unity of all of the members of
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the movement. Leaders from the national committee also reached out, but were much more
direct in their communications. Sinarquista treasurer, Juan Ignacio Padilla, also celebrated the
anniversary, yet expressed concern over the movement’s lack of funds. He stressed the need for
fundraising to facilitate personal visits from the national committee, more publicity, as well as
the focus on building notoriety.40 It was the responsibility of the treasurer of the committee to
raise money and expand the organization’s presence.
Cultivating Support for Sinarquismo in the U.S.
While sinarquismo began to spread in the American Southwest in California and Texas,
José Antonio Urquiza continued to be in contact with the NCWC in D.C., still seeking to affect
public opinion in the U.S. regarding the situation in Mexico. Urquiza finally made a visit back to
the U.S. that he previously promised in September 1937. Luis María Martínez, former La U
founder and now Archbishop Elect of Mexico, wrote him an introduction letter conveying that
Urquiza “is an excellent Catholic, and labors with seriousness, self-denial, and intelligence in
favor of the Catholic Church and for the welfare of our country. For these reasons he is deserving
of our confidence and recommendation.”41 Upon his visit to Washington, D.C., William
Montavon accompanied Urquiza in meeting with Dr. Robert White, Dean of the Law School of
the Catholic University of America and part of the leadership of the American Legion. They
discussed a proposal to create a relationship between the sinarquistas and the American Legion
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in opposition to communism. The meeting proved unsuccessful, as White said that other such
anti-communist and anti-fascist organizations had reached out to the American Legion and that
his group turned down all of them.42 After Urquiza ended his visit, one setback was followed by
another, as Montavon notified NCWC General Secretary Ready that he just found out that
sinarquista meetings in Guanajuato were banned.43 Urquiza, however, did not lose sight of the
cause. He wrote Montavon in February 1938, affirming the sinarquista manifesto in writing that
“the people of Mexico are each day more clearly the enemy of the communist and fascist
government and I am sure that with all of their hearts they will aspire to freedom, the thing that
only a truly democratic government can obtain.”44 Despite the optimistic sentiment of the
message, communication between Urquiza and Montavon would drop off – for good.
José Antonio Urquiza, the principal contact with the NCWC for over a year, was killed
on April 11, 1938. Montavon received a telegram from his father, Manuel M. Urquiza,
expressing that, “Greatest sorrow my son Jose Antonio Urquiza was murdered Monday
afternoon.”45 Montavon sent his sympathies to Manuel, later finding out the details behind the
murder. Urquiza was returning from a visit to his farm in the state of Guanajuato. While heading
to the train station, Isidro Parra, a farmworker who most likely sympathized with the Mexican
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government, followed him. While he was waiting for a train in the town of Apaseo, Guanajuato
on his way back home to the state of Querétaro, Parra approached him and killed him at the
station. Parra was sent to trial, and when tried, the court sentenced Parra to thirty years in
prison.46 The death of José Antonio became a galvanizing moment for the sinarquistas, who
quickly portrayed him as a martyr for the movement.
With the passing of his son, Manuel ensured that the UNS had a new liaison with the
NCWC through his cousin and sinarquista secret leader Gonzalo Campos. Montavon became
acquainted with Campos via correspondence. Campos visited the NCWC’s headquarters in
September, and met with both Montavon and General Secretary Ready. He concerned himself
with picking up conversations about amplifying the sinarquista cause in the U.S. Campos asked
Montavon to keep him aware of the “attitude of informed opinion in the United States.” He
pushed for the “publicizing of definite facts for the purpose of informing public opinion” as
Campos believed that the NCWC “do whatever may be possible to assure that the Government
of the United States will assume a sympathetic attitude toward honorable right-acting men in
Mexico.”47 In his meeting with Ready, Campos reiterated the need for publicity in the U.S. as the
majority of news coming into the U.S. stemmed from the Mexican government itself. The
sinarquistas needed to work with someone already based in the U.S. who was sympathetic to the
movement. Campos initially suggested hiring San Antonio, Texas-based Rómulo Munguía. He
was a former employee of La Prensa, as well as a printer and publisher of a variety of
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publications for the Mexican community in the city including Actividades, El Pueblo, La Voz de
Mexico, and La Voz de la Parroquia. Munguía dedicated himself to engender pride within
Mexicans of their identity, while also building ties between Mexico and the U.S. After some
thought, Campos expressed concerns about Munguía’s ability of working with confidential
information, most likely because of his extensive connections. Instead, Campos chose Benigno
Silva to be the sinarquista correspondent in San Antonio.48
In the meantime, the NCWC utilized its own news agency, the N.C.W.C. News Service, to
follow through on its promise to shape public opinion of the sinarquistas in the U.S. One such
piece, titled “Synarchists, New Citizen Body, Seen as Hope in Mexico,” aimed to do just that.
The article portrayed the group as not inherently political or religious, but instead as a neutral
civic-minded organization. It argued that “the Synarchists are not a political party. They have no
religious test for membership. They are a voluntary association of Mexican citizens for the
defense of the political rights those Mexicans excluded from civic activities under the one-party
system as reorganized by President Cárdenas under Communist inspiration.”49 The piece focused
on how on the heels of President Cárdenas’ nationalization of petroleum in Mexico in March
1938, that he acquired more control over the country, particularly in the popular, labor, military,
and agrarian sectors.50 The U.S. Catholic Church through the NCWC sided with the UNS in
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opposing the petroleum nationalization, in contrast to the Mexican Catholic Church who
supported expropriation.51 Cárdenas’ control of power through various sectors throughout
Mexico was represented in the name change from the Partido Nacional Revolucionario to the
Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM or Party of the Mexican Revolution). The NCWC
article ultimately demonstrated the group’s appeal for sympathy, particularly from “social
justice”-minded Catholics fearful of the spread of communism around the world.
The sinarquistas’ “social justice” anti-communist message, such as this one, evoked
responses from the exact group it antagonized within its short duration as an organization. This
empowered Mexicans to defend the state against any perceived threats, such as the sinarquistas.
The El Paso Times reported in November 1938 how communists looted and burned the León,
Guanajuato offices of the organization. Luis Uranga, the chief of the UNS committee in El Paso,
issued a response to Governor Rafael Rangel of Guanajuato articulating that “members of this
anti-Communist Union, who had held a meeting in the building, were helpless to defend it when
police failed to render assistance.”52 Less than a year later in July 1939, San Antonio’s La Prensa
published an article on how sinarquistas were attacked once again, this time in Celaya,
Guanajuato. Sinarquistas arrived as a part of a political tour in the region, which evoked a
response from local farmworkers. They opened fire on the sinarquistas, and either killed or
injured roughly twenty-five of them. This time, Uranga wrote a letter to President Cárdenas,
claiming that “the sinarquista committee of El Paso respectfully, but energetically protests before
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you punishing those responsible for assassinating sinarquistas in Guanajuato.” The
53

sinarquistas’ message was not being received without pushback. However, the UNS still
benefited at least to some extent, allowing them more publicity, particularly in the U.S., as well
as cultivating a sentiment that those who were targeted were both defenseless and martyrs for the
sinarquista cause.
Sustained Growth in the U.S.
By 1940, the UNS experienced significant growth beyond the large urban centers of Los
Angeles and El Paso. Smaller, rural sinarquista committees had emerged both in Texas and in
California. These local committees fell under the supervision of the regional committees in the
two cities. Whereas the urban regional committees consisted of middle-class Mexicans such as
property owners and small businessmen, the rural committees were composed of lower class,
predominantly agricultural workers. This divide was similar to that of the composition of
committees in Mexico by this point, split between the capitals of states and rural towns on the
periphery.54 In the U.S., the committees were concentrated in particular regions of Texas and
California respectively.
The Texas committees operated along the U.S-Mexico border. One such committee
opened up in McAllen, Texas, led by Jesús María Dávila. He was an active member in the
Asociación Católica de la Juventud Mexicana (AJCM, or the Mexican Catholic Youth
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Association), having served as its vice president. Like Las Legiones, AJCM embodied the
Catholic resistance in Mexico, but with a focus on young adults. It was a natural transition for
someone like Dávila to move from an organization like AJCM to the UNS. In October 1939, he
represented the McAllen committee at the organization’s national convention in Mexico City.56
Dávila and McAllen sinarquistas even welcomed UNS president Manuel Zermeño to town as
part of a tour to Texas. The sinarquistas also established committees in the neighboring
communities of Weslaco and Edinburg within the Rio Grande Valley, as well as in Clint, Fabens,
and Fort Hancock closer to El Paso.57
Similarly in California, the UNS expanded into agricultural regions with significant
Mexican populations. The movement entered Fillmore in Ventura County, as well as the rural
Central Valley, starting local committees in Bakersfield and Fresno.58 The local sinarquista
committee of Fresno acted like a civic-minded community group. The local committee of the
UNS joined fellow “clubs” like the Edison Social Club, American Loyalty League, and the
Japanese Association in pledging donations towards uniforms for band members of Edison
Technical High School. The Fresno branch similarly worked alongside Mexican civic groups
such as Alizana Hispana Americana, Feminil Morelos, Sociedad Morelos, and the Unión
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Nacionalista Mexicana to prepare the festivities for the city’s Mexican Independence Day
celebration.59 Both in Texas and California, the UNS expanded its presence.
UNS secret leader Antonio Santacruz supported the spread of sinarquismo in the U.S.
Like José Antonio Urquiza and Gonzalo Campos, he sought the aid of the NCWC to sway hearts
and minds towards sinarquismo. Santacruz wrote to William Montavon’s secretary, Rita Walsh,
in the NCWC’s Legal Department, looking to promote the group, such as providing support in
publishing an advertisement in one of Hearst’s papers in the U.S.60 She agreed, and he provided
her with a detailed list of sinarquista activities in Texas. He described mass meetings with
enthusiastic audiences and entertainment in and around El Paso in Clint, Fort Hancock, Socorro,
and Ysleta. Santacruz also commented that possibilities for circulating the movement’s year-old
paper based out of Mexico City, El Sinarquista, were expanding.61 Growing audiences in these
local committees provided for a new base of readership, and thus new potential followers to the
movement.
The movement did indeed grow over the course of four years since the initial interaction
of Las Legiones’ members with the NCWC. The UNS not only created a formalized
organizational structure connecting members in both nations, but geographically extended north
of Mexico throughout the Southwestern U.S. Its original connections with the NCWC expanded
its presence in the U.S., if at least among the Mexican and Catholic communities. However, as
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the UNS grew, fascism was gaining strength in Europe, eventually leading to building suspicion
that the group was itself fascistic.
Increasing Anxiety around Fascism
The United States was firmly a world superpower in 1936 as fascist aggression was
growing in Europe. Either by or during that year, Fascist Italy under Mussolini invaded both
Libya and East Africa, Nazi Germany conquered the Rhineland, and the Spanish Civil War
began. The government under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt grew increasingly concerned
about threats within and beyond its borders, especially instigated by foreign nationals from
fascist countries on the rise. To the south, Mexico had a similar anxiety in relation to fascism,
particularly in relation to a foreign force overthrowing the Lázaro Cárdenas administration. The
Mexican political left led the fight against fascism and drew the connection between the
expanding UNS and international fascism. This, in turn, led the U.S. government to target the
movement as a foreign threat, laying the groundwork for surveillance of the movement.
Fear of Fascism in the United States
In the midst of increasing fascist-led hostilities in the second half of the 1930s, the U.S.
state feared that immigrants from these particular countries embodied the same extremist
politics. The concern was that foreign political organizations such as German Nazis, Italian
Fascists, and Soviet Communists would stir up racial, class, and religious prejudice to undermine
U.S. democracy and eventually overthrow the government. During this period, the Communist
Party USA did not call for toppling the state, and although the Italian American community had
the Sons of Italy and the Fascist League, they were disorganized. The closest internal threat
existed in the form of the German-American Bund. The Bund tapped into German nationalism,
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participated in paramilitary activities, and had a membership of 200,000 by 1937. Ernest
Hemingway’s 1938 book, The Fifth Column and the First Forty-Nine Stories, spread the term
which these groups would be associated with – the fifth column. Fifth columnists were groups
that could potentially subvert the security of the nation.63 The Roosevelt administration
monitored the activities of these political associations within its borders.
The president expressed concern about what took place beyond the nation’s boundaries as
well. On March 4, 1933, in his first inaugural speech as president, Roosevelt established that he
would “dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor,” one “who respects his
obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.”64
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy stemmed from this speech, seeking to reverse the
government’s stance on interventionism in Latin America, established under the Monroe
Doctrine of 1823 and reaffirmed by the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904. Years later at the Buenos
Aires Conference of 1936, Franklin Delano Roosevelt promoted not intervening in the region,
and instead supported Pan-Americanism which focused on the peaceful exchange of ideas,
culture, and education.65 The United States gave up military intervention in the hopes of market
access through diplomacy and economic alliance. Yet, the architect behind the Good Neighbor
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Policy was not Roosevelt, but rather Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Hull wanted to counteract
the possibility of German penetration of Latin America. He acknowledged Nazi aggression
taking place in Europe and stressed the importance of U.S.-Latin American cooperation.66
National cooperation contrasted greatly with extreme nationalism, and if the Roosevelt
administration was to combat fascism, the Good Neighbor Policy appeared to be its answer.
Beyond the federal government, American communists were also fearful about the spread
of fascism, and rightfully so, as fascism blatantly attacked communism. Earl Browder, Chairman
and General Secretary of the Communist Party USA, penned a 1938 pamphlet titled, A Message
to Catholics, calling on American Catholics to embrace communism rather than reject the
movement. He articulated his concern about how particular Catholic leaders attacked
communism, siding instead with fascism.67 Although the NCWC never condoned fascism,
prominent American Catholic leaders such as Reverend Fulton J. Sheen were vocally
conservative and anti-communist, and some such as Reverend Charles Coughlin publicly
supported fascism. The U.S. government was not the only entity in the country concerned about
an internal threat, as the American political left also thought that Catholics, who were
approximately one-sixth of the country’s population, would share the wrong sympathies.68
Fear of Fascism in Mexico
The situation in Mexico fed into American fears around the spread of fascism in the
world, and fascism did indeed appear to be a real threat in the country as it materialized through
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a couple of organizations. The Partido Fascista Mexicano (PFM or Mexican Fascist Party) was
the earliest such organization. Italian fascism influenced the party started by Gustavo Sáenz de
Sicilia in 1922, which openly opposed socialism. The party took adopted the Italian model to
some extent with a supreme leader in the form of Sáenz de Sicilia and an official paper, El
Fascista. However, the PFM diverged from Italian fascism as it was not a violent movement and
openly Catholic, affiliating with clerical groups.69 The party targeted the agrarian reform put
forward by the Constitution of 1917, particularly appealing to landowners in rural areas who
were afraid of their land being seized by the postrevolutionary government. They did not want
the indigenous landed class to have access to Mexican political and cultural life.70 Ultimately, the
PFM was short-lived, losing support to the range of other conservative, Catholic resistance
organizations at the time.
The Acción Revolucionaria Mexicanista (Revolutionary Mexicanist Action, known as the
Camisas Doradas or the Gold Shirts) was another example of a fascist movement in the country.
Nicolás Rodríguez Carrasco, a former general during the Mexican Revolution, started the
organization in 1933. The Camisas Doradas were called just that because members wore a gold
shirt worn with black pants and a palm hat. At meetings, they marched in formation according to
cavalry, infantry, and medical services, always led by a military-style leader.71 The group
embraced a very exclusive form of nationalism, utilizing violent tactics to attack communists and
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Jews in the country. For example, the Camisas Doradas forcefully entered and destroyed the
Communist Party headquarters in Mexico City in March 1935.72 Attacks such as this called
attention to the movement, and the Cárdenas administration forced Rodríguez Carrasco into exile
in the U.S. in 1936. Rodríguez Carrasco died in 1940, and the movement eventually dissolved in
the mid-1940s.
The Mexican labor movement was very much behind building panic around the spread of
fascism. The Confederación de Trabajadores de México, a coalition of Mexican labor unions,
emerged out of the former Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM or the Regional
Confederation of the Mexican Laborer) in 1936. Both sought to consolidate Mexican workers
under the postrevolutionary Mexican government. The latter CTM, however, was instrumental to
the Cárdenas administration’s base of support and led by labor leader Vicente Lombardo
Toledano. He was a a lawyer by training, influenced by Christian morality as well as socialism.
Lombardo Toledano rose to prominence in the CROM and the postrevolutionary Mexican
political machine.73 He established a variety of institutions to assert the CTM’s influence
including the periodicals América Latina, Futuro, El Popular, U.O., and the English-language
Mexican Labor News, as well as the Universidad Obrera de México (Workers’ University of
Mexico). All of these acted as mouthpieces to disseminate the sanctioned voice of labor, and
more broadly the government’s leftist stance in the late 1930s. As the Mexi can state
consolidated power over the years, especially under Cárdenas, it did not want to lose any
political ground.
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As a result, Lombardo Toledano’s CTM formed an Anti-Fascist Committee by 1937 to
stomp out the foreign political right in Mexico. The confederation sent out an invitation to its
constituency and beyond “to organize and coordinate the task of combatting fascist tendencies
wherever they appear.” Not only would the committee counteract international fascism via
disseminating propaganda, but “study fascist movements and their effects in other countries; to
investigate fascist activities, particularly those being carried on by foreign powers in Mexico.”74
The confederation highlighted in particular the Spanish fight against fascism in the form of the
Falange Española during the Spanish Civil War.75 The CTM galvanized a Mexican base, but
promoted the committee in its June 1937 Mexican Labor News for an English-speaking,
assumedly sympathetic audience of laborers and labor activists in the United States. Both the
CTM and its new committee took on the crusade against fascism.
The CTM’s Lombardo Toledano led the fight, claiming that there existed tangible alarm
aimed directly against the Mexican state. U.S. periodicals disseminated this threat in Mexico to
its readership across Mexico. In early August 1937, United Press disseminated an article in a
variety of American publications such as the Los Angeles Times about him claiming that a
“Fascist revolutionary plot” was taking place against President Cárdenas. He said that Mexico
was at “the center of international Fascist espionage” as stocks of arms and ammunitions were
supposedly compiled along the borders of Mexico both with Guatemala and the United States to
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take down the president. This prompted the president to investigate into attacks on the
government. Later in the month, The New York Times reported how Lombardo Toledano
received fascist pamphlets from unionists in the north of Mexico, confirming the notion that a
plot against the security of the country was taking place. By this point, however, Cárdenas
ordered the end of the investigations, stating that there was no real danger of activities against
the government. As a result, Lombardo Toledano had to fall in line with his message.77 Even
years later in June 1939, the newspaper highlighted how the labor leader obtained similar fascist
propaganda. This time around, the materials did not relate to a plot to overthrow the government,
but rather to sour increasingly positive relations between the administrations of U.S. President
Roosevelt and Mexican President Cárdenas. Lombardo Toledano carried on the CTM’s focus on
the Falange Española, noting how it is operating secretly within Mexico, spreading the influence
of Francisco Franco and totalitarianism.78 Lombardo Toledano’s accusations had been relatively
vague up to this point, without identifying a particular group or individuals involved in
espionage. The labor leader and his confederation were set on stirring up panic both in Mexico
and the U.S. about external fascist infiltration, and they were about to find their smoking gun.
The Sinarquistas as Fascist Foreign Agents?
The growth of the UNS by 1939 in Mexico and the U.S. led Lombardo Toledano’s CTM
to attack sinarquismo a month later in a July 14, 1939 article in its newspaper, El Popular, which
drew the connection between the sinarquistas and international fascism. Its title, “Nazi Agents
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Lead Sinarquismo in the Country,” fed into fears of fascist infiltration. The piece claimed that
two Germans – Oscar Hellmuth Schreiter and another with the last name Ritter (the first name
was not included) – were foreign provocateurs who were the true leaders of sinarquismo. A
notarial act written up by Manuel Villaseñor, Jr. was the source of this information. The
document reportedly showed that the sinarquistas were receiving weapons and ammunitions
from Hitler, acting through former Cristeros to assassinate farmworkers and ultimately take
down the Cárdenas administration. The article noted that in response the National Council of the
CTM would create a commission to investigate the activities of sinarquistas in Guanajuato and
Querétaro. It sought to expel the two men, create a manifesto denouncing their activities and
finally, “declare sinarquismo enemy of the proletariat andthe people.”79 The article perpetuated
the trope that Lombardo Toledano repeated since 1937 about how foreign fascists were
transporting arms to overthrow the Mexican state. Instead of the Falange Española, it
incriminated the sinarquistas as connected to the German-based Nazi Party. This particular El
Popular piece would leave a lasting impact on the sinarquistas for years to come, tying them
directly to international fascism.
This article labeling the sinarquistas as fascists drew the attention of the U.S.
government. The organization’s leadership believed that in cooperation with the NCWC that
they could direct U.S. government policy in their favor, particularly through the media. Instead,
in July 1939, the U.S. Embassy in Mexico was starting to become suspicious of the sinarquistas
as the group questioned the supremacy of the Cárdenas administration. U.S. Ambassador to
Mexico, Josephus Daniels, reported to Secretary of State Hull on a lecture that a member of the
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embassy attended regarding sinarquismo. The speech was titled “The Labor Movement in
Mexico” by César Ortiz, and hosted by The Committee on Cultural Relations with Latin
America. Daniels relayed verbatim to Hull what Ortiz articulated during his speech. He
communicated that the UNS was composed of individuals who fought against the Mexican
government during the First Cristero War. He also noted that it was an organization under the
direct control of the Catholic Church, first called the National Confederation of Catholic
Workers, a trade union operating in Guanajuato, that was expanding to other parts of Mexico.
Not only were the sinarquistas under the control of the Church, they were influenced by fascist
and Nazi elements, according to an investigation made by the CTM.80 Daniels expressed concern
about the sinarquistas on multiple fronts. He was worried how the sinarquistas threatened the
upcoming 1940 presidential election as the organization opposed Cárdenas, and would
undoubtedly oppose his successor as well. The U.S. ambassador also stressed the association of
the sinarquistas with international fascism, and attached the El Popular article in his
communications to Secretary Hull. If the UNS won the election, the organization could threaten
the security of the U.S.
The 1940 general election was a particularly contested moment in Mexican politics. The
PRM chose the Secretary of National Defense under President Cárdenas, Manuel Ávila
Camacho, to be the party’s choice for the presidential race. Juan Andreu Almazán served as his
opponent under the Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Nacional (PRUN or the
Revolutionary Party of National Unification), representing the rising tide of political
conservativism in Mexico who opposed the postrevolutionary state. Not only did the UNS
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emerge within the past several of years, but so did the Partido Acción Nacional in 1939, a
political party founded by former Las Legiones member Manuel Gómez Morín, similarly
founded by devout Catholics.81 The postrevolutionary government with its official party did not
want to lose any political ground, and a conservative candidate such as Almazán threatened its
hegemony.
Much of Mexico was anxious about the outcome of the 1940 presidential election, yet the
sinarquistas decided to opt out altogether. U.S. Ambassador Daniels’ concern came to naught.
The official stance of the UNS was not to support either the PRM’s Manuel Ávila Camacho nor
the politically conservative Juan Andreu Almazán for president. UNS president Manuel Zermeño
urged members at a rally in León, Guanajuato in May 1940 to “take no notice of the forthcoming
elections for president, congress and state governors which are nothing more than a pretext for an
armed revolution.” He believed that communists and the political left in Mexico would use the
election as an opportunity for a revolution, “seizing the opportunity to sow in Mexico anarchy
and terror, the only means by which they can triumph.”82 On July 7, 1940, Mexico voted and
Ávila Camacho won by a landslide, defeating Almazán – with no revolution. The ruling party
remained in power, nonetheless general unease about fascism and the sinarquistas did not
dissipate.83
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As the United States Department of State was beginning to monitor the UNS in Mexico,
the U.S. federal government also sought to do the same of sinarquista committees within its
national boundaries. The government was becoming increasingly wary of foreign threats over the
course of the late 1930s. In 1938, Congress passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)
in response. FARA required “foreign agents,” or individuals who supposedly held the interests of
another country in the U.S. in a political or semi-political capacity, to disclose their relationship
with a foreign organization, regularly registering and submitting evidence to the federal
government.84 A year later, Nazi Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, beginning World
War II. The U.S. doubled down on seeking out internal threats. Jerry Voorhis, a Democratic
Congressman from California, introduced a bill that required the registration of particular
organizations with the Attorney General. The organizations were any that the U.S. government
perceived as potentially at risk of overthrowing the government or representing a foreign power
through using violence.85 The Voorhis Act of 1940 passed, and weaponized registration during
the beginning of war abroad.
The federal government began investigating sinarquista committees in the U.S., requiring
them to adhere to the federal law, and they ended up following suit. The sinarquista
correspondent in San Antonio, Benigno Silva, corresponded with the NCWC’s William
Montavon in May 1940 about how representatives of the department approached individual
committees in Fabens and McAllen, Texas. Silva was unsure of whether they should register.
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However, Montavon advised that there was nothing to fear and that they should register. In the
86

following months, sinarquista committees like the one in El Paso, proudly proclaimed that their
registration. The El Paso Herald-Post boasted that the “Regional Sinarquista Committee of El
Paso now enjoys legal status in the United States.” The chief of the El Paso committee, José
Neder Quiñones, claimed that despite the need to register, that the UNS was an apolitical group
with more than half a million members in Mexico. Neder Quiñones even used registering as a
way to convince the public that the UNS was not fascistic. Although the group was not political,
it was ideological “dedicated to combatting Communism, Fascism, and Nazism.”87 Legality was
not only important, but so was legitimacy as an organization. By complying with U.S. law, the
sinarquistas demonstrated that they were not going to undermine it.
The national organization emphasized the legitimacy of the movement in the U.S. El
Sinarquista published a piece about the importance of registering with FARA. The paper
proclaimed how “our movement has been distinguished in every occasion for its discipline and in
respecting the law.” The article went on to assert that “we are a legitimate association, accepted
by the highest federal authority of the United States and our propaganda has in that country the
protection that our ideals claim.” The UNS interpreted complying with federal registration as
reinforcing the notion that the sinarquistas were assembling peacefully throughout the United
States.88 Sinarquista secret leader Antonio Santacruz even remarked that the federal government
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was buttressing the movement: “Immigration Agents and other Government officials have been
ordered to protect and help our members as far as they can.”89 Not only did the UNS respect U.S.
federal law, the U.S. government was in turn respectful of its members.
Despite Santacruz’s optimism, the U.S. government would not continue to respect the
sinarquistas. Building anxiety around fascism in the U.S. and Mexico compelled the respective
administrations to pin particular organizations as fascist. The sinarquistas with their ultranationalist rhetoric, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism made them a target. That combined
with their growing public image in the U.S. placed the UNS a subject of government scrutiny.
Conclusion
The Unión Nacional Sinarquista emerged as a result of years of sustained conflict
between the Mexican Catholic Church and the Mexican state, but which ultimately had a
transnational impact. American and Mexican Catholics forged bonds during and after the First
Cristero War, maintaining ties via U.S. Catholic institutions such as the NCWC. Las Legiones
found an ally in the NCWC, helping them gain a foothold in the U.S., especially with the
foundation of the UNS. The UNS built up itself as a highly structured movement, creating
committees first in cities with large Mexican populations, spreading out to more rural
communities. As the UNS grew in the late 1930s, so did panic around international fascism and
the threat of possible insubordination via foreigners. With increased publicity, the sinarquistas
drew the attention of the U.S. government, leading to surveillance of their activities.
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Despite growing attention towards the group, from 1940 to 1941, the UNS would reach
its height as a movement. The organization gained approximately half a million followers across
national boundaries with tens of thousands within the United States, growing beyond the
American Southwest into the Midwest. The UNS formed relationships with new conservative
American Catholics, supporting dissemination of the organization’s message. However, as the
movement grew, so did the opposition to it.

CHAPTER TWO
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SINARQUISTAS IN THE UNITED STATES – 1940-1941
“Finally, the nation of the North has awaken to interest in knowing about Sinarquismo,”
reported the editors of the October 9, 1941 edition of El Sinarquista. Felipe Vázquez Galván and
Alfonso Trueba proclaimed that, "we want to advertise that Sinarquismo is willing to inform the
Yankee nation of what it is, it is not inspired by any other purpose than that of being known to
all. With the same goodwill, we will inform all of the world.”1 The leadership of the Unión
Nacional Sinarquista knew that the movement was reaching the attention of United States
residents. American press – and as a result the United States government – grew an interest in the
organization. The editors asserted that the group was public, transparent, and not associated with
international fascism. This recognition – both positive and negative alike – signaled that the
Unión Nacional Sinarquista reached a place of prominence in the country.
Between the Mexican presidential election of Manuel Ávila Camacho in July 1940 and
the United States entry into World War II in December 1941, the movement established a
foothold in the U.S. With the new sinarquista leader Salvador Abascal, the organization further
facilitated the movement of its institutional culture across the U.S.-Mexican border. The group
increased distribution of its newspaper El Sinarquista, disseminated pamphlets purveying its

The article says that “Ultimamente se ha despertado en la nacion del Norte un vivo interes.” It goes on to explain
that “Advertimos que se el Sinarquismo esta dispuesto a informar a la nacion yanqui de lo que es, no lo inspira otro
fin que el de que sea conocido por todos. Con la misma buena voluntad informaremos a todo mundo.” “En Los
E.E.U.U. Hay Interes Por el Sinarquismo,” El Sinarquista, October 9, 1941.
1
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values, created new traditions such as songs, and solidified its stance on a variety of issues. The
sinarquistas established more committees in California and Texas, both in urban and rural
communities. The UNS also grew beyond just the two states, expanding into the Midwest
through setting up a committee in the greater Chicago region and selling its newspaper across the
region. The movement continued to benefit from its relationship with the National Catholic
Welfare Conference, all the while building new connections with conservative American
Catholics elsewhere in the country. No longer was sinarquismo an emerging transnational
movement during this period. Instead, it became a mainstay among conservative Mexicans in the
United States.
Especially as the UNS became an established movement, debate swirled around the
“true” political motives of the group. The left-wing Confederación de Trabajadores de México
continued its attack on what the confederation deemed to be a fascist movement. Media outlets in
the United States picked up on the notion that the group was fascist. Writers such as Betty Kirk
and Marshall Hail wrote publications conveying that not only was the movement a threat to
Mexico, it endangered the future of the United States by undermining the nation’s security. The
U.S. government’s Office of the Coordinator of Information built off of the media reports,
continuing state surveillance of the organization. The UNS and its supporters, however, pushed
back against accusations that it was associated with European fascism. Local sinarquista
committee leaders denounced the fascist label as did American Catholic leaders.
This chapter examines this high period of the Unión Nacional Sinarquista as the
movement both gained ground as well as faced growing backlash in the United States. Members
embraced sinarquismo, holding onto a particular Mexican identity not held by Mexican
Americans or the Mexican state. Amid the aftermath of the Mexican presidential election and the
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onset of world war, the sinarquistas did not seek to be Americans and they certainly did not want
reflect the leftism of the Mexican government. In this period of uncertainty, the Unión Nacional
Sinarquista under Abascal provided a sense of stability across borders through idealizing a
hierarchical and Catholic Mexico. This was an identity that the movement would not let go, even
among doubts of its organizational purpose.
Solidifying a Presence in the U.S. after the 1940 Mexican Election
By mid-1940, the Unión Nacional Sinarquista established a foothold in the American
Southwest among Mexicans. As World War II was picking up in Europe and amid changing
politics in the country, the group needed to recapitulate its ideology amongst its members in the
U.S. The movement’s presence demonstrated its purpose as a Mexican nationalist organization
rooted in Catholicism in a context of growing American nationalism and apprehension towards
political outsiders.
U.S.-Mexican Relations Following the 1940 Election
Just as Mexico elected a new president in July 1940, the United States was also at the
midst of a political crossroads. Europe descended into war less than a year before, and
Americans were awaiting the actions of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Roosevelt was
reaching the end of his second term as president, having served since 1933, and Americans
questioned whether or not he would serve a third term. At the Democratic National Convention
on July 19, 1940, Roosevelt won the nomination from the party. In accepting the nomination, he
embraced liberal ideas over dictatorship and force. In doing so, President Roosevelt made clear –
despite his administration’s neutral position in the war – a stance against fascism. This included
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fascism and perceived fascism in all forms, even “fifth columnists” perceived as sowing division
within the United States’ boundaries.2
Soon after the July 7, 1940 presidential election, American and Mexican leaders claimed
international cooperation between the two governments over any fifth column activities in the
respective countries. Lázaro Cárdenas still served as Mexico’s president until December. He
wanted to demonstrate to the United States that Mexico had fascism under control. This was
important, especially among accusations swirling around the fascist nature of failed presidential
candidate Juan Andreu Almazán and the sinarquistas, as well as the Camisas Doradas, Partido
Nacional de Salvación Pública (National Party of Public Salvation), and the Movimiento
Nacional de Vanguardia (National Vanguard Movement). Mexico was one of many nations that
partook in the Havana Conference of July 21-30, 1940, a meeting focused on defending the
Western Hemisphere against fascist intrusion.3 Cárdenas’ Secretary of the Interior, Ignacio
García Téllez, assured Americans that “the Mexican government had Nazi fifth column activities
under control and was cooperating closely with Washington in the spirit of the Havana
Conference for the preservation of American democracy.” García Téllez claimed that Mexican
foreign policy “was one of friendship toward the United States and opposition to all totalitarian
powers.”4
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The Roosevelt administration also sought for the two states to have an amicable
relationship with Cárdenas as long as he was still in power. The governments entered into secret
military talks starting in summer 1940. The U.S. military wanted to establish bases in Mexico in
Magdalena Bay, Territorio Sur de Baja California (the Southern Territory of Baja California and
known as Baja California Sur), as well as in Acapulco on Mexico’s southern Pacific Coast.
Mexican Ambassador to the U.S. Francisco Castillo Nájera and military officers responded by
asserting that Mexico could defend itself, without U.S. aid.5 Nonetheless, these talks solidified a
military relationship between the governments in preparation for war in the Western
Hemisphere, especially against a possible Japanese invasion.
This favorable relationship between the two carried over into the incoming presidency of
Manuel Ávila Camacho as well. Roosevelt ended up winning a third term in office in November
1940. His Vice President-elect Henry A. Wallace noted that “we have with Mexico, as with other
Latin-American countries, a concern in keeping peace in this hemisphere and primarily this
implies sound national economies and satisfactory trade relationships. If those are secured we
need not worry as to our ability to get along together and to keep out the Nazi and Fascist
influences we agree in detesting.”6 Wallace invoked Pan-Americanism through the Roosevelt
administration’s Good Neighbor Policy, advocating for a harmonious relationship based on
mutual economic benefit. Roosevelt sent Wallace to the December 1, 1940 inauguration of Ávila
Camacho, confirming his trust in the relationship between the U.S. and Mexican governments.7
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President-elect Ávila Camacho surprised both Mexicans and Americans alike with a
statement he made on religion in September 1940. Since the establishment of the 1917
Constitution and its anti-clerical articles limiting the presence of the Catholic Church in Mexico,
Mexican political leaders avoided overt statements regarding their faith. All of this changed
when Ávila Camacho declared that “I am a believer.” This confession of spirituality benefitted
him, as Mexican Catholics saw him as the less religious of the two presidential candidates as
compared to Juan Andreu Almazán.8 Ávila Camacho’s statement ended up swaying some
notable Catholic resistance leaders who in the past actively organized or fought against the
postrevolutionary Mexican government, which they previously saw as atheistic. Archbishop Luis
María Martínez Martínez, formerly of clandestine organization La U, remarked that Ávila
Camacho was “the only president who declared publicly and categorically that he is a Catholic.”
He argued that “liberty of conscience” would increase under the new president, and encouraged
Mexican Catholics to cooperate with his administration.9 Not only did Mexican Catholics find
Ávila Camacho’s faith and subsequent reaction by Mexican Catholic leaders notable, so too did
the U.S. government. A day after the Novedades piece came out, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico
Josephus Daniels notified Secretary of State Cordell Hull.10 The United States government was
invested in a mutually-beneficial relationship with Mexico. This relationship appeared to
materialize in the transition fromthe more radical President Cárdenas to themore moderate
President Ávila Camacho.
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Disseminating Ideology Across the U.S.-Mexico Border
Within this rapidly-changing context, the UNS utilized the opportunity to emphasize its
ideology and did so via the dissemination of published materials across the U.S.-Mexico Border.
Salvador Abascal was largely behind this reinvigoration of the group’s platform when he
assumed the role of president of the sinarquistas a month after the Mexican presidential election.
Abascal helped found the movement in 1937, but took a role on the sidelines until 1940, where
he would push the UNS and its ideology into the forefront. Abascal was a controversial figure.
The ex-Las Legiones leader was charismatic and a great orator, however he was also more
fanatical and doctrinal than past sinarquista president, Manuel Zermeño. Abascal and Antonio
Santacruz, both in the upper leadership of the movement, had differing views and their own
respective factions that stemmed from conflict originating during Las Legiones. Whereas
Abascal was more political and in opposition to the Mexican government generally regardless of
who was president (whether Cárdenas or Ávila Camacho), Santacruz was more religiouslyminded, moderate, and willing to compromise. From 1940 to 1941, Abascal shifted the direction
of the organization, albeit briefly, from Santacruz’s vision of a social-religious movement
towards an overtly political one advocating for a Christian social order. He emphasized
hierarchy, discipline, and paramilitarism.11 The UNS became even more of a top-down
movement than it already was.
The head of the UNS developed a variety of publicity materials at this time to be
distributed far and wide. The organization expanded the distribution of its one-year-old
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periodical, El Sinarquista, to subscribers across California and Texas, as well as sold at
newsstands in these respective states.12 Sinarquismo had an audience through those invested in
politics, as well as religion. Not only did Mexicans interested in the movement purchase El
Sinarquista, they bought sinarquista publications such as José Trinidad Cervantes’ Alba-Patria.
Cervantes’ work featured a variety of sinarquista poems praising the group.13 These publications
circulated the organization’s ideas years after its founding. In 1940, they disseminated ideas
around martyrdom, gender, and revolution, strengthening sinarquista identity among members on
both sides of the border.
Among the movement’s beliefs, the group fully embraced the notion of martyrdom. José
Antonio Urquiza’s unexpected death in 1938 ushered in a practice of treating anyone who died
on behalf of sinarquismo as a martyr. Immediately following the 1940 election, the editors of El
Sinarquista published a full-page spread on the front of the newspaper that proudly declared “to
remember the blood of the martyrs is to fully fight for justice.”14 The paper was honoring two
sinarquistas who died in Celaya, Guanajuato July of the previous year in a clash between
sinarquistas and farmworkers.15 Of them, one was Gonzalo Aguilar, “whose example will lead
the youth to continue the goal that he gave up with his sacrifice,” and the other was María Teresa
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Bustos, “whose blood is the flower of eternal blessing for Mexico.” Both of them were
16

examples for living sinarquistas to carry on the struggle which they gave their lives for. The
membership of two sinarquista committees in Texas even decided rename themselves after
Bustos. McAllen sinarquistas named their committee after “Maria Teresa Bustos” whereas the
women’s branch of the El Paso committee took on the name “Grupo Teresa Bustos.”17
The commemoration of martyrs did not stop there as the UNS also actively began a
donation campaign in 1940, asking committees to raise funds for the families of the martyred.
Each edition of El Sinarquista featured the names of those “fallen” in the Bajío such as Emilio
Cruz, Ramón Mendez, Constantino Mendoza, Martín Peña, Inocencio de la Rosa, Esteban
Saldaña, and Victor Villanueva. Accompanying the names in each copy of the paper was a list
from regional and local committees in the Bajío and elsewhere in Mexico, as well as from the
U.S that gave funds. Donations came from Bakersfield, Fillmore, Fresno, Los Angeles, and
Pittsburg in California and Clint, Edinburg, Fabens, Fort Hancock, and Weslaco in Texas. Along
with the names of the committees, the paper also listed how much they gave, and the chapters in
the U.S. almost always gave more money those in Mexico, in relation to the capital that
sinarquistas had available.18 Donations not only represented mobilization on behalf of the
group’s martyrs, they demonstrated the vastness of its reach across the U.S.-Mexican Border.
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The organization built a culture of martyrdom that could be exported through media as
well as through music. Also in 1940, the UNS released a book titled Canciones y Corridos
Sinarquistas. A song titled “Faith, Blood, Victory” contained lyrics including “Motherland, for
your honors, the best fell: their precious blood was of freedom. Their remains, lying down: but
their souls present in the fighting positions are always there. – The fallen! – Present!” Other
songs had a particular emphasis on individuals who died on behalf of the movement such as the
“Ballad of Gonzalo Aguilar,” the “Ballad of Juan Martín y Celaya,” and the “Ballad of Martín
Peña.” The ballad about Aguilar in particular explained that “There the evil communists killed
this Man. Gonzalo Aguilar died: he already fulfilled his mission. He had given his country, soul,
life, and heart.”19 Although the movement claimed itself to be nonviolent, it honored dying on
behalf of a valiant cause – for sinarquismo by advocating on behalf of freedom and Mexico, and
against communism. This music carried on the notion of martyrdom through song, utilizing
another medium to spread a message to sinarquistas and potential supporters in the U.S.
Beyond martyrdom, another important aspect of ideology that the UNS focused on during
this period was the role of women. Sinarquista leadership emphasized as early as 1938 in its
bulletins to committees that women were essential to the movement, despite placed within a
hierarchy.20 They held a belief in a traditional family structure with a man at its head, a wife as
support, and children at the bottom. Only men could be committee chiefs and chapters were
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dominated by men. Women were to aid men in their endeavors. They did so through the creation
of women’s groups like the Bustos branch of the El Paso committee.
As El Sinarquista served as the main organ of disseminating sinarquista values, the paper
reiterated these prescribed gender roles for women. One instance of this was when the newspaper
laid out the “Ten Norms of Life” for the sinarquista woman in its August 22 edition. As part of
the organizational commitment to the collective over the individual, the piece emphasized the
necessity of women to be first and foremost dedicated to God, and then Mexico. It also continued
the notion of women supporting men in their struggle for the nation. Sinarquista women were to
“cultivate in the heart of men and boys a grand love of the motherland” and that they should
“push and encourage men to fight.” They could not rest “until all of their family members
participated in the sinarquista section” and could not support “cowardness nor laziness.”21 El
Sinarquista restated the movement’s stance on women. They had a role to place in sinarquismo,
albeit on the sidelines.
On the heels of the July presidential election, the UNS also utilized El Sinarquista to
make its viewpoint known on the group’s stance on the possibility of another revolution in
Mexico. Prior to the election, rumors circulated that the sinarquistas would undermine the
process by revolting. Following the vote, no revolt occurred and in fact, the organization
promoted a slogan of “no revolution” across the front page of El Sinarquista in August 22, 1940.
The newspaper’s editors wanted to show that the fears of revolution had come to naught. They
published a piece by new sinarquista president, Salvador Abascal, denouncing revolution in
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favor of “organization.” He explained that Mexico did not need a regime change, but rather order
– in reference to the group’s name. There needed to be the organization of bodies as soldiers
under the hierarchy of chiefs. This structure, Abascal predicted, would expand to the point where
there would only be sinarquistas and non-sinarquistas. As such, sinarquismo would ultimately
overtake the Mexican state through organization.22 Therefore, committee structure – whether in
the Mexico or the U.S. – was so important. Order was key. While the UNS was already a
hierarchical group, Abascal’s new role as sinarquista president marked a period of discipline. He
ensured that ideology unified the movement’s members.
Transnational Organizing, Support, and Backlash for Sinarquismo at the End of 1940
The national committee of the UNS in Mexico City with Salvador Abascal at its helm
invited sinarquistas from the U.S. to partake in its second annual meeting from November 3 to 9,
1940. Twenty-five Mexican states, as well as California and Texas, had representation at the
conference. It was the first national conference to have representatives from the U.S. The 470
sinarquistas reflected some of the organization’s half a million members across both countries.
At the conference, the UNS celebrated its exponential growth.23 In addition to discussing internal
affairs of the movement, the conference also featured talks by movement leaders such as José
Trueba Olivares, Manuel Zermeño, Alfonso Trueba, Manuel Torres Bueno, and Abascal. Among
the speeches, Abascal reiterated the group’s nationalist rhetoric, pushing members to reject
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“Anglo and Protestant penetration” on the customs of Mexico, instead reviving and
strengthening the “beautiful national and regional traditions.”24 He expressed a growing
organizational fear of the U.S. and its cultural influence upon Mexico and Mexicans. Even as
members were based in the country to the north, they were to resist any encroachment on their
Mexican identity. The meeting was a celebration of who the UNS was and what it meant to be a
sinarquista.
The American Catholic press highlighted such actions of the UNS, applauding their
efforts. In Kansas, the Catholic Diocese of Wichita’s newspaper, The Catholic Advance,
published its support for Mexican women’s anti-leftist activism. The paper honed in on their
involvement in the recent national sinarquista congress, and how the movement dedicated to seek
out and destroy communism.25 In Washington, D.C., the NCWC continued its unconditional
support of the UNS in the United States through its Press Department and its syndicated
newspaper, the N.C.W.C. News Service. The NCWC Press Department’s Charles Betico asserted
the importance of sinarquismo and how it sought to develop civic education “without anarchy” in
Mexico. He also highlighted the movement’s re-embrace of Catholicism under Abascal.26 The
group originally shed its religious label in 1937, taking it up again three years later in 1940. The
American Catholic press was invested in seeing through the success of its Catholic brethren by
promoting the UNS cause in the U.S.
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Just as the UNS’s supporters utilized the press to buttress the group during this time, the
movement similarly had its detractors, especially in the form of the Confederación de
Trabajadores de México, who used the same tactics as in the past to bring it down. A year after
the CTM drew the connection between the UNS and fascism, the labor confederation continued
to emphasize the relationship between the two. It’s English-language publication, Mexican Labor
News, aimed at swaying hearts and minds of Americans. The CTM in its November 14 edition
called out sinarquismo, describing how as “Franco Fascism [is] increasing its propaganda in
Latin-America, Mexican labor is turning its attention to the most likely conveyor of the Spanish
brand of fascism in this country.” According to the publication, “they resemble the so-called
‘Social Justice’ movement of Father Coughlin in the United States, altho the Sinarchist leaders
are considerably smoother.”27 More than anything, the CTM pushed forward the notion that the
sinarquistas were not rooted in the Mexican nation, but were instead fifth columnists working on
behalf of fascism in either its Spanish or U.S. iteration.
Sinarquismo at Its Height in the U.S. in 1941
In 1941, the UNS grew on multiple fronts within the U.S., maintaining the nationalist
cause among Mexican expatriates.28 The movement experienced widespread growth of the UNS
across the entire state of California, along the Texas borderlands, and into the Chicago region.
The majority of these that emerged during this time were in smaller, rural areas. Outside of the
committees themselves, sinarquismo grew in terms of reputation. The readership of El
Sinarquista took off both in and beyond where the committees existed. The organization
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distributed the paper and its pamphlets to wherever there were sizeable populations of Mexicans
in the U.S. Through both a membership of tens of thousands of members and the dispersal of its
ideas on a mass scale, sinarquismo sought to make a name of itself in the country on its own
terms.
The UNS distributed a new pamphlet to its committees throughout Mexico and U.S. in
1941. This booklet aimed at committee chiefs, titled Folleto Para Jefes (Pamphlet for Chiefs)
demonstrated Abascal’s desire for hierarchy and structure within the organization as a whole. In
addition to reiterating the movement’s manifesto and sixteen points, the brochure provided a
series of instructions for committee chiefs to follow. It reinforced the role of local or municipal
committees below regional committees, and that both existed underneath the authority of the
national committee based in Mexico City. Each local committee needed to consist of a chief,
with various other positions for note-taking, propaganda, finances, organization, as well as laying
out youth and women’s branches. The local chief oversaw the mobilization of members as if they
were soldiers, with them broken up into quadrants, centuries, and companies. The brochure also
emphasized how sinarquismo was fulfilling the Mexican Constitution – and thus not in full
opposition to the postrevolutionary state. Lastly, there was a list of all of the sinarquistas who
died on behalf of the movement at the very end of the pamphlet, reiterating its veneration of
martyrdom.29 Each and every committee chief possessed the booklet, and thus organizational
structure in U.S. chapters followed suit.
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The UNS also disseminated another pamphlet in 1941, yet this one was less about
organization and instead about portraying its vision of Mexico approximately twenty years in the
future. The former chief of the El Paso regional committee, José Neder Quiñones, left the city
and moved to Mexico’s capital where the UNS national committee appointed him to be the
official distributor of the group’s pamphlet, México en 1960 (Mexico in 1960). The document
was a fictional work imagining a sinarquista-controlled nation. In the pamphlet, it explained that
Mexico “is dictated by the enthusiasm of those who participated in the saving action and has
seen the evolution from the anarchic state to the synarchist state.”30 No longer was there a
postrevolutionary Mexican state, but the new Mexican government was portrayed in Abascal’s
vision as top-down and authoritarian following an integralist Christian social order. This utopia
was the vision of Salvador Abascal and Manuel Romo de Alba before him as the booklet detailed
an organized, hierarchical society. Neder Quiñones distributed México en 1960 far and wide
across Mexico and the U.S., including back home in El Paso. New committee chief for the city,
José Soto, noted how “it forecasts a better state of affairs for Mexicans in general 19 years from
now.”31
While the UNS disseminated its ideas via its publications across the U.S., it continued to
expand in California. The UNS established local committees throughout Southern California
branching off of the regional committee in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles branch continued to be
quite active under the leadership of Pedro Villaseñor, former Las Legiones member who ran the
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committee since 1937. Sinarquistas regularly met at Townsend Hall in Boyle Heights, a
neighborhood with a population of Mexicans living alongside people of Japanese and Jewish
descent.32 The Los Angeles regional committee established chapters in the environs in and
surrounding the city in Azuza, Claremont, La Verne, Ontario, Pacoima, Pomona, San
Bernardino, San Fernando, Van Nuys, and Watts. A little farther afield, the Southern California
regional committee established a local committee in the agricultural community of Oxnard in
Ventura County. El Sinarquista regularly published reports from these committees and others in
the U.S. and Mexican states under the headline of “News from All of the Republic.”33 Although
not part of the Mexican Republic, the paper portrayed these Southern Californian members as
contributing to their country as much as those within Mexico were.
In Northern California, the UNS set up a new regional committee with headquarters in
Bakersfield to represent the region, stretching up north through the Central Valley into the San
Francisco Bay Area. Porfirio Rivera, formerly of Las Legiones, led the Bakersfield regional
committee where he directed efforts to consistently create new local committees. Although
Fresno already had a committee, Rivera worked to established chapters in Antioch, Benicia,
Pittsburg, and San Francisco, working to set up more in Bellavista and Stockton. These
committee meetings typically included assemblies and sometimes showed films depicting
sinarquista activities in Mexico. El Sinarquista reported a meeting in Richmond in late 1941
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between the Bay Area chiefs where “they talked with love of the distant motherland. And they
proved that wherever there is a Mexican heart, there is Sinarquismo.”34
Such was the case in Fresno where sinarquismo existed for over a year. The local
committee’s chief, Isaias Torres, sustained Mexican nationalism and identity through civic
participation and a commitment to the UNS. After a successful Mexican Independence Day
celebration in the city in September 1940, the organizations that hosted the event formed the
Mexican Patriotic Committee. Torres, alongside Tirso Romo, served as the sinarquista
representatives on the planning committee, working alongside the other members to organize
Fresno’s Cinco de Mayo Celebration. In April, the membership of the committee voted Torres to
be head of the group.35 The committee organized a successful celebration in Fresno in May.
Beyond his role on the Mexican Patriotic Committee, a month later Torres traveled to Mexico
where he attended two sinarquista conventions, as well as took a 6,000-mile trip throughout the
country, examining living and working conditions.36 The Fresno committee under Torres’
leadership concerned itself with Mexicans both on the local and transnational level.
Outside of California, the UNS maintained an active presence in Texas with El Paso as its
center. El Paso served as the regional committee for the state, with local branches clustering
around the city in Clint, Fabens, Fort Hancock, and Yselta. In the Rio Grande Valley,
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committees, McAllen was the center of the sinarquista community, flanked by Edinburg,
Mission, and Weslaco. By 1941, the group was unable to sustain the committee in San Antonio
despite its large Mexican population.
The Texas chapters in the Rio Grande Valley around McAllen were particularly active.
The McAllen “María Teresa Bustos” committee under the leadership of Jesús María Dávila met
weekly. Once a month, a regional meeting took place in McAllen with groups such as Edinburg,
Donna, and Milla.37 As Fresno sinarquistas worked to commemorate Mexican holidays, so too
did those in the McAllen committee as they honored Día de la Bandera (Flag Day) at the Sam
Houston School Auditorium. Organizers scheduled a two-day program from February 23 to 24,
1941, to accommodate the schedule of workers in the region. Among other speakers, Dávila,
gave a brief history on the Mexican flag.38 As with sinarquistas in other parts of the country,
those in the Rio Grande Valley drew a connection between themselves and Mexico.
As early as February 1941, the UNS moved away from having committees solely in the
southwestern U.S. as it established a presence within the pre-existing Mexican community in the
area in and around the city of Chicago.39 Mexicans arrived to the region beginning during the
Mexican Revolution of the 1910s as a result of railroad networks connecting Mexico with the
Midwest. Initially migrants came predominantly from Mexico City and northwestern Mexico,
but by the 1930s, especially with the upheaval of the First Cristero War, most were arriving from
the Bajío. Labor agencies enlisted Mexicans in Texas to work in agriculture in the Midwest.
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However, upon arrival to the metropolitan region, many decided instead to work in higherpaying industrial and manufacturing jobs such as the railroad, steel production, and meat
packing. Most ended up in cities such as Chicago and Aurora, Illinois as well as East Chicago,
Indiana.40
Mexicans brought with them their Catholic faith and houses of worship worked to serve
this community. The Congregation of Missionaries, Sons of the Immaculate Heart of the Blessed
Virgin Mary (the Claretians) established Our Lady of Guadalupe Church on the South Side of
Chicago in 1924 as the first Spanish-speaking parish in the city in 1924 for Mexicans. Reverend
James Tort, C.M.F. became the pastor there, as well as worked to convert an old German
Catholic Church – St. Francis of Assisi on the Near West Side – into a Mexican-serving church
in 1926. St. Francis became the center of the Mexican Catholic community in the
neighborhood.41 Aurora’s Mexican community formed in large part because of the railroad, both
for transportation to the Midwest and for work there. The Mexican Catholic community either
attended mass at a chapel at the Eola boxcar camp or in the city at St. Therese Church.42 In East
Chicago, Mexicans uprooted by the religious conflict came to find a home in the its very own
Our Lady of Guadalupe Church in 1925.43 By the 1940s, ex-Cristeros and devout Catholics from
the Bajío in these respective parts of the region were attracted to what the UNS offered. The
40
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movement allowed Mexicans in the Chicago area a connection to their home country although
they were far from home.
As early as February 1941, sinarquismo established a presence in and around the city of
Chicago. For example, Victoriano de León, a Mexican migrant and billiard hall owner wrote a
letter to the editors of the UNS publication, El Sinarquista, describing the rising demand for the
paper among his customers. He described that “it is impossible for my compatriots to buy their
newspaper, due to their shifts and working hours. For this reason, I ask you to tell me at what
conditions and prices I can sell El Sinarquista to Mexicans who want it.” The editors responded,
explaining that they would supply papers to De León, noting that “where there is a Mexican,
there will be a sinarquista.” De León and others soon started disseminating the publication
among communities of Mexican migrants.44 Organizational leadership expressed excitement in
building sinarquismo in the region. Although conservative Mexicans were far from their home
country, they sought to remain connected with like-minded individuals through the periodical –
and through the movement.
Sinarquismo started early in the year in Chicagoland with the distribution of El
Sinarquista and solidified in the form of a committee later in the year. In May, El Sinarquista
discussed work in the region to form a committee, hoping “in that great city, like others in the
United States, they do all that can be done to unite under the flags of Sinarquismo for [our]
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banished compatriots.” The editors of the newspaper in Mexico City, emphasized how
45

Mexicans were displaced from their country because of the church-state conflict and forced to
like in places like Chicago as a result. The first committee to emerge in the area was in Indiana
Harbor (part of East Chicago) in August. Jesús Acevedo, María Dolores Acevedo, Francisco
Alvarez, Wenceslao Cortés, Ester Flores, Manuel Reyes, Nicolás Salvador, Elias Valdés, Eloísa
Valdés, and Luis Verduzco came together in forming the sinarquista chapter. By August 15, the
group had fifteen members, was meeting weekly, and was working to bring in more people from
Indiana Harbor and the surrounding region.46 The sinarquista local committee in Indiana Harbor
would be instrumental in mapping the expansion of the UNS committees in Chicago and Aurora.
Elsewhere in the Midwest, Frank Gross, a lay Catholic residing in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
would delve into the world of sinarquismo. The Mexican community in the city grew starting in
in the 1920s to work in the leather and steel industries.47 White parishioners of Holy Trinity
Church alongside with the local branch of the Knights of Columbus organized an outreach to
Mexican Catholics in 1924. Gross was a parishioner of German descent and an active member of
both the Knights and the Society of St. Vincent de Paul. He had traveled throughout Latin
America in his work as an accountant and banker. Through the outreach campaign of Holy
Trinity Church and the Knights, Gross began a connection with the Mexican Catholic
community that grew in the following years. With the beginning of the First Cristero War in
1926, Gross was instrumental in working alongside the community to establish the Mexican
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Mission Chapel of Our Lady of Guadalupe to demonstrate the need to guard and support
Catholicism in both the U.S. and Mexico.48 By the 1940s, he continued to be working alongside
Mexican Catholics so he wanted to know of the contemporary situation in the country. In
February 1941, Gross reached out to a friend of his, Carlos Fernández, a former employee at
Harley-Davidson Motorcycles in Milwaukee, who used to reside and give talks to Mexican
Catholics in the city, but had since returned to Mexico. Upon his return to Mexico, Fernández
became involved in sinarquismo as a devout Catholic, as well as a landowner opposed to
Mexican government-instituted land reform.49 The information that Fernández shared regarding
the UNS and how Gross could help would send him down a path in aiding the sinarquistas for
the next eight years, garnering him the nickname of “Sinarquista Gringo.”50
Fernández responded to Gross’ original inquiry, sending him a range of news articles on
the labor situation in Mexico, but ultimately emphasized sinarquismo. He described the
movement and how NCWC Legal Department Director William Montavon aided the group in
registering for the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Fernández noted that despites accusations
that the UNS was Nazi or fascist, it functioned freely in the U.S. Southwest as a federallyregistered organization.51 The main reason why Fernández was describing sinarquista activities
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in the U.S. was because he wanted Gross to disseminate El Sinarquista, as well as sinarquismo
more broadly, in Milwaukee. He explained that “we want you to help us place a few
subscriptions, particularly among the paisanos and at least one for the ‘hemeroteca’ of the
Mexican Mission. I will start by asking the editors to mail some sample numbers.” Fernández
wanted to see sinarquismo come to Milwaukee, reiterating the sinarquista motto for recruiting
new members: “where there is a Mexican, there will be a sinarquista.”52 Gross agreed and in
doing so, he maintained in contact with Fernández over building a sinarquista committee in the
city, expanding the reach of the UNS.
One topic that the two discussed in the following months was over who could be a
sinarquista member in Milwaukee. Gross inquired about the extent to which he could be
involved in the Milwaukee local committee. Fernández responded by not wanting Gross to be
directly involved, instead having him to encourage involvement of the Mexican population itself.
Gross could partake indirectly, facilitating involvement in the organization as a sympathizer and
extraofficial promoter of the movement. All he had to do was share El Sinarquista with
Mexicans in the city, observe their reactions, and choose whoever was the most able or
enthusiastic to be the local sinarquista leader.53
Tied to the conversation over membership in Milwaukee was a discussion about the
sinarquistas’ particular Mexican identity, especially within the context of the U.S. Fernández
explained that Mexico had not been the motherland, but rather a “cruel stepmother” to Mexican
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migrants. The government’s revolutionary ideas did not benefit the population as a whole, and
instead were utilized for political purposes. He therefore believed that it would be best for
Mexicans who migrated to the U.S. to become citizens and enjoy the advantages of being an
American. Fernández thought that they could be members as long as they longed for their native
land, and above all, its traditions. In doing so, they could assist in the restauration of Christian
social order to Mexico and the removal of the revolutionary government influenced by
“Bolshevik ideas.”54 Fernández reinforced the nationalism of the movement towards a particular
notion of what Mexico was and how it had gone astray. Sinarquistas in the U.S., including in
Milwaukee, were to embody such a nationalism.
Gross did his best to make the Milwaukee sinarquista committee a reality. Fernández
worked with the editors of El Sinarquista to send him copies, which he then distributed to
Mexicans – residents and citizens alike. After a few months in May 1941, Gross followed
Fernández’ instructions by finding someone from the Milwaukee Mexican community to be the
committee’s chief. Gross chose Jesús Sánchez to lead the group. As a result, he regularly
received copies of the newspaper to disseminate himself. Fernández expressed excitement
regarding the possibility of a new committee, waiting to hear about the reactions from his
countrymen in the city. After some time, however, the chapter was not as successful as he had
hoped as Sánchez contacted the editors of El Sinarquista, asking for the suspension of the
shipments.55 The Milwaukee committee unfortunately did not come to fruition. Gross was able
to recruit subscribers to the newspaper, but not facilitate a new center of sinarquismo.
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Southwest of Wisconsin in the Lower Midwest, Mexican Catholics attempted to drum up
support for the UNS in Kansas. El Progreso, the newspaper of Topeka’s Our Lady of Guadalupe
Sodality highlighted sinarquismo and encouraged its members to engage in the movement in one
form or another. In its May 11, 1941 edition, the paper had a feature on Mexican movements that
were seeking for a “Great, United, and Free” Mexico. In doing so, the periodical honed in on the
UNS. It described that its objective is Mexico and Mexicans, and that within that objective,
Catholicism was essential.56 Months later in September, El Progreso encouraged its readership to
subscribe to El Sinarquista and join its ranks. The paper proclaimed that El Sinarquista “week
after week talks of sacrifices, of fights, [and] unheard of triumphs.” “Many Mexican residents in
this country are intimately becoming part of this savior movement. Those who want to
communicate with the leaders, can ask for information, in order to obtain the weekly
periodical.”57 Even in the middle of the U.S., Mexican nationalists were gaining traction.
The Unión Nacional Sinarquista solidified a presence in the United States starting in
1940, going into 1941.The movement was establishing deeper organizational roots in the U.S., as
well as camaraderie between committees as the U.S. prepared for eventual war. Under the
leadership of Salvador Abascal, it used materials to promote the group’s ideas across the U.S.Mexico border. UNS committees and its newspaper, El Sinarquista, became more ubiquitous
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wherever there existed sizeable populations of Mexicans within the United States. The
organization thrived in 1941, yet the year also served as a moment of contention over the
movement’s true purpose.
Contestation and Compromise in 1941
While the Unión Nacional Sinarquista grew across the U.S. Southwest and Midwest in
1941, the rumors that movement was associated with European fascism were growing stronger
than ever before. At the center of these reports was that the UNS was a tool for the Falange
Española, which was itself under the control of Nazi Germany. Spain supposedly had a plan to
take over the Western Hemisphere and the sinarquistas were part of their grand project.
Conservative U.S. Catholics, particularly the staff of the NCWC, worked to defend the group.
Negative Sentiment Builds Against the UNS
As sinarquismo extended through much of the U.S., the movement’s detractors were
growing in force, and coming from the political left, media and government. What occurred in
Mexico made its way to the U.S. through each of these transnational channels. Additionally, each
one channel influenced the other. As Mexicans in the United States established committees,
fostering communities supporting their political and religious ideals, they increasingly found
themselves the subject of attacks that they were fascist surrogates.
The CTM continued to publish its Mexican Labor News for a base of sympathetic leftleaning American readers. In March 1941, the labor confederation planned a concerted effort
against the UNS who it saw as paramilitary organization, trained by Nazi agents.58 The CTM
utilized its English-language newspaper, publishing a piece attacking the sinarquistas in almost
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every month for the remainder of the year. It framed the UNS as “Mexico’s native clericofascism,” as part of the Axis’ efforts to increase agitation in the Western Hemisphere led by the
Falange Española and the Nazi Overseas Bureau. Sinarquismo was “trying to provoke a conflict
between the US and Latin America.” Mexican Labor News emphasized that it would do so by
attacking all organizations asking for aid in support of the allies as “communist,” stressing the
idea of Nazi Germany defending the world from communism, and winning over bourgeois nonfascist sections.59 The newspaper conjured up fear in its American reader base of the
organization.
Similarly, U.S. media equated the sinarquistas to be a fascist threat. Betty Kirk was an
American freelance journalist whose articles were published in mainstream outlets such as The
Christian Science Monitor, The Nation, The New York Times, and The Washington Post. Kirk
wrote a variety of pieces aimed at U.S. audiences on the threat of fascism to Mexico starting in
1939, but particularly honed in on the UNS beginning in 1941.60 She demonstrated a sympathy
for the postrevolutionary Mexican government over the years, and her view towards President
Ávila Camacho was no different. Similar to the CTM, she sought to build fear around the
movement as not only endangering Mexicans, but putting Americans at risk as well. In fact, the
language she used about the sinarquistas as totalitarian agents was almost exactly the same as
what the CTM used. She described how the movement was a proxy of the Falange Española,
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sowing division amid the unity created by Pan-Americanism. Sinarquismo would weaken
Mexico, as Nazi Germany weakened surrounding countries in the midst of the war.61
El Paso-based journalist Marshall Hail also took on sinarquismo. As a reporter with the
El Paso Herald-Post, he watched and covered the movement as it grew over the years ever since
it started in the city back in 1937. What took him beyond audiences in West Texas was a highlysyndicated piece published everywhere from the Los Angeles Daily News in California to The
Burlington Daily Times-News in Vermont. In some ways, this article was more compelling that
those of Mexican Labor News or the works by Kirk because images of the sinarquistas
accompanied the text. The photos alone evoked a totalitarian movement. One showed
sinarquistas saluting with their right arm over their right shoulder, another was a portrait of the
“fuehrer” Salvador Abascal, and the last image demonstrated hundreds of members marching.
The photos immediately drew associations between European fascism and the movement. The
accompanying text elaborated on the connections. Hail noted how it attracted supporters in the
hundreds of thousands, with branches in the U.S. and throughout Latin America. Symbolism was
of particular importance to Hail. He emphasized the “united front” of the Mexican family, which
according to him meant “one party – and one leader.” In addition to the salute, the flag featured a
silhouette of Mexico in a circle on a dark field – similar to the composition of Nazi Germany’s
flag. Hail also honed in on its political stances of embracing nationalism and rejecting
communism. He quoted the sinarquistas as saying, “We condemn the Communistic tendency to
unify all countries into a sole universal republic…and will defend the independence of Mexico.”
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He used the sinarquistas’ nationalistic anti-internationalism against the movement. Hail, like
62

other journalists of the time, drummed up panic about the looming effect that these fascist fifth
columnists would have in Mexico – and the U.S.63
The U.S. government, as it had in the past with the sinarquistas, utilized the press as a
major source of intelligence gathering. The Division of Press Intelligence for the Office of
Government Reports collected articles across the country that were of relevance to various
departments. Coverage on the sinarquistas by reporters like Kirk and Hail were of particular
importance to the Department of State. The department was acquiring any information that it
could in regards to what it deemed were “axis activities.”64 Although the U.S. was not yet at war,
it was compiling any relevant information that could compromise hemispheric security.
The Roosevelt administration founded the Office of the Coordinator of Information
(COI) in July 1941 to better facilitate information between government agencies. The agency
noted how the sinarquistas were an actual or potential enemy of the U.S., alongside the PAN.
The COI echoed sentiments displayed in the press about the UNS. The office characterized the
group as semi-militarized, opposed to the Ávila Camacho administration, pro-Catholic and anti-
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Semitic, as well as showing sympathies with Axis powers, particularly the Falange Española.

65

The COI believed that the Falange was working on behalf of Berlin, operating behind the scenes
to coordinate efforts in the Americas. It sought to cause internal insurrection through armed
disturbances and anti-U.S. sentiment.66 The COI was aware that Mexican laborers in the U.S.
were joining the movement. The office reported that sinarquista “cells” existed in California,
Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and in Chicago.67
Responses to and Effects of the Charges
Such targeting of the sinarquistas by various forces provoked the movement to respond.
In the U.S., local committee chief of McAllen, Texas, Jesús María Dávila, responded directly to
charges against the movement. He said that from such press, “one can learn that Synarchists are
nothing less a Nazi-Fascist organization, something which is absolutely false. As organizer of the
Synarchists of the Lower Valley of the Rio Grande, I can not but deny most explicitly such
assertions.” He further explained the movement’s longevity as an organization since 1937, its
“Sixteen Basic Points,” and that “our organization was registered at Washington, D.C. in May
31, 1940.”68 Amid accusations that the movement was associated with the Axis, U.S. chiefs such
as Dávila had to be on the defensive. As Mexicans, sinarquistas already faced discrimination,
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especially in places like Texas, but these charges took the attack against them to the next level.
Therefore, registration with the Foreign Agents Registration Act was of particular pride and a
sign of legitimacy, even as Fernández noted in his conversations with Gross. Nonetheless, this
layer of imagined protection would only go so far with mounting charges from various angles.
Salvador Abascal himself faced the effects of this pushback. He sought to return to the
U.S. in August 1941, wanting to connect with members in Los Angeles, but did not plan on
holding any meetings in the country. He initially received a transit certificate from the Vice
Consul A.F. Yepis at the United States Consulate in Tijuana and was set to cross. The Tijuana
Chief of Police, Félix Zavala, received notice that the sinarquista president was in town. He
informed Yepis that the movement was very dangerous, aiming to overthrow the Mexican
government, and that Abascal should not be admitted into the U.S. Yepis received additional
information that the movement was “Nazi at heart” and masquerading as being pro-Catholic and
pro-Mexican, as well as anti-communist and anti-fascist. Swayed by what he heard, the Vice
Consul cancelled approval and notified the local Immigration and Naturalization Service office.69
Abascal attempted crossing into Southern California via the entry at San Ysidro, however the
U.S. Border Patrol stopped him from doing so. The building sentiment against sinarquismo in
Mexico was working against him because of the reputation’s ever-growing pro-Axis reputation.
As a result, he ended up returning back to the UNS headquarters in Mexico City.70
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Even the editors of El Sinarquista felt compelled to respond to the growing negative
sentiment and took the accusations of fascism head on. They wrote that U.S. journalists and
“agents” are investigating the movement. In response, they noted how the sinarquistas sought to
be transparent, consistently answering questions openly and explicitly. There is enough
information “to get rid of the fear that we are ‘Nazis’ and other equally fantastical things.” The
editors hoped that “they know who we are, appreciate us justly, and dissolve falsities circling
about them.”71 Sinarquismo “– does not have any assistance other than it can offer to the people
of our motherland – have no fear.”72 The sinarquistas did their best to control the narrative.
Ultimately, though, they had continued assistance in the form of conservative American
Catholics.
Sustained Support by Conservative U.S. Catholics
Catholics in the U.S. – both clergy and lay alike – supported the UNS over the course of
1941. Although the majority of these individuals were of European descent, they found common
bonds through a particular politicized conservative Catholicism. Conservative American
Catholics sustained transnational networks with Mexican sinarquista leadership and passionate
members. They did so via mobilizing populations in the U.S. to create committees, spreading the
word to Catholic leaders, as well as through speaking on behalf of the movement in front of
federal government bodies.
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In Milwaukee, Gross and Fernández eventually moved beyond forming a committee in
the city, and instead discussed the need for swaying public opinion in the U.S. towards
sinarquismo. Gross believed that it was necessary to publish more about the movement in
American media. Fernández agreed, saying that “I also think that publicity in the secular press
would be more valuable for our purpose than the Catholic press.”73 U.S. Catholic periodicals had
supported the movement for years, but that was not the case with other publications. The UNS
needed to reach a wider audience. In order to counteract “ill-intentioned Jewish propaganda
against Sinarchism,” Fernández pushed that it is “absolutely indispensable to publish as many
articles as possible in American dailies and magazines.”74
The sinarquistas needed someone – a “good American Catholic writer” – who could
translate their Spanish-language materials and newspapers into English for an American
audience. Fernández and Gross considered various options, all of whom were rooted in
Catholicism, yet could speak to a broader audience and who would be willing to do the
translation work for free.75 One was Reverend James A. Magner whose recent 1941 book, Men
of Mexico, highlighted seventeen Mexican leaders through a politically conservative, anticommunist perspective. Beyond his book, Magner sympathized with counter-revolutionary
Mexican movements in the past such as the Camisas Doradas and was also sympathetic to the
sinarquistas. Alternatively, Gross and Fernández thought about Reverend Ramón José Miller,
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another American sympathizer to sinarquismo, and contributor to the N.C.W.C. News Service.
The two also considered Gross himself.76 They hoped that whoever wrote the articles in English
would build stronger connections between sinarquismo and influential American Catholic
leaders like Magner, Reverend Francis W. Kelley of the Catholic Church Extension Society, and
well-known radio priest and fascist-sympathizer Reverend Charles Coughlin.77 In the end, Gross
and Fernández went with both Gross and Miller as American spokespersons for sinarquismo,
supporting the work that the NCWC, and specifically William Montavon, was doing. According
to Fernández, Montavon “has provided us with extremely valuable services.”78
Meanwhile in Washington, D.C., the NCWC demonstrated its commitment to the UNS
by amplifying the sinarquista cause in a positive light. Like Gross and Fernández, the NCWC
envisioned that it could affect public opinion in the U.S. and ultimately the U.S. government.
William Montavon and his secretary, Rita Walsh, at the NCWC Legal Department worked to
facilitate these interactions. For example, among Catholics, he introduced Reverend
Bartholomew Timlin, O.F.M., the guardian and rector of Holy Name College in Washington,
D.C. to sinarquista national committee representative, Emilio Cervi. Timlin wrote to Montavon
that he appreciated the opportunity to meet him. He explained that “when I write to Fr.
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Provincial, I wish to tell him of the splendid work of this body of militant Catholics.” The more
79

that the sinarquistas could be known about, the better.
The NCWC published sinarquista articles in the U.S., portraying the UNS in a favorable
light. Walsh was in contact with sinarquista Alfonso Franco. He requested that the NCWC
publish a series of articles in the U.S., related to the motherland, communism, family, racism,
and education.80 She responded that, “I will be delighted do what I can to arrange for the
publication of the articles on such interesting topics.” In considering Pan-Americanism, she said,
“they will contribute much to the spirit of good will between our countries.” Walsh worked with
Charles Betico and the NCWC Press Department to circulate the N.C.W.C. News Service pieces
in favor of sinarquismo. The NCWC published articles disseminated among Catholic spheres of
influence nationwide.81 One of the N.C.W.C. News Service’s syndicated pieces made its way to
New York City in the official paper of the Brooklyn Diocese, The Tablet. Like other articles by
the NCWC, it attempted to show how the UNS was embracing “social justice,” seeking to reduce
disparities between classes. It dispelled accusations of fascism, distancing sinarquismo from
fascism, asserting that the movement was both anti-fascist and anti-communist. The piece, above
all, worked to portray the sinarquistas as nationalists valuing the Mexican motherland, seeking to
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82

unify rather than divide the nation. The NCWC would do its best to counteract mainstream
publicity attacking the group in the U.S.
The connection between the sinarquistas and NCWC staff was beyond one of just
strategic importance between Americans and Mexicans; it was also a relationship based on
transnational friendship. Franco in correspondence with Walsh, noted that “I am sure that you
received the little flower of Mexican silver…even though in itself it does not have much value, it
is simply a small token of gratitude for all your attentions and as a remembrance of Mexico.”83
Walsh was extremely grateful, thanking the sinarquistas “for the beautiful sample of Mexican
handiwork in silver. I have often heard of the delicate bounty and design of these articles and I
am most pleased to be the proud possessor of the lovely broach which you sent me.”84 The
sinarquistas appreciated the time and effort that the Walsh and Montavon put in to support and
promote the cause.
Montavon’s sights were still on influencing government policy in favor of the
sinarquistas. Montavon accepted an appointment as a member of the Advisory Policy Committee
in the United States Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between
the American Republics (OCCCRBAR) in early 1941.85 President Roosevelt created the office
August of the previous year under the leadership of Nelson A. Rockefeller to institutionalize
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Pan-Americanism and the Good Neighbor Policy, preventing the spread of fascism in the
Western Hemisphere. Montavon had considerable experience working in Latin America,
especially in the context of Mexico as he aided in brokering the modus vivendi that ended the
First Cristero War in the 1920s. Just as Montavon had an interest in protecting Catholic rights in
Latin America then, he sought to do the same in the 1940s, and one of his focuses was the UNS.
Montavon used his platform to provide a pro-sinarquista voice in OCCCRBAR. Walsh
wrote sinarquista leader Antonio Santacruz upon Montavon’s appointment that “Don Guillermo
[Montavon] will be happy to cooperate with you and your associates in this connection.”86 As the
year progressed, Montavon received two documents relating to the philosophy of the UNS from
his sinarquista colleagues in Mexico. One was a general statement of the principles of
sinarquismo from 1939, while the other was a recent article in El Sinarquista, defending the
movement against “false charges” made against the movement. He sought to influence the Office
so he sent both to Rockefeller.87
Of particular interest to Montavon was the second piece that he sent to the head of the
OCCCRBAR. The El Sinarquista piece responded to two articles written by Betty Kirk in the
Christian Science Monitor and The Washington Post respectively in June 1941. Kirk claimed
that sinarquistas were at “the service of international fascism in Mexico” as tools of the Spanish
nationalists. The sinarquista organization “is totalitarianism incarnate, transplanted to this
continent, and backing a European-dictated crusade to destroy democracy in the Western
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Hemisphere.” Kirk was convinced that “injection of this poisonous fluid into the Mexican
88

nation is for the purpose of undermining the Ávila Camacho government, which has declared its
support of Pan-American solidarity and friendship with the United States, and for sabotaging
continental defense.”89 Salvador Abascal wrote a response on behalf of the UNS national
committee to her accusations in the July 17 edition of El Sinarquista. He claimed that the
sinarquistas were nationalists and had no connections to foreign parties or concepts. According
to Abascal, sinarquismo did not have totalitarian aspirations, but was driven by faith and
fraternal love.90 Montavon made sure that when Rockefeller saw the rebuttal, he would have
another side of the story not present in the widely-disseminated pieces written by Kirk.
Montavon was convinced that he could sway Rockefeller. He wrote Rockefeller that “it is
my impression that the Sinarquist movement is being maligned.” He explained that the
sinarquistas turned down invitations from the Spanish Falange. According to him, “it was not
easy for them to do this because the Phalangists based their appeal on the community of religious
belief, language, and so forth, but the Sinarquists were firm in holding to their position of
Mexican nationalism.”91 In response, Rockefeller articulated that “I was most interested in
having this information and appreciate greatly your thoughtfulness in bringing it to my
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attention.” Through Montavon’s inside position within OCCCRBAR, the NCWC staked its
92

claim to influence U.S. government opinion in Pan-American circles.
Montavon did not stop there, seeking to influence other government offices as well. He
contacted Vicenzo Petrullo from the federal government’s Science Service, noting that “I am
sending you herewith a translation which I have prepared some time ago of the statement of
principles of the National Sinarchist Union of Mexico. I would be glad to meet with you
sometime for the purpose of discussing matters of this nature in which we have a mutual
interest.”93 Montavon also was in communication with Jean Varthaliti, Chancellor of the Belgian
Legation in Mexico. Varthaliti informed Montavon that he was sympathetic to sinarquismo and
was in contact with the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. He wanted to defend Catholicism in the
country.94 In light of rising attacks against sinarquismo, Montavon did what he could to speak on
their behalf.
Even beyond the NCWC, Montavon had the support of U.S. Catholic leaders that he was
able to leverage, including Reverend John O’Grady. O’Grady served as the executive secretary
of the National Conference of Catholic Charities since 1920 and very much believed in Catholic
“social justice” principles. The priest scheduled a meeting with Department of State diplomats
Philip Bonsal and George H. Winters, where he relayed his recent visit to Mexico. He admitted
that that he was biased towards the movement prior to his trip, but even upon his return, he saw
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the movement as a desirable one. O’Grady denied that the movement was under totalitarian
influence. He did note that the UNS was somewhat critical of the U.S., but believed that their
opinion could be altered. Winters listened to what O’Grady had to say, but was mindful that what
he said was different from prior State Department reports.95 Nonetheless, O’Grady was able to
have air time with officials dealing directly with Mexico.
Towards and Into War
A world war was raging its way through Europe since 1939, but it had yet to touch the
Western Hemisphere until December 7, 1941 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The
Roosevelt administration expected to enter the war at some point, so it was only a matter of
when. The next day, the United States Congress declared war on Japan and on December 11,
1941, Germany declared war on the U.S. The U.S. was suddenly thrown into the midst of a twofront war on the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Ávila Camacho worked to demonstrate that his
administration was still allied with Roosevelt’s government.
Ever since Mexican President Ávila Camacho took office in December 1940, he sought
to maintain amicable relations with the Roosevelt administration in the U.S. This was especially
on his mind on the eve of U.S. involvement in an impending war. In March 1941, Ávila
Camacho made public the military discussions occurring between the U.S. and Mexico, while
assuring neutrality.96 In the following months, there were two issues in particular that he would
have to deal with – assuring military cooperation and getting rid of any threats to internal
security. As such, Ávila Camacho pledged the Mexican military in joint cooperation with the
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U.S. defense effort. He also promised to squash any fifth column elements in Mexico that could
potentially spill over into the U.S.97 The Mexican president would therefore demonstrate that
Mexico was fully on board as an ally to the U.S.
Upon the U.S. entry into war in December 1941, the Mexican president worked in
conjunction with the U.S. Department of War to secure Mexico’s borders and stomp out any fifth
column elements. Ávila Camacho sent military reinforcements to the country’s Pacific Coast
under the command of former President Cárdenas and ordered Rear Admiral Luis Hurtado de
Mendoza to supervise naval forces on the Gulf Coast. The Mexican Naval Ministry captured two
small Japanese fishing boats and held them for investigation. Deputy Cesar Garizurieta released
a statement detailing centers of Nazi activity, asking the government to bring them to justice.98
Although the Mexican government did not declare war itself, it was consolidating power over its
domain.
Despite 1941 being a year of great success for the Unión Nacional Sinarquista, the
organization faced head-on attacks. These attacks revolved around its connections to fascism on
the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Conservative American Catholics worked to counter
negative sentiments against the group with their own publicity campaign, as well as attempts to
influence policymakers. By the end of the year, the UNS was steadily gaining the reputation as a
fifth column, despite efforts to the contrary.
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Conclusion
The Unión Nacional Sinarquista established itself in the United States in a short period of
time between mid-1940 and the end 1941. Although the movement grew in the U.S. in the late
1930s, it became a force of its own in this year-and-a-half. The UNS under the leadership of
Salvador Abascal became more hierarchical, structured, and militaristic. The distribution of
materials in conjunction with the creation of committees gave the UNS a presence like it had
never had before. This presence brought with it a backlash led by the left, influencing the U.S.
media, and eventually the U.S. government. Conservative U.S. Catholics came to the
organization’s defense. With the U.S. government’s declaration of war on December 7th, the
group had reached its peak towards a long, slow demise that would last into the late 1960s.
Also in 1941, the Unión Nacional Sinarquista started a colonization effort, bringing
together Mexicans in the U.S. and Mexico. Colonization would be the epitome of sinarquismo
itself. Between 1941 and 1944, the UNS set out to create colonies to live out its ideals and bring
“organization” to Mexico. Mexicans from mainly the Bajío and the U.S. donated funds,
materials, and themselves to the effort. The Unión Nacional Sinarquista colonization plan was
more than just the materialization of sinarquista dreams, it continued to be – just like the
movement itself – a point of contestation.

CHAPTER THREE
HOPE FOR A NEW SOCIETY – SINARQUISTA COLONIZATION IN THE
BORDERLANDS – 1941-1944
“Sinarquista comrade: To ensure the triumph of colonization is to ensure the triumph of
sinarquismo,” proclaimed El Sinarquista on January 1, 1942. The newspaper and principal organ
of the Unión Nacional Sinarquista displayed its hope for the movement’s colonization plan. A
full-page spread featured a Mexican family in front of a map of northwestern Mexico, with one
sinarquista flag located in Baja California Sur and another in Sonora. The paper went on to make
known that “remember that we have to rescue the great part of the motherland that is Baja
California; that we have to establish great MEXICAN populations there that will unite Mexico.”
Both Baja California Sur and Sonora “will be the places where Sinarquismo constructs the basis
of a New Motherland; where we will test our ability to construct.”1 The sinarquistas’ plan for
colonization in the north of Mexico along the United States border would create a new society,
taking over and unifying Mexico.
As sinarquismo was at its height in 1941, organizational leaders, with Salvador Abascal
at their helm, envisioned putting rhetoric into action with the development of colonies. The UNS
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embodied ultra-nationalist, anti-communist, and pro-Catholic values, and the group did its best to
promote these values through El Sinarquista and demonstrate them on the ground via its
committees. Abascal emphasized as sinarquista president that the movement needed organization
and discipline rather than a revolution. The opposition – the Mexican government – took on the
Mexican Revolution as its own, embodying it through the ruling Partido de la Revolución
Mexicana. Rejecting revolution, the UNS instead pursued a plan based on organization,
establishing from the ground-up places to live out the movement’s ideals in “colonies,” obtaining
control of regions in the less-populated north of Mexico. Disciplined sinarquista members from
the various committees in Mexico and the U.S. emulated the Spanish conquistadores who they
admired by settling and populating the colonies. Sinarquistas attempted to develop societies
completely from scratch, centered on their Catholic faith as well as ownership of property. The
colonies epitomized Abascal’s leadership, putting organization and discipline into practice.
Sinarquista members from the U.S. and Mexico donated money and materials to make the
colonies possible. Sinarquista families, with the large majority being upper middle-class families,
established and populated the colonies. The largest and most publicized of the colonies was
Santa María Auxiliadora in Baja California Sur. The sinarquistas established a secondary colony
which they called Villa Kino de Santa María de Guadalupe in Sonora. The UNS also had other
colonies in the north of Mexico including San Miguel Arcángel in Durango, Santa María del
Refugio in Tamaulipas and San José Opodepe in Sonora, but they were all considerably smaller.
The sinarquistas’ project faced opposition from a variety of forces amid growing
suspicion and animosity against them at the beginning of World War II. Both the Mexican and
U.S. governments opposed the effort. Together, they saw the UNS as a fifth column element
infiltrating both nations in the midst of World War II. These settlements would not only
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empower the sinarquistas even more, but they would threaten the security of Mexico and the
U.S., aiding the Axis, especially on the Pacific Coast where these colonies were located.
This chapter examines how between 1941 and 1944, the Unión Nacional Sinarquista
embarked upon an ambitious project to colonize the north of Mexico as the world delved
intowar.2 The colonization project began as a master plan that would epitomize the sinarquistas
and their goals in creating a Mexican society rooted in their Catholic-based “social justice”
values. External opposition combined with internal logistical issues led to its demise.
Nonetheless, the project allowed the Unión Nacional Sinarquista to both live out its values in
utopian settlements and assert autonomy away from both the Mexican and U.S. governments in
the borderlands, albeit for a limited amount of time.
The Master Plan and Build-up to Colonization
Salvador Abascal envisioned colonization in 1941 as incapsulating various elements of
sinarquismo under his leadership. The north of Mexico, particularly the northwest of the country
close to the U.S.-Mexico border including the peninsula of Baja California and the states of
Sonora and Sinaloa, was less populated than the rest of the country. There had been many
attempts since Spanish colonization of the 1500s to bring “civilization” to the desert. Abascal
believed that the region was ideal to develop as well as to live out what he saw as sinarquista
ideals. By developing this part of Mexico, the UNS could have autonomy and make multiple
integralist societies – fusing together church and state – a reality. Abascal set out to do just that
at the end of 1941.
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The Problem with the Peninsula of Baja California
By the 1930s, Northern Mexico was considerably less populated than the center of the
country. The Mexican government wanted to incorporate the region into the rest of the nation.
The majority of Mexico’s population resided in Central Mexico, one of the first regions to be
colonized by the Spanish in the sixteenth century. While Northern Mexico consisted of states
along the U.S.-Mexico border, the peninsula of Baja California had two sparsely settled
territories – Territorio Norte del Baja California (Baja California) and Territorio Sur de Baja
California (Baja California Sur) – which was just one until 1930.3 Neither territory was
connected with reliable land routes via road or train. When President Lázaro Cárdenas came into
office in 1934, he sought to develop the economy in the region. In 1936, construction started on
the Sonora-Baja California railway to facilitate development and national integration.4
Ultimately, the goal was to encourage Mexicans from throughout Mexico and the U.S. to move
there. The plan was to “colonize” the peninsula.
Word of his plan to populate the territories spread during his presidency both within
Mexico and among Mexicans in the United States. Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution
empowered the Mexican state to expropriate land, however the majority of land reform and
redistribution did not take place until President Cárdenas took office.5 The peninsula was no
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exception from participating in land reform and Mexicans reached out to the president,
expressing their desire to cultivate the land there. José Alvarado Cortés wrote on behalf of the
residents of Quiringuicharo, Michoacán in February 1939. He requested that the president
provide them with a new settlement in the peninsula for those who were displaced from their
homes. Alvarado Cortés explained to President Cárdenas that we “accept to colonize those
regions of the republic that await the handsof men to develop them, being willing to work with
the protection that your worthy government gives us.”6 Similarly, Mexicans outside of Mexico
wanted to return and cultivate land in the northern territory of Baja California. The Unión
Nacional de Veteranos de la Revolución (Veterans of the Revolution) branch based in Los
Angeles, California sought to establish an agricultural colony. They met with President Cárdenas
and he agreed, setting into motion reintegrating Mexican families.7 Los Angeles was also the
home to the Sociedad de Colonización pro Baja California (Colonization Society for Baja
California), dedicated to transforming the peninsula. The society sought “to colonize, to
industrialize and to make the motherland.” The organization claimed that “we will make a great
empire in the ugly Baja California. We will build the great Mexican City of the Pacific.”8 The
Cárdenas administration in conjunction with the interest of Mexicans themselves worked to
make the economy viable by populating the region.
Alvarado Cortés’ letter states that the people of Quiringuicharo “aceptar colonizar aquellas regions de la República
que esperan la mano del hombre para producer, estando nosotros bien dispuestos a trabajar correspondiendo así a la
protección que su digno Gobierno nos imparta.” Letter from José Alvarado Cortés to Lázaro Cárdenas, February 11,
1939, 503.11/212, Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas del Río, Archivo General de la Nacion (AGN-LCR).
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By 1941, there existed sustained interest to populate the peninsula, unifying it with the
rest of Mexico. Benjamin R. Hill, ex-deputy from the northern territory, called on Mexicans in
April 1941 “to save” the region from the U.S. He explained how the U.S. government was
concerned about protecting its coasts and the Panama Canal from Asian totalitarianism and thus
had interest in the peninsula, which was being under-utilized by the Mexican state. Mexico
needed to be united and fully incorporate the region. Hill proposed that a highway be constructed
between Tijuana and Mexicali as well as another between Tijuana and La Paz and Cabo San
Lucas. The roads would be financed through bonds. He also suggested that Mexicans who were
now residing in the United States could reintegrate into the country, populating the peninsula
with Mexicans and for Mexicans.9 Hill believed that it was beyond time for the region to fully be
incorporated into Mexico.
The Sinarquista Colonization Plan
The UNS certainly did not seek to serve the Mexican government, but it also saw an
opportunity in the peninsula, for many of the same reasons that the postrevolutionary
government had. The organization had regional and local committees throughout Mexico and the
United States, but did not have a chapter in the region. The UNS shared some of the concerns as
Hill. There was fear among organizational leadership that Mexico was in danger of losing the
peninsula – either to the ruling Mexican state, by American filibusters or to the U.S. government
– if the group did not do something.10 In June 1941, the movement set up a committee in the
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small border city of Tijuana led by Gustavo Morán. Abascal, however, wanted something
more. Rather than being located in pre-existing settlements, he wanted the group to create towns
and cities from scratch, and the sparsely-populated peninsula would be ideal for making an
impact.
Colonization was a chance for the movement to develop this region of Mexico on its own
terms, while contesting the power of the Mexican state. Salvador Abascal traveled throughout
northwestern Mexico in August 1941 and saw great potential in the region for the sinarquistas.12
He, like Hill, noted problems regarding transportation, encountering particular issues with the
lack of networks linking the peninsula to the rest of the country. No direct routes existed through
Mexico and he noted that to get to the northern territory from Sonora, one had to pass through
the United States or take a boat across the Gulf of California. Baja California Sur, on the other
hand, was completely isolated from Mexico. Abascal explained the region’s significance to the
sinarquistas:
Baja California is like a very important arm, which is not united to Mexico except
spiritually, thanks to the strong patriotism of [Baja] Californians; but it is also necessary
to unite it to the body of Mexico maternally; and thus we will further strengthen spiritual
ties. Populating and connecting Baja California is the only way to protect Sonora and
Sinaloa; and saving Sonora and Sinaloa is saving Mexico.13
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Northwestern Mexico was of strategic importance because of its location on the Pacific Coast,
economically and militarily, and the region just needed to be tapped for its potential. The UNS
had the ability to lead the charge to develop and connect this portion of Mexico, instead of the
Mexican state itself.
The movement could act as a sovereign entity in its own right. Salvador Abascal would
facilitate the movement of hundreds of sinarquistas and their respective families to the peninsula,
developing its riches without government funding. Abascal offered the UNS to construct the
entire projected network of highways as they were necessary for success and development of
colonization. Not only that, he believed that the sinarquistas could build them for half the price
of the federal government. The organization would distribute any resources found in the
construction of the roads between themselves and the government. Not only was the colony
focused on sinarquistas’ well-being, but Abascal welcomed thousands of dispossessed Mexicans
in the Bajío to join the effort. Those who lost their land as a result of Cárdenas’ land reforms
could choose to be part of the project.14 Beyond economic development, he also demonstrated
the sinarquistas’ support of national defense in the buildup to war. He would invite garrisons of
federal troops to the peninsula.15 The UNS would have an upper hand over the government in the
region, maintaining autonomy while negotiating the terms on which the Mexican state could
operate.
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Colonization also embodied the religious and nationalist ideals of the organization. The
construction of a colony would spiritually unite the country, as well as maintain its integrity by
incorporating the peninsula into the fold. The UNS was destined by God to develop what it saw
as a barren territory. By doing so, the movement would create a new type of society founded in
Christian principles. The organization envisioned colonization as an opportunity to create an
integralist Mexico where Catholicism and the state were one. Colonization allowed the
sinarquistas to bring back the grandeur of what they perceived as the foundation of the nation –
Spanish colonization – where church and state indeed worked hand-in-hand.16 Sinarquistas
openly embraced Hispanidad (Spanishness) in their vision of Mexico, acknowledging Spain as
shaping Mexican “civilization.” The UNS noted how conquistadores like Hernán Cortés,
Francisco de Ulloa, Francisco de Alarcón, Juan Rodríguez Cabrillo, and countless others failed
in their attempts to colonize the peninsula, but that the sinarquistas would succeed.17
Colonization epitomized Abascal’s influence upon the organization as sinarquismo is “unity,
peace, hierarchy. It is a spiritual militia. It is eminently Mexican and absolutely incompatible
with sectarianism of any sort.” The group’s leadership issued a statement on the project that
proclaimed that it was “animated by a spirit of missionaries and soldiers; determined to deliver
everything that we are and have, we sinarquistas will undertake this gigantic work that no one
had dared to commit.”18 The UNS would finish what the Spanish colonizers had started over four
hundred years before.
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The organization’s national committee sent out a circular in September 1941 to all of its
committee chiefs laying out its plan for the colonization of Baja California Sur. The first
expedition to the territory would take place in November or December and consist of a hundred
families, carefully choosing the strongest men ready for the work to construct the colony and
work the land. Sinarquista members would cultivate corn, beans, dates, olives, peas, chiles and
tomatoes. Not only did sinarquista leadership need farmers, but intellectuals, artisans and
laborers, developing industry where there would be a market in Mexico and the southwestern
United States. The plan limited where colonists could come from, allowing for migration only
from the Bajío states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato y Querétaro. The national committee
explained that it was in these Central Mexican states where both the majority of farmers and
dispossessed came from, not to mention they were where the highest concentration of
sinarquistas existed. Money and resources were also necessary to make colonization possible and
the organization would have to collect any and all aid that it could receive. Lastly, the
movement’s leadership asked its committee chiefs for a list of members who were willing to
colonize including their contact information, as well as their moral fortitude and ability to
work.19
Salvador Abascal presented the national committee’s colonization plan that same month
to now-President Manuel Ávila Camacho as the UNS still needed the federal government’s
consent to proceed. He explained to the president that he wished to utilize the UNS’s “great
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popular force in patriotic works and in collaboration with the Government of the Republic, to
arrive at creating NATIONAL UNITY that frees Mexico from internal and external dangers” by
colonizing the peninsula.20 Abascal justified settlement of Baja California Sur as opposed to the
northern territory as the population was 55,000 as opposed to 100,000. He sought the
government’s help with transportation – in sea passage between Manzanillo, Colima or
Mazatlán, Sinaloa across to Magdalena Bay and in road transport upon arrival. Abascal unveiled
the first town that would start the colony – Santa María Auxiliadora (Holy Mary Help of
Christians) in Comondú municipality – and asked Ávila Camacho for the concession to construct
highways connecting it to Magdalena Bay, La Paz and Santa Rosalía. He also wanted the
availability to develop private property and the extension of taxes on the colony until August 31,
1946. In addition to covering logistics, Abascal sought to ensure “absolute freedom in religion:
for the construction of temples, a hospital with religious workers, Catholic schools, etc., and
without limitation on the number of priests.”21 Abascal promised the president collaboration
between the UNS and the federal government towards the mutually beneficial goals of national
defense and economic development, all the while allowing the sinarquistas freedom to practice
their Catholicism and live in a Catholic society.

Abascal writes that the UNS will “emplear su gran fuerza popular en obras patrióticas y de colaboración con el
Gobierno de la Republica, para llegar a realizar la UNIDAD NACIONAL que libre a México de los peligros
interiors y exteriores.” Letter from Salvador Abascal to Manuel Ávila Camacho, Plan de Colonización del Distrito
Sur de la Baja California, September 12, 1941, AGN-MAC 544.61/39, caja 0565.
20

Abascal asks for “libertad absoluta en la religión: para construcción de templos, un hospital con religiosas,
escuelas católicas, etc., y sin limitación en el número de sacerdotes.” Letter from Salvador Abascal to Manuel Ávila
Camacho, Plan de Colonización del Distrito Sur de la Baja California, September 12, 1941, AGN-MAC 544.61/39,
caja 0565.
21

127
Sinarquista Colonization and the Mexican Government
Up to this point in 1941, the Mexican federal government appeared that it was unified
against the UNS. President Ávila Camacho issued orders in early August curtailing public
demonstrations. Ávila Camacho issued anexecutive order sharply restricting public
demonstrations by the sinarquistas. His call came after a sinarquista rally in Michoacán that
ended in two sinarquistas killed and three sinarquistas wounded. The president claimed that his
action supported national unity, ordering political leaders throughout Mexico to guard against
demonstrations.22Ávila Camacho also openly denounced sinarquismo as well as communism
during his address of the opening of Congress on September 1.23 Upon notice of the planned
sinarquista colony, the CTM publicly opposed the project. The confederation continued to claim
that the UNS was a totalitarian movement that had ties with fascist powers in Europe. The CTM
argued that the Axis wanted control over the peninsula because of its strategic and vulnerable
location next to the U.S. on the edge of Mexico.24 The sinarquistas appeared to have multiple
forces in the government opposing them.
On September 12, 1941, President Ávila Camacho surprised everyone by accepting the
sinarquistas’ colony proposal. The president agreed to collaborate with the sinarquista national
committee colonization plan. Ávila Camacho notified Abascal that he offered the UNS an
immediate plan to work alongside the organization regarding colonization of lands in the desert
for the purpose of agricultural cultivation, road construction and the creation of new industries.
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He just needed the sinarquista leader to provide more exact details regarding the overall
project.25 The president approved the colonization plan partially as part of a broader aim to bring
more people to the peninsula, continuing the efforts of his predecessor, Cárdenas. Ávila
Camacho completed preparations to send six hundred agrarian families to colonize the northern
territory around the city of Mexicali on the Mexican-U.S. border.26 Ávila Camacho also likely
wanted the sinarquistas occupied with colonization rather than with national politics. The
colonization project would not only distract members, but would silo them on the edge of
Mexican society. Nonetheless, the sinarquistas viewed the agreement to collaborate as a success.
Certain representatives serving on the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, on the other hand,
did not. Alfredo Félix Díaz Escobar, a partisan dedicated to the postrevolutionary Mexican state,
founded the Comité Nacional Antisinarquista (National Anti-Sinarquista Committee) and led the
charge in the chamber against the sinarquista colonization project. Similar to the CTM, he
expressed concern about the adverse effects of colonization on both Mexico and the U.S. Díaz
Escobar claimed that the UNS was openly anti-American and posed a threat to Mexico’s
northern neighbor.27 On October 14, the sinarquista colonization plan was the subject of debate
on the chamber floor. Deputy Díaz Escobar continued to argue that the UNS was a threat to
national security, calling the movement a fifth column within Mexico. Deputy Carlos Zapata
Vela proclaimed that “a Lower California colonized by the Sinarquistas would be for Mexico
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and the United States what Holland and Belgium were for France and England.” Zapata Vela
drew the parallel between the loss of countries in Europe to the fascist Axis during World War II
to what potentially could happen in North America. At the end of the debate, the chamber
introduced a resolution asking the president to reconsider and withdraw supporting the
sinarquista colonization plan. Deputies expressed concern that the colony would be a possible
base for the Nazis because of its location near the harbor of Magdalena Bay on the western coast
of the peninsula and therefore threaten the hemisphere.28 The Comité Nacional Antisinarquista
distributed pamphlets among the public following the session, arguing that the president should
not only remove his support for colonization, but that the UNS should be considered illegal and
dissolved as an enemy of Mexico.29
The sinarquistas pushed back against the Chamber of Deputies’ proposed resolution.
Sinarquista leadership argued that the chamber did not have any right to oppose the project
which was received well by the president. Abascal admitted that the plan he presented to the
president was going to be difficult because of the desert location, but that the movement had the
manpower to cultivate the land and develop industry.30 El Paso sinarquista chief, José Soto,
noted how “the Mexican government not only has approved the plan, but it also has shown its
co-operation by supplying government-owned vessels for transportation of colonists.”31 The
sinarquistas were determined to have their colony.
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The Chamber of Deputies decided to reject the resolution to ban the sinarquista
colonization plan, but Deputy Díaz Escobar did not give up his fight against the movement. The
chamber gave the president a vote of confidence, agreeing with Majority Leader Leonardo
Reynoso, who stated that the president granted permission for the project because he believed
that he could not restrict the movements of Mexicans within Mexico. If anything, deputies
discussed how non-sinarquistas could colonize Baja California Sur, countering the sinarquistas.32
Díaz Escobar did not agree with this response at all and kept opposing the plan. He contended
that the colonization project was a pretext to determine the selection of recruits for Hitler. The
deputy thought that the UNS was preparing for an armed movement to fight in Europe.33 Despite
his opposition, multiple elements of the Mexican government supported the sinarquistas’ project.
The fact that the president supported the enterprise also led two major Mexican
politicians to back the project. One was Francisco José Mujica, a general in the Mexican
Revolution who became the governor of Baja California Sur starting in 1940. He trusted Ávila
Camacho’s support of colonization, but believed that such an effort would be very difficult given
the circumstances of the region.34 The other individual would be Lázaro Cárdenas, now no
longer president of Mexico, but appointed by Ávila Camacho to oversee the Pacific Command of
the nation’s military. The area he oversaw included the peninsula and he aligned with the
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president by agreeing that have the sinarquistas there would “protect” the region. This was
35

quite remarkable as Cárdenas and the UNS were archenemies at the founding of the
organization. Why would the former leftist president seek to support sinarquista colonization?
Like Ávila Camacho, Cárdenas probably agreed with that sending the sinarquistas away would
make them less of a threat to the Mexican government. They would be isolated on the edge of
Mexican society.
Attention to Sinarquista Colonization in the U.S.
The sinarquistas’ desire to colonize Baja California Sur not only attracted those in
Mexico, but drew attention and support in the United States. Although the UNS was going to
receive some aid from the Mexican federal government, the colony would not be possible
without garnering support in the U.S. For example, in Topeka, Kansas and Kansas City,
Missouri, Catholic organizations serving the Mexican community in the respective cities saw
colonization as a great patriotic work that would bring religion back to Mexico, coming to reality
with the approval and cooperation of the Mexican government.36 However, more than anything
else, support needed to come from sinarquistas themselves.
From October 30 to November 1, 1941, sinarquistas across the U.S. and Mexico came
together for the movement’s third annual meeting in Mexico City, with the topic of colonization
clearly on their minds. Approximately 600 members met, including leaders from committees in
twenty-six Mexican states, in addition to those in California, Texas, and Indiana. The national
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committee in conjunction with the regional and municipal branches joined together to discuss
plans for the future. They voted to raise funds for the colonization of Baja California Sur where
they hoped 100,000 of the organization’s half a million members would settle.37 Abascal spoke
at the conference, reiterating concepts valued during his tenure as sinarquista president. He
emphasized how sinarquismo was part brotherhood and part militia, the belief that sinarquistas
could conquer their enemies by loving them, and that sinarquismo was a movement of
international importance. Manuel Zermeño, former UNS president and on the UNS national
committee spoke to the need for a Christian state that colonization was bringing. This could not
be done without support in the U.S. Zermeño explained that, “Sinarquismo has interested not
only Mexicans, but also the United States, they are very aware of what we do, they translate our
newspaper El Sinarquista to know what we say and what we think the peoples that make up
Hispanic America.”38
U.S. sinarquista committees played their part in making colonization a reality. No longer
did El Sinarquista galvanize its members to raise money for solely families of martyred
sinarquistas, but the paper also also advocated that sinarquistas raise money for colonization
efforts in late 1941. U.S. committees did just that. The Bakersfield, California chapter was quite
generous as were committees in Donna, Edinburg, McAllen, Milla, Pharr, and Weslaco, Texas.39
The list of donations from sinarquista committees regularly took up the length of the entire page
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of the publication. More people donated than before and they were also more invested in a cause
that they themselves could partake in. Beyond money, sinarquistas gave anything that they could
to the cause. A sinarquista from Ontario, California agreed to donate fifty thousand grapevines to
the colonization effort. Another member from the San Fernando, California committee offered
four hundred quince plants and a few thousand vines. Others from the chapter offered tools for
tilling land, and women members donated clothing.40 In addition to donations of various kinds,
California sinarquistas literally came together for the colonization effort in Los Angeles. Porfirio
Rivera of the Northern California regional committee, Pedro Villaseñor of the Southern
California regional committee, and chiefs of local chapters around Los Angeles met in the city.
Together – amid a celebration the sinarquistas organized to celebrate Mexican independence
leader Agustín de Iturbide – they drafted work plans of how they would collaborate in supporting
the colonization effort.41
The U.S. federal government also became aware of the sinarquistas’ plan and was
initially cautious. As early as September 1941, the Department of State was aware of the project.
Gerald A. Mokma, U.S. Consul to Tijuana, sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, notifying him of what he knew. Mokma had read an article in the Heraldo de la Baja
California that brought his attention to the sinarquista plan as well as the CTM’s opposition to it.
The consul could not determine whether or not the UNS had a connection with any Axis power,
but he did remark that the peninsula was sparsely populated and that any anti-democratic
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organization could be dangerous. U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels and even the
42

Federal Bureau of Investigation relayed information to the Secretary of State as the UNS moved
closer to making its colony a reality.43 The U.S. government was unclear if the colony would
endanger national security.
However, the U.S. government became increasingly more apprehensive of the planned
Baja California Sur colony, especially when the U.S. entered World War II on December 8,
1941. The U.S. Office of the Coordinator of Information believed that the Axis did indeed have
interest in the region. The office’s analysts Maurice Halperin and Vincenzo Petrullo reported that
newspapers were claiming that 5,000 Japanese were coming to the peninsula from throughout
Mexico. They disputed the claim of such a massive migration, however noted that colonists in
the region resided in the region for some time as fishermen. They noted how the Army’s
intelligence division reported how Japanese were also coming into the peninsula from Southern
California. Although the region consisted of a desert climate, there was a possibility that some of
the ports along the Pacific Coast could be used for the refueling of Japanese submarines or
surface raiders.44 The COI’s Halperin and Petrullo shared a variety of concerns with President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt about how the Japanese and UNS were connected, and therefore the
sinarquista colonization project threatened the U.S. The analysts observed that only the Japanese
knew the peninsula well, and neither Mexico nor the U.S. really had knowledge of the region.
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They expressed how upper-class Mexicans opposed U.S. influence, instead trusting the Spanish
government. Not only that, but Halperin and Petrullo believed there was no real opposition to the
Axis in Mexico. Lastly, they shared that they thought the U.S. government’s policy was weak
and not geared to the wartime emergency. Halperin and Petrullo advocated for intervening,
creating an anti-Axis propaganda campaign in Mexico, building pro-U.S. sentiment.45 Although
the U.S. was now in the midst of a two-front war in the Pacific and European Theatres, the COI
was urging more of a focus against the Axis within the Americas.
Making Colonization a Reality
Even with Mexico’s neighbor now at war, the sinarquista national committee did not lose
its sights on colonization, mobilizing its own warlike support and excitement among its members
in El Sinarquista. Sinarquista leadership continued to utilize its periodical to collect donations,
regularly publishing a list showcasing the individuals and committees from throughout the U.S.
and Mexico that gave money to the cause. The paper even published a call for sinarquistas to
donate gold and silver to María Auxiliadora’s first church. Monetary donations continued to
arrive, as did precious metals through the end of the year.46 Beyond donations, the paper built off
of the organization’s Canciones y Corridos Sinarquistas, featuring songs that further worked to
cultivate sinarquista identity. One such song, “Voy a California” (“I go to California”) by León
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Aguilar, was from the perspective of a sinarquista who believed that he was destined to colonize
Baja Calfornia Sur. He claimed that “I know very well that my chiefs are Christians like me;
that's why I am going with them to such a distant region. With my wife and children I go to
California ... Sinarquistas: Viva Mexico! God help us! Goodbye!” Another piece by Agustín
Montaño titled “Morir Tambien es Triunfar” (“To die is also to triumph”) argued that the colony
was essential because “we sinarquistas want our nation to have a government that loves and
serves the people with attention.”47 Colonization mobilized sinarquista members as if they were
going to war. El Sinarquista was crucial in convincing sinarquistas – whether traveling or not –
that they were all necessary to make a Christian society possible.
Finally, in mid-December 1941, the time came for the UNS to make colonization a
reality. Salvador Abascal resigned from his position as president of the UNS to personally direct
the Baja California Sur colonization effort with fellow colonists from the Bajío. Abascal turned
the organization’s leadership over to Manuel Torres Bueno.48 In the public eye, it appeared that
Abascal chose to resign and lead colonization on his own, however UNS secret leader Antonio
Santacruz encouraged him to do so.49 Santacruz continued to want a social-religious movement,
rather than the militant integralist one that Abascal was creating, and so he decreased his power
in the organization, sending him off to Baja California. On December 18th, the first one hundred
families were en route from the Bajío as the sinarquista national committee had promised.
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Approximately 450 people participated in the expedition including people from the cities of
Querétaro, Acámbaro, Pátzcuaro and Morelia. Each family paid their own travel costs, first
meeting in Guadalajara and from there disembarking by boat from Mazatlán.50 Although entirely
all press about the sinarquista colonization project up to this point highlighted Baja California
Sur, the organization revealed at the point of departure that it indeed had two colonization
projects. Abascal mentioned back in September how colonizing Baja California Sur would
protect Sonora and the UNS actually sought to do so. The majority of colonists made their way
across the Sea of Cortés to the peninsula, while a smaller contingent instead went to establish a
settlement on the coast of Sonora, north of Guaymas. José Trueba Olivares, former sinarquista
president and brother of El Sinarquista editor Alfonso Trueba led the expedition.51 While
Abascal and Trueba Olivares led the respective colonization projects on the ground, the new
sinarquista President Torres Bueno designated Juan Ignacio Padilla as the national secretary of
colonization. It was his responsibility to ensure that the new colonists had all the resources they
needed in order to be able to succeed. Padilla oversaw the creation of secretaries of colonization
at the regional and municipal committee levels, such as in El Paso, where they worked to
mobilize their membership for contributions to the cause.52
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Now with the colonists en route to the colonies in Baja California Sur and Sonora, Padilla
pushed more than ever for sinarquistas across Mexico and the U.S. to give to the colonization
project. At the beginning of 1942, he called on all members to prepare for January 4 – a day of
giving. Padilla urged every sinarquista to contribute to the colonization effort on that day,
insisting that “OUR COLONISTS SHOULD NOT, CANNOT BE ABANDONDED.” He
encouraged members to “remember your companions; your obligation to collaborate; excite the
indifferent; sway those who don’t care; in your home, in your workshop, talk about colonization
and make everyone realize its immense importance.”53 Sinarquista chiefs hosted assemblies on
the date for their respective committee members to give money and metals. The effort was
indeed successful and the organization received the largest amount of donations up to that point
at $48,458.31 pesos. Contributions came from either the sinarquistas’ center of support in the
Bajío or from Southern California and Texas along the border.54 This campaign would not be the
last of Padilla’s efforts to support the colonies.
The colonization plan that Salvador Abascal dreamed up was coming to fruition with the
aid of Juan Ignacio Padilla and the leadership of José Trueba Olivares. Despite opposition, the
UNS moved forward with the project. Colonists traveled to northwest Mexico to construct
colonies from scratch and make sinarquista societies possible. Colonization was ambitious so it
was only a matter of time to see if either settlement would not only survive, but thrive.
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Santa María Auxiliadora, Baja California Sur
María Auxiliadora was the principal colony and Salvador Abascal’s personal project. He
had his sights on the peninsula for some time in 1941 and now he would both live and oversee
the colony himself starting in 1942. Abascal would see if he could create not only one settlement,
but multiple colonies in the region, acting on promises made to the organization and to the
Mexican state. He also worked to build a society, implementing the ideals of “social justice”
lessening class divisions all the while integrating church and state. Abascal’s optimism and
idealism only took María Auxiliadora so far and issues mounted over time.
Optimism around María Auxiliadora
Abascal was quite positive about the colonization project in Baja California Sur that he
was about to lead and oversee. Abascal met with the soon-to-be colonists upon departure and
noted that “to abandon the land in which they were born, detaching themselves from it forever;
leaving affections, interests, everything, and accepting the luck that God brings only for love of
Mexico, that is heroism.”55 His political vision combined with the determination of the initial
colonists gave the sinarquistas the sense that the colonization project in the peninsula would
indeed succeed.
Upon arrival to Baja California Sur in December 1941, the colonists made their way to
establish María Auxiliadora in January of the following year, and were optimistic of the project
at hand. They first arrived to the coastal city of La Paz and from there took buses into the interior
of the peninsula, first stopping at the town of La Cruz and later the town of El Refugio. The
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journey to the colony took a very long time through the desert, finally arriving to the site of the
settlement near Santo Domingo where they were greeted by its residents. They departed the
buses, lining up behind former sinarquista president Manuel Zermeño who was holding up the
Mexican flag. Collectively, they marched to the settlement.56
Sinarquista leadership planned on agriculture being fundamental to the colony and it was
the first task that the colonists worked on. The colonists were particularly concerned about
transforming a place that otherwise appeared inhabitable into one that could flourish. They
removed cactus and other desert flora to establish the first experimental farm of the colony. The
colonists utilized multiple wells to extract water and worked the land to plant onion, garlic, peas,
cabbage, cauliflower, carrots, radish, date palms, and olive trees.57 The residents of María
Auxiliadora first needed to sustain themselves through farming before developing enterprises.
Another crucial aspect of the colony in Baja California Sur was for the sinarquistas to
have a settlement where they could openly practice their Catholicism in Mexico without
persecution. Father Daniel Zavala arrived on January 10as the colony’s priest. The colonists
worked with the priest to unpack religious objects donated by sinarquistas from Acámbaro,
Guanajuato, holding mass among them. Father Zavala would share a role in María Auxiliadora
alongside Salvador Abascal, fitting into the organization’s belief that Catholicism was crucial for
one’s personal life.58 Abascal arrived a day later on another bus, saluting the crowd with
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“Sinarquistas, long live Mexico!” Upon departing the bus, he marched with sinarquista national
committee leader Manuel Zermeño and fellow colonists to the newly-built improvised chapel. It
was there where he announced the official foundation of the colony: “I declare the sinarquista
colony María Auxiliadora in Santo Domingo, Baja California, founded for the good of the
country and to honor God, today, Sunday, January 11, 1942, at 1:15 PM.”59 Catholicism was part
and parcel of the establishment of the settlement. It would be at this site where the UNS hoped
that it could finally practice integralism through bridging together church and state.
By the end of January, more people were planning on supporting María Auxiliadora.
Over 500 sinarquistas reached out to the Office of Colonization and its secretary, Juan Ignacio
Padilla, whom approved the grand majority of requests. His efforts to accumulate donations for
the colony was gaining traction, but he sought even more to industrialize the peninsula. Padilla
addressed comments that the sinarquistas were partnering with the Japanese. He countered by
arguing that the Japanese were outsiders robbing Mexico of its fish. The fishing industry in Baja
California Sur needed to be improved and it was up to the colonists to do the work, but they were
not able to do so without the additional investment of sinarquistas.60 Even beyond the
organization, Mexicans became invested in the project. The Coahuilan Committee for the
Economic Reintegration of Baja California formed in the city of Saltillo, Coahuila to publicly
support the effort. Committee members organized an evening to raise funds for colonization.61
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The peninsula was separated from the rest of Mexico and such a group believed that the UNS
was destined to bring Mexico together.
On the ground in Baja California Sur, sinarquista leader Manuel Zermeño thought that he
was indeed witnessing the sinarquista promised land. Zermeño explained that he saw “the
silhouettes of the sinarquistas [working], with their hoes and shovels on their shoulders. Some
returned from digging wells; others to clean the ground of scrubs; others cut wood for the huts.
They gleefully returned to their temporary shelters, glad to have labored hard for many hours.”
He described that they while they worked they were singing “beautiful sinarquista songs.”
Zermeño contrasted the current joy of these people while in Baja California Sur as opposed to
the horrible conditions they left in the Bajío, where they watched their backs and were constantly
threatened with violence.62 According to him, now the sinarquistas could joyously live and work
in peace among their brethren in contrast to where they came from and were outsiders due to
their middle class status and political identity as sinarquistas.
This was possible due to a daily routine emphasizing both hard work and the colonists’
commitment to a community of faith. The colonists collectively woke up at dawn and attended
mass. Then they ate based upon a ration that each family received of corn, beans and meat.
Following their meal, they divided into various work crews, each overseen by a respective boss
who oversaw their work. Zermeño saw the discipline of the colonists and the society they were
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creating as a utopia in the model of sixteenth century priest Vasco de Quiroga. Quiroga, the so63

called “protector of the Indians” and part of the colonial project of New Spain, constructed what
he named pueblos-hospitales. These settlements “offered” the indigenous peoples of Michoacán
physical salvation through an opportunity to live and work, as well as spiritual salvation via
education of the Gospel.64 Zermeño similarly believed that “on the unshakable foundation of the
Religion of Christ, sinarquismo must aspire to the construction of a more just world than this
uninhabitable world in which we live.”65
Many of the colonists at the onset of the colonization project took sinarquismo to heart
and thought that a UNS utopia was taking shape in the peninsula. Vicente González expressed
“how happy we are in these lands so beautiful, and so beautiful, and so rich. We daily have our
Holy Mass and our temple that is covered with interwoven reeds. We have a holy peace, we have
charity, we have conformity, we have brotherhood and we are very happy and very, very
encouraged.” This notion of a paradise within Mexico was indeed shared by other colonists.
Isidro Rivera, described how the peninsula was ideal for the sinarquistas. “You have no doubt
that this is the true promise land. We are in Baja California and I say for myself that this seems
like a dream and as I have observed others say the same.”66 Colonists embraced the plan as
envisioned by Abascal and sinarquista leadership, and believed that it was coming to reality.
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Education of the youth would be crucial in raising ideal sinarquistas. Lázaro Cárdenas
visited in March to help foster sinarquista schools in the colony after previously supporting the
colonization project the past year. By donating funds towards the schools, Cárdenas worked to
isolate the movement. The former president gave 4,000 pesos to establish a school destined for
the colony’s children, with the approval of Ávila Camacho.67 The colonists ended up
constructing not one, but two schools – one for boys and one for girls growing up in the colony.68
Abascal led one school whereas Juventina Morales oversaw the other. As Catholicism held an
important role in everyday life, so was its importance in schooling. Each school had a cross over
its entryway, notable in Mexico where secular education became the norm in the
postrevolutionary era. The colony’s schools trained the youth to live an ideal, conservative
Catholic life where each gender knew their place in society, discouraging intermixing between
men and women besides forming a family. Boys were trained to expect to work in the public,
whereas girls were taught to expect a life of work inside of their houses.69
Plans were in the works for building more permanent structures for the settlement so as to
live out these roles. Up to this point, the majority of the structures were temporary, built with
branches and reeds. Even the “mansion” of Salvador and his wife Guadalupe Carranza de
Abascal was made of these materials. The colonists did succeed in building a permanent cellar of
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adobe to store the colony’s food, as well as houses of the same material. They eventually
converted the colony’s temple into a lasting structure. The colonists sought to construct the
industry that Abascal promised, including a proposal for a textile factory that would produce
clothing for the colony.70
The colonists ushered in the fifth anniversary of the UNS on May 23, 1942, taking the
day off to honor the movement that had founded its very own settlement. Abascal, however, did
not want María Auxiliadora to be the only such sinarquista city in the region. Abascal toured the
peninsula passing through Loreto and San Francisco Javier, encountering a variety of people who
were sympathetic of the organization.71 He was most likely scoping out possible places in the
territory for expansion of his colonization project. The colony appeared to be successful and
destined for future success.
Issues arise in the colony
Over the course of 1942, the colony persisted, yet not as an absolute utopia as it was
starting to face some issues. Water was an issue in the middle of the desert, however the
colonists dug an additional well to sustain them, leading to the planting of more crops. They also
finished constructing an oven to create roof tiles and bricks to replace the temporary structures
that they initially built. Although the settlement was taking shape, there were some colonists who
wanted to return to the Bajío, where they originally came from. A colonist, José R. Basagoiti,
commented that he did not worry about the colony losing residents as they could easily be
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replaced by sinarquistas wanting to come live there. He believed that the majority of those who
resided in the colony were good, strong and loyal to the effort.72
By July, the colonists were running into another issue – having a lack of supplies and
food to sustain María Auxiliadora. They did not have corn, a staple food, nor did they have the
sufficient amount of tools to work the land and build the settlement. Secretary of Colonization
Juan Ignacio Padilla was running short on funds and had to rely on emergency donations.
Sinarquistas in California donated money to purchase more food for the colony.73 This problem
in not being able to supply the colony with basic necessities led to Padilla initiating another
contribution campaign. Padilla galvanized members via El Sinarquista to donate on July 26,
1942, bringing in even more money. The majority of support came from Mexico, however a
considerable amount came from the U.S. Committees in South Chicago and Indiana Harbor in
the Midwest, McAllen and El Paso in Texas, and Richmond and Bakersfield in California, all
donated funds.74 Sinarquistas sustained the colony going from afar.
A physical divide did indeed exist between the sinarquistas who gave up their lives to be
colonists in Baja California Sur and those who resided in Mexico and the U.S., but El
Sinarquista made a point of closing that gap. It was a strategic decision to keep the colony afloat.
The paper’s editors, Alfonso Trueba and Jose Néder Quiñones, regularly published pieces on
colonization, highlighting the colony on the peninsula. They featured a series of pieces justifying
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the need for the Baja California Sur colony. They worked to dispel notions from the sinarquistas’
opponents that it was going to be a failure. The editors responded that the colony was the
embodiment of sinarquismo and that the sinarquistas would sacrifice everything for the project;
to triumph or die. Trueba and Quiñonesalso reiterated the need for the colony – the importance
of reintegrating Mexico and the ability for the sinarquistas to live on their own terms.75In
addition, El Sinarquista began an effort of drawing a more explicit connection between the past
of Spanish colonization and that of the sinarquista colonization project than Abascal did at the
beginning. The paper frequently had a column called “The History of Baja California” which
emphasized the region’s past as connected to Spanish colonization. It taught readers of various
attempts by conquistadores to establish settlements in the region.76 More importantly, it
emphasized the peninsula’s history as part and parcel of Mexico and how the sinarquistas were
fulfilling their legacy. El Sinarquista also regularly published a piece titled “Figures and
Episodes of the Motherland’s History” glorifying the Spanish conquest. The periodical
frequently featured Hernán Cortés in addition to incidents in history such as the Cholula
Massacre of 1519 and the Conquest of Jalisco from 1530 to 1531.77 Colonization may have been
in motion from afar, but all sinarquistas were still part of the colonization effort. All members
were part of Mexico’s new conquest whether physically at the colony or not.
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U.S. Government Surveillance of Colonization
As María Auxiliadora was in development in Baja California Sur, the United States
government continued to be skeptical of the sinarquista colonization project, particularly as a
tool of the Axis. The Office of the Coordinator of Information noted how the Ávila Camacho
administration acted in a spirit of cooperation with the U.S. since its entry into war. It severed
relations with Axis powers and helped organize the United States-Mexican Joint Defense Board.
The office was still concerned with the Ávila Camacho administration’s handling of domestic
affairs. Of them, the COI did not believe his administration was handling the sinarquistas
appropriately. Colonization was continuing unchecked and sinarquistas were growing in the U.S.
with activity in Los Angeles, El Paso and Las Cruces. The COI claimed that sinarquistas were
arriving from California into the peninsula to agitate. These sinarquistas formed a California unit
called itself “El Sol Naciente” or “The Rising Sun,” suggesting possible Japanese connections
from the agency. The Office of the Coordinator of Information intelligence agency believed that
the Ávila Camacho government needed to address Axis forces in Mexico before they grew out of
hand.78
The FBI was also concerned about the growth of the UNS in Mexico, especially in
relation to “totalitarian activities” occurring within the country. Although outside of the U.S.’s
borders, the FBI considered its neighbor to the south to be of vital importance economically,
politically and militarily. The latter was especially the case as the Mexican government formally
declared war on Germany, Italy and Japan on May 22, 1942, joining the U.S. in World War II.
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The bureau shared different concerns than the COI, but still believed that the sinarquistas
threatened the stability of Mexico. The FBI shared reports that the UNS colonization project was
a front for overthrowing the Mexican government. The sinarquistas were planning a coup and
sought to install the Governor of Baja California Sur, Francisco Mújica, as Mexico’s president.
The peninsula itself was militarily strategic during wartime. Although the region had Mexican
military presence, the FBI believed it was insufficient. A weak naval patrol oversaw the western
coast. Between 13,000 and 15,000 troops were stationed in the peninsula, with only about 3,000
in Baja California Sur. Near the site of María Auxiliadorawas Magdalena Bay, which had a
harbor and a Mexican Army landing field.79 The concern was that the Axis could dock ships and
invade from the harbor. The U.S. government did not believe the UNS’s intentions for its colony,
instead viewing the organization’s involvement in Baja California Sur as undermining
hemispheric security. Despite this fear on the part of the U.S. federal government, it took no
action regarding the colony, other than to continue to surveil the organization’s actions in the
peninsula.
Mounting Issues
Meanwhile in the colony, the residents were more concerned about growing internal
problems such as with its religious life than aiding the Axis. While Abascal led María
Auxiliadora’s development, Father Zavala was to oversee the maintenance of Catholic
spirituality. The colony paid the priest monthly for his services, but in the middle of 1942, he
abandoned the settlement and its residents. Father Campos replaced him in December, but he
was not free of issues. Campos was strict in his beliefs. Campos believed that residents needed to
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reject material comfort, chastising men for eating snacks of tomatoes, and Abascal for wearing
gloves. When Abascal sought to baptize his newborn child, Campos would not allow the baby’s
godfather to be from outside of the colony, forcing him to choose someone from within the
settlement. Eventually disagreements between the two led to Campos leaving the colony.80
As the colony had issues with its spiritual life, its financial issues did not disappear.
Secretary of Colonization Padilla made donation campaigns for the colonization effort a common
occurrence. This time around he was looking for funds for the next planting of crops in the
colony including corn, wheat, pears, dates and figs.81 He promoted the third contribution drive
for February 7, 1943 through a full-page advertisement in El Sinarquista. At the top of the page,
the paper published an image of the makeshift church in María Auxiliadora with a roof of reeds.
He reiterated the need for the colony, stating that “trusting in God, waiting for all his Providence
and the efforts of all Mexicans, a year ago we undertook this work pushing for a united nation”
by constructing settlements and cultivating new land.82 Padilla explained that because of the lack
of funds, the colonists lived in poverty without work, in large part because of not having enough
food nor fuel. Rather than engage exclusively with sinarquistas as Padilla had before, he made a
point of reaching out to all Mexicans: “Go to her, sinarquista. Go to her, Mexican.” “We invite
all sinarquistas and non-sinarquistas - also those who call themselves our enemies - to give their
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support and generous help to this enterprise that belongs to no one, but only to Mexico.”

83

Padilla reaffirmed the need for unifying the nation. The situation was so dire that he had to reach
out beyond the organization’s membership and appeal to the nationalism of all Mexicans.
Luckily, he indeed received an influx of donations as he had before, this time receiving more
funds from throughout Mexico, as well as from Los Angeles and San Francisco in the U.S.84
Money was a constant struggle for maintaining María Auxiliadora.
Mounting issues led to rumors increasingly being circulated about the colony being a
failure in 1943. Informants from the FBI reported that the colony was poorly managed and how
many colonists were going hungry. They believed that María Auxiliadora was in fact in decline.
U.S. and Mexican press corroborated this information, explaining that colonization was going
slowly and not leading to the goals that Salvador Abascal was touting at the end of 1941.85 Both
the U.S. government and the media portrayed such information as positive, perhaps signaling a
decline in the UNS as a whole.
This growing talk of failure prompted responses from the group. El Sinarquista’s editors
Alfonso Trueba and Jose Neder Quiñones pushed back, explaining that “we are poor, yes, and
work gives us support. But we sinarquistas know how to get out of the most difficult situations.
The colonies will continue to live. The generosity of our colleagues is inexhaustible and with our
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own scarce resources, we will move forward.” Sinarquista Salvador Navarro visited the colony
86

in mid-1943 also addressed these concerns. He admitted that there were issues, particularly the
desert, lack of diversity of food and the loss of labor over time. Nonetheless, he highlighted the
daily routine that the colonists maintained over time, especially admiring their strong work ethic.
Navarro did admit that Abascal was having issues with rumors of failure. He described how “the
gossip, the intrigues, the slander, the ingratitude and the tremendous weight of his responsibility,
have aged him. In the 18 months that the colony has existed, Abascal has lived a whole life full
of bitterness. But, nevertheless, he is strong and optimistic.”87 The attacks on sinarquismo, and
on the colony in particular, were mounting. Abascal had a grandiose plan to create a colony not
just in María Auxiliadora, but criticism existed from the very beginning and was simply not
going away.
The Ávila Camacho government that previously agreed to sinarquista colonization in the
peninsula back in 1941 was beginning to see that the project was not working out as originally
intended by July 1943. The Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (General
Directorate of Political and Social Investigations or DGIPS), the government’s intelligence
agency, conducted a study of María Auxiliadora, interviewing many of its colonists, as well as
Salvador Abascal, noting issues particularly in relationship to the management of the colony.
DGIPS found that Abascal was becoming increasingly authoritarian, focusing much of his
oversight of the colony on ensuring that the people stayed and did not leave the settlement, in
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order for them to work. He encouraged single male colonists to have children with indigenous
women from Baja California Sur, committing them to the colony while also birthing future
colonists. Abascal also had a tactic of not allowing colonists to earn enough salary for them to
afford the return trip home to the Bajío. The leader divided up any necessary supplies, including
food, through a ration system. DGIPS noted that while the colony began with high morale among
its residents, in large part tied to sinarquista culture – meetings, songs and celebrations – that was
no longer the case.88
In March and April 1944, journalist Carlos Velasco Gil also examined the debate swirling
around whether the colony was indeed a failure in a two-part series in Mañana magazine titled,
“El Nuevo Moisés” (The New Moses), in reference to Abascal. More than anything, Velasco Gil
sought to prove that Abascal’s project was indeed not working and that he was masquerading as
a new prophet. Velasco Gil detailed the issues that the colonists had with the climate, not having
a reliable source of water, as well as the lack of supplies to construct truly a great society. He
described that the “the dreamed city of Abascal, with its great universities, factories and
convents, was a bitter dream that no one wanted to remember.”89 What was once a grandiose
plan to build a vast new Mexican civilization across the peninsula ended up being an isolated
little village in the middle of the desert.
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Not long after the exposé, Salvador Abascal ended up being forced out of the very colony
that he dreamt up. The sinarquista national committee in Mexico City under the leadership of
President Manuel Torres Bueno – and with Antonio Santacruz behind the scenes – viewed
Abascal as lacking the “ideals of the movement” and the “principles” of the sinarquista doctrine.
National leaders initially wanted to isolate Abascal from the UNS by having him lead the
colonization of Baja California Sur in late 1941, but by 1944, he was tarnishing the image of the
movement as a whole. The national leadership ended up replacing him with José Valadez and
Valentín Lozada as leaders of the colony.90
Mutiny occurred against the new leaders of María Auxiliadora. A group of over 34
people left the colony, claiming that they sought to serve Abascal and if he had to depart, they
would do the same. In an open letter, these individuals explained their complete dismay at
having Abascal’s integralist Mexican society vanish:
We thought we would live until the day of our death in that colony, dripping with our
sweat and with the tears of our families. We dreamed of seeing the desert blossom and to
form a Christian community, without expecting any other reward than that of that blessed
land that would shelter our bodies after death.91
These former colonists instead would instead return back to their homes in the Bajío, teaching
their children in their “Holy Religion” of Catholicism and that it was the only institution that
they needed to obey. They articulated that they broke off from “a sinarquismo that no longer is
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sinarquismo because it now does not conform with the Christian spirit.” These individuals gave
92

their lives to Abascal’s colonization project and were truly dedicated themselves to it, despite its
growing problems. Once he was gone, no longer would they be colonists nor sinarquistas.
Abascal’s dream was over.
The colony continued on for a while after Salvador Abascal left, yet the UNS under
Manuel Torres Bueno ultimately let María Auxiliadora die. Abascal’s plan for the Baja
California Sur colony was grand in scale in 1941 and yet it ended as a shadow of its former self
by 1944. Issues, whether caused by circumstances, the location or personality, hindered the
initial vision. Nonetheless, Abascal’s colony brought attention to the peninsula of Baja
California, briefly providing an alternative version of Mexican society.
Villa Kino, Sonora
In 1941, Villa Kino was a secondary colonization project in relation to María
Auxiliadora. Abascal honed in on Baja California, yet nonetheless did have interest in colonizing
Sonora. Sonora was on the other side of the Sea of Cortes from the peninsula of Baja California
and he believed that the two needed to be connected to unite Mexico. José Trueba Olivares
would direct this colony rather than Abascal. Although the leader was different, the overall idea
was similarly ambitious in establishing a settlement for sinarquistas to live on their own, work
hard and practice their faith. Despite the vision, the size of the colony combined with conditions
ultimately impeded its success.
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Planning Villa Kino
The UNS saw Sonora as a vital place to colonize. Similar to the peninsula of Baja
California, there was a lack of sinarquista influence in the state for quite some time. Sonora was
one of the last states not to have the presence of a sinarquista committee.93 Over the course of
1941, Felipe Navarro of the sinarquista national committee visited Sonora several times to
establish a chapter on behalf of the movement. In particular, he focused on training individuals to
“conquer” Sonora on behalf of sinarquismo in the town of Nogales on the Mexico-United States
border, but was facing considerable difficulty. Navarro claimed that “we need much patience and
tenacity to go conquering little by little these cold people. Sometimes it gives us despair,
especially with the youth who ignore us; but we do not lose faith; the more difficulties we face,
the more courageously we fight.”94 Navarro described the people of Nogales as wayward and
who needed to be brought into the sinarquista fold. By December, Navarro ended up having
success in Navojoa, a city located farther south than Nogales and closer to the coast of the Sea of
Cortés.95 The sinarquistas were finally starting to make inroads into Sonora. Although not as
sparsely populated as Baja California Sur, it was geographically as strategic because of its
location on the Sea of Cortés.96 By managing the land around the gulf, the UNS could bring
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together and unite Mexico. Having control of the state’s people and resources would give the
movement an upper hand over the Mexican state.
The UNS purchased a plot of land on the coast of Sonora honoring a Catholic priest
instrumental in Spanish colonization. The colony was located on Kino Bay named after Father
Eusebio Francisco Kino, S.J., an individual that the UNS admired. As with sinarquismo and the
overall project of colonizing the north of Mexico, the movement sought to honor the nation’s
Spanish heritage rather than its mestizo one. Kino was a Jesuit missionary who originated from
the Bishopric of Trent and lived from 1645 to 1711. Kino received holy orders from the Society
of Jesus to proselytize the indigenous populations in New Spain, first in the peninsula of Baja
California and later in the Pimería Alta of what later became Sonora and Arizona. His
expeditions of the region led to the creation of more than two dozen missions and brought about
the colonization of the region.97 The sinarquista national committee sought to bring a new wave
of colonization to the region such as Father Kino had.
Representatives of the UNS national committee scoped out the land prior to the arrival of
the colonists at the end of November. The site ninety kilometers southwest of Sonora’s capital of
Hermosillo contained approximately 2,000 hectares.98 The leader of the colony, José Trueba
Olivares, met with Felipe Navarro and a representative of the Yaqui indigenous people to tour
the colony’s site. They spent one day and one night at the site, and Trueba Olivares was instantly
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impressed at the richness of the arid, yet “virgin land.” With a little water, he believed that
anything could grow from wheat to olives to tobacco. He portrayed it as a promised land and that
it just needed to be cleared of mesquite and cactus. Trueba Olivares was obviously optimistic
about the location, but needed the right people to make the settlement thrive.99
As with the main colony, sinarquista leadership were very selective in who could reside,
work and practice their faith in the colony. Trueba Olivares asserted that “we need the settlers to
be the best sinarquistas; that they do not cower in the face of difficulties, that they have initiative,
a well-formed character and a Christian life.” He awaited the orders of the sinarquista president
and looked forward to the colonists that the UNS national committee would choose.100 In
December, the organization’s leadership indeed chose the sinarquistas who would live in Sonora
and they departed in the middle of the month.
Concerns of the Colony’s Connection to the Axis
Opponents of the UNS claimed that the group had Axis connections and rumors circled
around Japanese influence in Sonora as they did in the peninsula of Baja California at the same
time. Xenophobia combined with wartime fear prompted anxiety about the population in the
state. The Liga Nacional Campesina (National Farmworkers League) shared a report with
President Ávila Camacho in late 1941 about possible infiltration. The organization claimed that
an engineer by the name of Yokama, was the chief of the “Japanese fifth column” in Ensenada,
Baja California and was in the process of organizing an armed attack. His trained guerillas would
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start an armed attack in Sonora, passing into Arizona then west, and back into Mexico in Baja
California. Such a plan would distract both the Mexican and U.S. militaries, allowing Axis
troops to disembark on the west coast of Mexico.101 This plan did not come to fruition, however
similar reports persisted into the following year.
The U.S. government also worried about foreign intrusion into Sonora by the Japanese.
The United States Army’s intelligence unit compiled a long list of individuals who it deemed to
be connected to the Axis in the region. On the list were Japanese and Germans residing in Sonora
from Hermosillo to Navojoa. These foreigners were residing in the state and had connections
with municipal and state officials, but the worry was that they could use such affiliations against
Mexico.102 The FBI did pinpoint Japanese influence close to Villa Kino. The agency reported a
Japanese rancher residing twenty-four kilometers to the east of Kino Bay who was suspected by
local residents as against the interests of the U.S. and Mexico. Not only that, the FBI believed
that the area immediate to the bay was strategic. The bay itself had a vast beach area that could
be utilized by the Japanese or Axis powers for landing operations of troops or planes. Just inland,
an extensive piece of flat open land could be used for an improvised landing strip for
planes.103Although there was no proven link between the sinarquistas in Sonora and the Axis,
such a plan to create a colony in the state during wartime appeared to be a threat.
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Building and Sustaining the Colony
By early 1942, José Trueba Olivares established the colony of initially 85 people on the
coast of Sonora. Whereas the Baja California Sur colony was populated by individuals from
throughout the Bajío, the Sonoran colonists all came from the stronghold of sinarquismo in
Mexico – León, Guanajuato. After arriving to San Blas, Nayarit from Guadalajara, the group
made its way north along the coast up to Sonora. The colonists briefly met up with fellow
sinarquistas in Navojoa before heading to Hermosillo and then eventually to the site on the Sea
of Cortés.104
The colonization effort in Villa Kino took off slowly, constructing temporary shelters and
then working to create a more established community. Trueba Olivares emphasized the
importance of sinarquistas working from the ground-up, creating the colony from scratch. He
oversaw the development of the colony, first constructing huts, eventually working towards more
permanent structures.105 They then transitioned into building adobe houses, with Trueba
Olivares’ hopes of eventually building 30,000. He sought to take advantage of resources in and
around the colony. The colonists planned on extracting rocks from a nearby hill for the
construction of more structures. They were also in the early stages of cultivating crops for
sustenance.106
The principal project among colonists at the beginning was the construction of the “Casa
Común” (Common House) which served as the colony’s church. El Sinarquista poetically
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described the building “whose foundations were laid on February 6 and whose walls are already
humble but strong.An airy tower that is already twelve meters high and on which our tricolor
flag floats - shaken by the wind.”107 The structure stood above the rest of Villa Kino as a sign of
not only the colony’s progress, but as a sign of the sinarquistas’ service to the nation. As with
María Auxiliadora,such a project was uniting Mexico. This building would serve as the
centerpiece of the development of Villa Kino and documentation of the colony frequently
showed the building.108
Trueba Olivares as well as the secretary of colonization Juan Ignacio Padilla sought the
buy-in of all sinarquistas to both sustain and build-out Villa Kino. Although less publicized and
smaller than María Auxiliadora, the colony was no less important. Trueba Olivares traveled from
Villa Kino to Mexico City for the fourth annual UNS Assembly in December 1942. It was there
where he updated sinarquistas from the U.S. and Mexico about the colony and the progress it
was making.109 However, it could not survive without the aid of all members. Padilla’s regular
fundraising campaigns promoted by El Sinarquista and promoted via assemblies at committees
across North America pushed for support of both colonies. In the case of Villa Kino, the
donations particularly were helpful in regards to construction and in sustaining the colonists with
food. The hope, however, was to move beyond providing sustenance towards the point where the
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colony could be self-sustaining, gaining strength, support and influence in Sonora and beyond in
Northern Mexico.
Problems in Villa Kino and Its Demise
By March 1943, sustenance did indeed come from the outside as the colonists could not
maintain the settlement. As sinarquistas from the U.S. and Mexico funded Villa Kino by
donating to Padilla’s colonization drives, the colonists had some funds, yet not a lot. Trueba
Olivares distributed the money respectively to single persons and members of families. Villa
Kino could only survive as long as sinarquistas continued to support the colonization effort.110
Trueba Olivares’ plans for a vast development did not materialize. Colonists began to see
the small colony as a failure. Families slowly left the colony, heading back to Guanajuato. The
colony only had eight families left. The settlement featured only a church and five adobe houses
with some families sharing houses. The houses had dirt floors and roofs covered with reeds,
straw and dirt. The isolation of the location, combined with discouragement and ill health, did
not help matters in building up the colony.111
Agriculture was to be instrumental to the success of the colony. Trueba Olivares claimed
from the onset that the site of Villa Kino was ideal for agriculture, yet he was a lawyer by
profession and had no experience in agriculture. Some colonists had expertise in working the
land, however they were used to the fertile land of Guanajuato and not the desert climate of
Sonora. They were accessing water from wells, yet it was unreliable. The colonists were
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disappointed with the crops they could produce given the resources they had access to. The
residents of Villa Kino relied on trips to neighboring towns for food and supplies.112
By 1944, Villa Kino faced its end. There was a split between José Trueba Olivares’ idea
and reality. His vision of a settlement with tens of thousands of adobe houses, flourishing
agriculture as well as successful development did not come to be. The colony was to be a place
where colonists could live a disciplined, Catholic life. Villa Kino was barely staying afloat and
could not persist without outside assistance. Colonists could not concern themselves with their
faith when they were concerned about basic survival. The UNS intended for a colony like Villa
Kino to thrive and be a shining example of sinarquismo, but it was the opposite.
The Other Colonies
The UNS was not done with colonization in 1944. The colonies were not meeting the
vision set out for them in 1941 and yet the organization under the leadership of Manuel Torres
Bueno supported having even more of them in other parts of Northern Mexico. He wanted to
garner more support for the movement which had since been waning and believed colonization
was the way to go. The colonies that did take off only lasted for a short period of time. The
multi-year saga of colonization was coming to an end.
San Miguel Arcángel, Santa María del Refugio, and San José Opodepe
Juan Ignacio Padilla left the post of Secretary of Colonization and Manuel Torres Bueno
replaced him with Gustavo Arizmendi who pursued more colonies, despite the pre-existing ones
failing. Padilla could see that the writing was on wall in regards to the colonies. Arizmendi,
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however, did not give up hope, picking up where Padilla left off. He believed that the colonies
could be salvaged through the continued support of sinarquistas on both sides of the Mexico-U.S.
border. Arizmendi published a piece in El Sinarquista:
The enterprise of colonization requires generous donations and no negotiation.
Sinarquismo currently maintains four colonies: María Auxiliadora in Baja California,
Villa Kino in Sonora, Santa María del Refugio in Tamaulipas and San Miguel Arcangel
in Durango. Butlet's not settle for the mediocrity of colonies that can hardly be
maintained. We aspireto make them prosper. Sinarquista, do your duty cooperating in
this common work.113
He, like his predecessor, sought to see the colonies thrive. Arizmendi did admit that they were at
the point of failure and sinarquistas needed to keep them afloat.114 Perhaps with more colonies,
members could give even more to the overall effort.
Arizmendi oversaw colonies elsewhere in Northern Mexico. Local committees in
Durango and Tamaulipas started San Miguel Arcángel (Holy Michael, the Archangel) and Santa
María del Refugio (Holy Mary of Refuge) in the respective states, which were very small in
comparison to María Auxiliadora and Villa Kino.115 Whereas San Miguel Arcángel was far from
the Mexico-U.S. Border, Santa María del Refugio was close to the border city of Matamoros.
Both were essentially subsidiaries of the efforts of municipal sinarquista chapters.
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Later in 1944, Arizmendi did facilitate the colonization of San José Opodepe, Sonora
from the level of the UNS national committee. As before, sinarquistas left their home in the
Bajío for a colony in the north, this time for a settlement 138 kilometers to the north of the state
capital of Hermosillo. Fifteen sinarquista families abandoned their town of Janamuato,
Michoacán because of issues with the postrevolutionary Mexican government for a new life
showing their “moral greatness” and “profound love of the motherland.”116 What set this colony
apart was not only sinarquistas arriving from Michoacán, but was that members were arriving
from the U.S. The leader of the colony was the former secretary-treasurer of the Los Angeles
Regional Committee in California, Baltazar de Luna. Additional colonists set to return were the
former Fresno committee chief Juan Enciso, ex-McAllen committee chief Jesús María Dávila,
and former Los Angeles chief Pedro Villaseñor. The sinarquistas in the U.S. that were supposed
to repatriate to Mexico never did.117 The notion that Mexicans would under their own volition
move back to Mexico appealed to the nationalist sinarquistas, yet it was difficult for them to
leave their jobs and families in the U.S. In the end, the actual colony was quite small, composed
of only de Luna and the sinarquistas from Michoacán. San José Opodepe was without enough
resources to survive as a sinarquista colony.
The UNS under Manuel Torres Bueno attempted to drive more support for the cause of
colonization by implementing more projects. The two long-standing colonies had failed and so
the organization began a slew of others. The issue was that the movement was already losing

El Sinarquista mentions how sinarquistas are showing their “grandeza moral y de profundo amor de la patria.”
“En Qué Condiciones Marchan los Nuevos Colonos,” El Sinarquista, February 10, 1944. The amount is 86 miles.
“Sinarquista Colony To Be Started in Sonora,” The Brownsville Herald, January 31, 1944.
116

“En Qué Condiciones Marchan los Nuevos Colonos,” El Sinarquista, February 10, 1944; Lucila Villaseñor
Grijalva, María Elena Villaseñor, and Alicia O. Colunga, Interview by Nathan Ellstrand, June 14, 2020.
117

166
support from its members because of its growing negative reputation combined with
organizational in-fighting. The sinarquista colonization project was a dream that could only last
so long.
Conclusion
Salvador Abascal led the Unión Nacional Sinarquista during its height, working to put
ideology into action. Rather than working within the confines of postrevolutionary Mexican
society, Abascal envisioned a plan to colonize and take over regions that had been previously
neglected. This way the sinarquistas could develop these areas while establishing ideal
settlements that represented its values of discipline, organization, Catholicism and finally
completing where Spanish conquistadores failed. Abascal developed the colony of María
Auxiliadora as he considered the peninsula of Baja California of the utmost importance as it was
underpopulated and isolated from the rest of the country. José Trueba Olivares oversaw the
colonization of Sonora as the state linked the peninsula to the nation. The plans for colonies were
ambitious, but ultimately failed due to mounting internal and external issues. The UNS later on
attempted other colonies, but the movement’s reputation waned and its membership could no
longer support such efforts.
Meanwhile, sinarquistas were facing growing scrutiny in the United States between 1941
to 1943 as the nation delved deeper into the Second World War. No longer was the UNS at its
height. Media outlets raised even more suspicion about the group as a fifth column organization.
In Southern California in particular, the press connected the sinarquistas with instigating criminal
activity among Mexican youth, bringing about the Sleepy Lagoon incident and Zoot Suit Riots.
The UNS faced opposition through anti-sinarquista government committees and the political left.
Communists also targeted the group. The organization went on the defensive, taking on a pro-

167
war stance and publicly denounced fascism. Catholic American allies worked to support the
sinarquistas, even sponsoring a public relations tour to change the perception of the group in the
U.S. The sinarquistas in the U.S. faced the beginning of the end following 1941, but they did not
give up without a fight.

CHAPTER FOUR
SINARQUISTAS PLACED ON THE DEFENSIVE – 1941-1943
Synarchism has been maliciously slandered with the accusation of being influenced by
Nazists, Fascists, Falangists, etc., and thus constituting a ‘fifth column’ at the service of
totalitarianism. It is false that Synarchism has ever considered a totalitarian system. It
will have nothing to do with the idolators of the Omnipresent State.1
The Los Angeles Regional Committee of the Unión Nacional Sinarquista responded to
and denounced any association that the movement was connected with European-based fascism
in 1942. The chapter distributed its English-language pamphlet, Synarchism – its Program,
throughout not only Southern California, but across the United States. Although the Mexican
nationalist organization was composed of and focused on Mexicans, the committee felt
compelled to reach out to English-speaking people beyond the movement. Accusations that the
UNS was linked to the Axis powers in World War II continued, but rumors also emerged that the
movement was creating instability among the Mexican community in Los Angeles – and beyond.
From the U.S. entry into World War II in December 1941 to the Zoot Suit Riots in June
1943, the UNS could no longer operate freely without scrutiny. The group experienced its height
between 1940 and 1941 and advanced its ambitious project to colonize the north of Mexico in
the years that followed. The war, however, placed the movement under scrutiny. Advocates on
behalf of the Mexican community in the U.S. wanted to address the social issues that the
population faced for decades, known colloquially at the time as the “Mexican problem.”
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Connected to the “problem” was the emerging rumor that the UNS was going to feed upon such
issues to sway the population in favor of the Axis. The Sleepy Lagoon murder and associated
court case at the end of 1942, which focused on the supposed threat of Mexican youth
delinquency in Los Angeles, led to speculation about the group’s involvement. Eventually, this
resulted in the California Un-American Activities Committee led by California state politician
Jack B. Tenney to investigate the UNS as one among other fascist and communist movements in
1942 and 1943. The Zoot Suit Riots in early June 1943 between U.S. servicemen and Mexican
residents of the city led to further scrutiny and another such investigation of the sinarquistas. The
media, governments, and the political left targeted the UNS more than in previous years.
The UNS pushed back against the opposition. In Los Angeles, the regional committee
held documentary screenings to demonstrate that they were not connected with European
fascism. The UNS also made use of ties with conservative U.S. Catholics more than ever. The
movement utilized connections that it formed with U.S. Catholic leadership through the National
Catholic Welfare Conference. Organization leaders also connected with Catholic laity and clergy
across the U.S. including Frank Gross, Reverend Alcuin Heibel, O.S.B., and Bishop Edwin
O’Hara to amplify the organization’s narrative. These individuals wrote pieces defending the
UNS, and in the case of O’Hara, he even sponsored a tour of sinarquista leaders to college
campuses around the U.S. The UNS believed that there was still time to convince hearts and
minds in the U.S. that its cause was a just one.
The period between 1941 and 1943 was one of attack and response. The press,
government forces, and left-wing organizations asserted that the Unión Nacional Sinarquista
compromised United States national security in the middle of world war. As a result, the
organization went on the defensive, utilizing its members and American allies to attempt to
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change the narrative. They argued how youth delinquency ran contrary to order, and that threats
of danger were socially constructed. The attacks on the Unión Nacional Sinarquista outweighed
any attempts to counteract them because of the concerted effort to root out any opposition to the
war effort, leading to the beginning of the end of the sinarquistas in the United States by 1943.
The Unión Nacional Sinarquista as a Fifth Column?
The Unión Nacional Sinarquista faced attacks for years, but the offensive changed as the
United States entered World War II. No longer was the organization simply surveilled by the
Department of State or compared to fascism in the media. The assaults on the group grew as the
sinarquistas’ supposed association with the Falange Española and Nazi Germany compromised a
nation now at war. The dominant white population already looked down upon Mexicans in the
U.S. Southwest and being an organization of nationalist Mexicans within the country’s
boundaries made matters worse. The Sleepy Lagoon murder and respective trial as well as the
Zoot Suit Riots were key moments in which engrained racism led to a mobilization among
Mexicans for civil rights. In the case of the UNS, liberal and left-wing ethnic Mexican political
organizations used the repression both to discredit conservative Mexicans and to encourage the
government to suppress them.
Perception of the UNS as an Internal Threat During Wartime
The U.S. government had its sights on the UNS as a fifth column more than ever. The
Office of the Coordinator of Information surveilled the movement in Mexico, especially in
relation to its colonization plan, as well as in the United States. According to the office, the
organization proved as much a threat to the U.S. as it did to Mexico. The Coordinator of
Information believed the UNS to be a well-developed fascist movement controlled by the Axis
and ready for social and military activities. Its widespread development of committees
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throughout the U.S. Southwest and Midwest showed that it established roots in the country. The
Coordinator of Information also noticed sinarquismo’s U.S. Catholic sympathizers, citing the
radio priest Reverend Charles Coughlin, as well as the Reverend John O’Grady who previously
defended the movement in September 1941.2 The Department of Justice, like the Coordinator of
Information, was carefully watching the UNS. The department arrived on many of the same
findings, however it pointed out the effect that the movement was having on Mexican
communities in the U.S. It drew a correlation between the establishment of sinarquista
committees in the country and reduced war morale among the Mexican population in those
respective communities. The Department of Justice came to the conclusion that the organization
was lowering the interest of Mexicans in the war effort.3 The department worried about the UNS
would divide the population when the nation was in a state of total war. The government
certainly did not residents to be undermined by what it viewed as an enemy group.
Other U.S. government offices viewed the UNS as an internal threat, controlling the
dissemination of sinarquista material as the country delved deeper into World War II. The U.S.
Post Office Department started limiting the mailing of El Sinarquista in 1941, preventing its
delivery to the movement’s members and supporters living in the U.S. Although the post office
allowed for some issues of the paper to be delivered, others were deemed “non-mailable,”
principally because the department saw them as containing “foreign propaganda.”4 Similarly, the
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newly-created U.S. Office of Censorship restricted correspondence relating to sinarquismo
between Mexico and the U.S., as well as domestically. The office blocked any reference to the
movement to prevent its spread. Such material included letters on what sinarquismo was,
minutes from sinarquista meetings, as well as correspondence commenting how Mexicans could
support the sinarquista colonization project.5 These government offices believed that by
controlling information about the movement, the UNS would have less of opportunity to win
over potential supporters and would therefore be less of a threat to the country.
Fear of sinarquismo as an internal threat existed beyond the government and on the
ground where sinarquista committees existed. The Bakersfield, California chapter was one of the
more well-known because it was a regional committee and its chiefs, first Porfirio Rivera and
later José Cleofas Rojas, led efforts to spread sinarquismo throughout the Central Valley and
Northern California. Sinarquismo began to face scrutiny in the region. Merle Taylor of the
Bakersfield Women’s Club hosted a talk in January 1942 to her fellow members on panAmericanism and how the sinarquistas proved to be a threat to the policy. Elliott J. Taylor of the
Reedley Junior College faculty spoke to the club warning the women of the sinarquistas, arguing
that they were pro-Nazi fifth column and grew through espionage and sabotage of Hitler’s
agents. Taylor argued that they seemed harmless, but that “we are apt to underestimate the power
and influence of the enemy.” According to him, pan-Americanism was necessary for
hemispheric peace and all Americans needed to support President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
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efforts towards a Good Neighbor Policy. The sinarquistas’ existence as a nationalist force in the
6

context of the U.S., such as in Bakersfield, violated that peace.
Sinarquista committees in the U.S. felt compelled to demonstrate that the movement was
not a fifth column. UNS branches made a point of showing their allegiance to both Mexico and
the U.S., dispelling the notion that the movement was an internal threat to either nation. The El
Paso chapter of the UNS, hosted an assembly in honor of Mexico’s Flag Day. The celebration at
the city’s St. Ignatius Auditorium addressed attacks on the organization. Sergio Arriola, a leader
in El Paso’s regional committee, pushed back against accusations and believed that it was time
for sinarquista members, like himself, to give their side of the story. He asked “what has
Sinarquismo done to be called Fifth Columnist?” Arriola placed an emphasis how the group
cared deeply about the current state of Mexico, but caused no harm. He also asserted the
sinarquistas’ respect for the U.S., explaining that “countless times our movement has publicly
declared itself friendly to the United States.”7 The El Paso sinarquista committee closed out the
meeting singing the U.S. and Mexican national anthems. Its members attempted to demonstrate
to the public that it had transnational ties to both Mexico and the U.S.
Down the Rio Grande in McAllen, Texas, the UNS chapter also made a point of
dissociating itself from the fifth column label. Like the El Paso committee, the McAllen
committee partook in local festivities to honor Mexican holidays. McAllen sinarquistas
organized the Cinco de Mayo parade alongside the local Concordia and Guadalupana societies.8
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In addition to celebrations, the committee organized a drive to finance U.S. military operations
during World War II. Male members of the youth branch of the McAllen sinarquista committee
including José M. Ponce, Leonardo Zamora, and Mauro Pérez sold $915.60 worth of war stamps
and bonds in support.9 McAllen sinarquistas worked to demonstrate not only their local
commitment to the war effort, but that the UNS as a whole did not oppose the Allies in World
War II. They pushed back against accusations that the sinarquistas did not support the war effort.
Although sinarquistas were political Mexicans residing within the borders of the U.S., they
aimed to show that they were not enemies, but allies.
Concerns About Mexicans and the Broader Spanish-Speaking Community in the U.S.
As the Mexican population increased in the Southwestern United States from the 1910s
into the 1940s, scholars and government officials increasingly studied the community and what
became known as the “Mexican problem.” Two individuals – Carey McWilliams and George I.
Sánchez – connected the “problem” with the domestic situation during World War II.
McWilliams, a lawyer, writer, and the Chief of California’s Division of Immigration and
Housing, defended and worked alongside migrant farmworkers, many of whom were Mexican,
and developed an interest in the community. He believed that they were neglected and that the
federal government had a responsibility, especially during wartime, to make sure that all
individuals in the region were brought into the nation, even if they were not citizens.10 Similarly,
Sánchez, a professor at the University of Texas at Austin and the national president of the
League of United Latin American Citizens, a Mexican American civil rights organization, was
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concerned about the welfare of Mexicans in the U.S. He called attention to the community and
issues it faced with poverty and discrimination, pushing for the U.S. government to act.11 Both
McWilliams and Sánchez turned to the United States Office of the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs (OCIAA) to address these issues.12
In late 1941, Carey McWilliams reached out to the coordinator, Nelson A. Rockefeller,
laying out his specific concerns and proposing a solution. He explained that Mexicans had a
sense of divided loyalty – one between Mexico and the United States. In California and Texas,
they had not been fully or partially assimilated because of their working-class status and Spanish
language. McWilliams believed that Mexicans in the U.S. faced “many years of manifold
discrimination both with respect to work opportunities, educational facilities and access to public
services. It has been this fact, more than any other consideration, which has made the Mexicans a
permanently disadvantaged, underprivileged social group.” He believed that in order to foster
positive hemispheric relations in preventing the spread of the Axis in the region, the U.S.
government also needed to respect Latin Americans within its own borders. McWilliams laid out
an ambitious proposal to bring in Mexicans into U.S. society. He proposed that the “most
effective way to improve Latin-American relations is for the national government to take public
cognizance of the problems faced by this resident Mexican population.” McWilliams wanted to
see the establishment of a committee in California composed of public officials, social workers,
professors and representatives from the Mexican community. The committee would study

11

See George I. Sanchez, Forgotten People: A Study of New Mexicans (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1940).
12

The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) was formerly the Office for Coordination of
Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (OCCCRBAR).

176
discrimination, economic problems and import Mexican labor. It would encourage citizenship,
forums focused on the community and legislation to benefit the population.13
Around the same time, George I. Sánchez also reached out to Rockefeller. Like
McWilliams, he also envisioned a committee, but his was more an investigatory group. Sánchez
submitted a proposal for funding from the OCIAA in December 1941 to create a national
research commission that would study the conditions of Mexicans in the U.S. Southwest. This
government body would consist of seven academics and three government officials to investigate
the matter. Sánchez did not hear anything from the office early the next year, so he followed up.
He believed that Rockefeller needed to move as quickly as possible to address issues in the
Southwest.14
The OCIAA responded to these advocacy efforts to focus on addressing the issues of
Mexicans in the U.S. The proposals of McWilliams and Sánchez, combined with federal reports
that came out during late 1941 and early 1942, insisted that the incorporation of Mexicans into
American society was a wartime issue, necessitated a response.15 Rockefeller supported the
creation of the Division of Inter-American Activities in the United States in March 1942, which
established the Program for Cooperation with Spanish Speaking Minorities in the United States
shortly thereafter. The program worked with public and private groups to “harmonize Spanish

13

Letter from Carey McWilliams to Nelson A. Rockefeller, October 15, 1941, Box 1717, Folder: McWilliams,
Carey – Plan, RG 229, NARA.
Natalie Mendoza, “The Good Neighbor Comes Home” (PhD Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
2016), 21; John M. Clark, “Problems of Resident Latin Americans,” N.D., Box 1717, Folder: Folder: Program for
Cooperation with Spanish Speaking Minorities in the United States, RG 229, NARA.
14

15

Emilio Zamora, Claiming Rights and Righting Wrongs in Texas: Mexican Workers and Job Politics during WWII
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009): 73-75, 263 n22 and n23; For one such report, see Paul
Horgan, “United States Latins in the Southwest, A Domestic Wartime Responsibility with Foreign Overtones,”
January 1942, Box 1717, Folder: Paul Horgan, RG 229, NARA.

177
speaking minority groups in the United States with the American Way of Life.” It conducted a
field survey of residents throughout the Southwestern U.S. and consulted with government
agencies such as the Department of War and Department of Justice. The office pinpointed the
program’s purpose during wartime as Spanish-speaking people were isolated from the rest of the
population and that their loyalties could lie elsewhere. These people were easy prey for
“subversive propagandists and un-American ideologies.” The OCIAA saw the Axis as seeking to
undermine inter-American solidarity by highlighting the problems that the population faced in
the U.S. Such problems the program observed were juvenile delinquency, illiteracy, criminal
activity, unemployment, poverty, disease and malnutrition. The OCIAA therefore saw the
program’s role as providing leadership for the community, valuing the contribution the
population could make and educate white Americans of the issues of the Spanish-speaking
people.16 The office believed that supporting these people would aid the war effort and foster
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s policy of pan-Americanism.
The OCIAA’s Program for Cooperation with Spanish Speaking Minorities in the United
States implemented its work through public relations, monetary assistance and popular
education. The program worked closely with the office’s motion picture, radio, press, and
science, and education divisions to disseminate information among Spanish-speaking people. It
provided financial assistance to Barelas Community Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico and to
Taos County, New Mexico. The program also sought to foster education bring up Englishspeaking representatives from Mexico and by providing scholarships to “promising” Spanish-
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speaking high school students in the Southwest. Not only did the program seek to address
inequities among Mexicans in the U.S., it would combat fascism and any attempts to subvert the
government.
The Congreso Nacional de los Pueblos de Habla Español wanted to ensure that
Rockefeller and the OCIAA followed through, especially by dealing with the UNS. El Congreso
formed in 1939 as a progressive political coalition of various Hispanic populations in the United
States. El Congreso sympathized with the Communist Party of the United States of America’s
Popular Front against international fascism.18 The general secretary of the organization, Josefina
Fierro de Bright, had an eye on the anti-communist UNS. She made a point of gathering
information on the UNS, even having fellow El Congreso members infiltrate the organization.19
Fierro de Bright contacted Rockefeller on the eve of El Congreso’s fourth annual convention in
Los Angeles in May 1942. She emphasized how the group aligned with the OCIAA in seeking to
unify the community around the war effort at the convention. Fierro de Bright notified him that
the UNS and certain sections of the Catholic Church opposed the conference. El Sinarquista was
continuing to be sold and being consumed by Mexicans. She urged Rockefeller to curb the
movement’s activities and counteract them.20 Following the convention, Fierro de Bright notified
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Rockefeller of the resolutions that members of El Congreso passed. Many of the resolutions
overlapped with that of the Program for Cooperation with Spanish Speaking Minorities in the
United States, especially in regards to job training, employment discrimination and unifying
support of the Spanish-speaking community in the U.S. in support of the Allies. Most
importantly, El Congreso emphasized its support for hemispheric unity against “propaganda as
an anti-democratic influence” that was threatening “Pan-American Unity and sabotaging the War
efforts.”21 In doing so, the organization drew a parallel between pan-Americanism abroad as well
as at home. El Congreso believed that a movement such as the UNS and its publication
undermined World War II and needed to be stopped.
Sleepy Lagoon, Youth Delinquency and the Sinarquista “Fifth Column”
In Los Angeles, one event early in August 1942 would shape how the broader public saw
the UNS as a fifth column. On the night of August 1, José Díaz decided to attend a party at the
house of his neighbors, Amelio and Angela Delgadillo. Very early the next day, Díaz was
walking home and attacked. He was hit with several blows to his face, arms and head. Once he
collapsed onto the pavement, someone stabbed him twice in the stomach with an ice pick near
the swimming hole known as the Sleepy Lagoon. Díaz died a couple hours later in Los Angeles
General Hospital. City newspapers considered this act of violence as one of many among the
Mexican population on Los Angeles’ Eastside.22 If anything, the press viewed the attack on Díaz
as another example of youth delinquency and the broader “Mexican problem.” What normally
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would have been written off was elevated to national importance because public officials sought
to dig deeper, even blaming the UNS as the source as prompting the attack on Díaz.
By mid-August, the attacks on sinarquismo as a fascist fifth column surfaced again, this
time by government leaders arguing that the movement was provoking Mexican gang activity,
which supposedly killed Díaz. One such individual, Guy T. Nunn, a representative on the War
Manpower Commission of Minority Groups, claimed that the sinarquistas took advantage of the
“idleness” of Mexican youth to sway them away from democracy. Not only did Nunn say that
the UNS was a fascist organization attempting to create disturbances among the population, but
that “the Sinarquistas discourage participation in the war effort in any way.”23
Nunn’s accusation prompted a response from UNS national headquarters in Mexico City.
The national committee of the UNS under Manuel Torres Bueno responded that the organization
had no participation whatsoever in the disturbances, but rather that the organization tried to
support the U.S. in the war effort. As the sinarquistas had in the past, the Torres Bueno
administration emphasized the approval that the group had from the U.S. government as part of
the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The UNS leadership specifically noted how it was
encouraging Mexicans in the U.S. not only to purchase bonds to support the war effort, but to be
grateful for the hospitality that the U.S. gave them. It considered the claim that the movement
was a Mexican fascist organization to be slander rooted in propaganda spread by leftist
extremists in Mexico.24 The UNS national committee swore that the group’s opponents – such as
in labor and the Mexican Chamber of Deputies – fueled Nunn’s statement.
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Within Los Angeles, the movement’s supporters spoke out. The Reverend Manuel A.
Canseco of Los Angeles’ Church of Our Lady of Guadalupe defended sinarquistas in the city. He
considered Nunn’s charges to be “absurd.” Canseco believed it was outrageous “that anyone,
much less a person in a responsible government position should charge our Los Angeles youth
with being instigators or promoters of disorderly gangs either here or elsewhere.”25 He rejected
what he saw as an outlandish claim.
Despite the denial of such accusations, others picked up on and amplified Nunn’s notion
that Axis-inspired agents inspired youth delinquency in Southern California. Mexican workers of
the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, Local 26 claimed that Mexican
young adults were defaming the American flag and tearing down war propaganda posters. They
believed that the sinarquistas inspired and directed such actions and called on the Department of
Justice to investigate the movement within Los Angeles County.26 Others concerned about Axis
influence included Elis M. Tipton, a teacher at San Dimas Elementary School in the Los Angeles
region, reached out to the OCIAA in October. She remarked about the outbreaks of gang activity
in the region and how law enforcement was reporting that Axis agents were distributing
marijuana among the youth. Tipton mentioned that “Axis propaganda has been widely
disseminated among the Mexicans here and throughout the Southwest, and we find that many
Mexicans are secretly in sympathy with the Germans and Japanese whom they like and greatly
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admire.” Like Nunn, some Southern Californians believed that agents in their midst were
27

misguiding juvenile Mexicans.
Even those from Mexico had something to say on the situation in and around Los
Angeles. Later in October, El Congreso’s Josefina Fierro de Bright invited Ernesto Félix Díaz
Escobar to come to Los Angeles from Mexico to speak to the city’s Mexican community. Díaz
Escobar was a lawyer, the head of the organization and propaganda section of Mexico’s Comité
Nacional Antinazifascista (National Anti-Nazi-Fascist Committee, formerly the Comité Nacional
Antisinarquista), and brother to committee president and Mexican politician, Alfredo Félix Díaz
Escobar. Díaz Escobar described that he was confident that “the organization has a foothold
among Mexicans in Los Angeles and other sections. The Sinarquistas, in turn, are being used by
Axis agents and fifth columnists who find them an excellent agency to promote disunity within
Mexico and bad feelings between Mexicans and citizens of the United States.” Díaz Escobar
admitted that “while our Antinazifascista Committee has been unable find conclusive proof that
Axis agents are financing the Sinarquista movement, the money must come from somewhere.”
He sought to create local committees to educate gang members that they were subject to Axis
influence and that it was their patriotic duty so as not to let racial friction impede the war effort.28
Advocates on behalf of the Mexican community identified not only the enemy, but one such
cross-national solution to youth delinquency. Díaz Escobar’s idea was that if the gangs did not
receive some form of intervention, the sinarquistas could infiltrate and corrupt them even more.
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Once again, the UNS felt compelled to respond, this time sinarquistas on the ground in
Los Angeles. Pedro Villaseñor, leader of the regional sinarquista committee, issued a statement
to the press directly responding to Díaz Escobar. He asserted how the sinarquistas were not a tool
of the Axis, but rather reiterated a line that the UNS used before – that the movement was
opposed to communism, fascism, Nazism, and the Falange Española. Villaseñor wanted to set
the record straight about sinarquismo, explaining that sinarquista “means ‘anti-anarchist’ and it is
well named Sinarquism [as] it demands an end to class war.”29 He sought to distance the local
chapter of the organization from any association as an internal enemy while clarifying what the
overall movement was. Such accusations of the UNS as a fifth column did not go away,
however.
Meanwhile, the Sleepy Lagoon incident developed into a highly-publicized trial
surrounding José Díaz’s murder. The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office and law
enforcement officials utilized the incident as an opportunity to crack down on youth delinquency.
The court case started in October between the state of California and twenty-two alleged
members of the 38th Street “Gang” who supposedly killed Díaz.30 The state charged that all men
were involved in his murder, but lacked the evidence. Not only that, not all the defendants had
access to due process. By November, the grand jury held a public hearing calling in a hundred
representative citizen “social experts.” These individuals brought up a variety of causes for the
“Mexican problem” and specifically youth delinquency. Many of these issues which had been
brought up before in discussion of the Spanish-speaking population included poor living

29

“Sinarquista Leader Denies Organization Tool of Axis,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, 1942.

30

Obregón Pagán, 71-97.

184
conditions, social neglect and lack of assimilation into American society. Multiple speakers
honed in on the UNS to determine whether the movementcould be held responsible for unrest
among Mexican youth. They noted how “fiery race theories” fueled these young people to
commit acts of violence after feeling nothing but discrimination all of their lives.31 The jury
needed to identified what was the source of the violent incident at Sleepy Lagoon and the UNS
continued to be portrayed as an instigator of youth criminal activity.
The Sleepy Lagoon case provoked a mobilization in the city’s Mexican American
community. Various local residents stepped up and created organizations to protect the youth
defendants. Josefina Fierro de Bright believed that the OCIAA needed to help bring justice to
Mexican youth as well as monitor the sinarquistas. She was responsible in forming the Citizens'
Committee for the Defense of Mexican American Youth in October 1942.32 The committee was
composed of some members of El Congreso including Fierro de Bright as well as other Mexican
and white activists. Fierro de Bright still did not believe that the OCIAA was fully addressing the
needs of the Spanish-speakers, specifically the Mexican community. In November, her and her
husband, John Bright reached out to the OCIAA’s Dr. Walter H.C. Laves, the director of the
Division of Inter-American Activities in the United States. The Brights wanted more government
investment in the Mexican community in the U.S. They also believed that “underestimation of
the activities of enemy agents in the ranks of the Mexican-Americans, and failure to recognize
the increased success of these energetic minions, would be a perilous mistake.” The Brights
noted that “from Madrid are instructed the thousands of fanatical Falangists and their subtle
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collaborators of the Sinarquist Union.” Not only did the OCIAA need to surveil the UNS, but the
Brights believed that the office needed to investigate the Sleepy Lagoon case.33
Another committee formed to address both youth delinquency and supposed Axis
propaganda. Roger Jessup, chairman of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, formed
the Citizens Committee for Latin Americans led by the Reverend Thomas J. O’Dwyer of the
Catholic Welfare Bureau. The committee included a range of individuals from community
organizations, institutions, and the government including representatives from the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, the city’s principal Spanish paper La Opinión and the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department. It aimed for the cooperation of agencies to remove the causes of
youth crime among the Mexican population. The committee emphasized its urgency in the midst
of wartime and President Roosevelt, explaining that the situation was being taken advantage of
by fascist propagandists. According to the group, they were seeking to divide any unity between
the U.S. and Latin America.34 These committees of local residents did not believe that the
judicial process of the Sleepy Lagoon Trial was going to get to the bottom of sinarquista
influence, so they took the matter in their own hands.
Of the committees, however, California state politicians were the ones to lead such a
deeper investigation into the sinarquistas and gang activity in December 1942. The California
Un-American Activities Committee formed a year before as a result of the efforts of California
State Assembly member Jack B. Tenney. Tenney was originally a lawyer and songwriter who
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shared sympathies with the political left, especially as a member of the American Federation of
Musicians. A power struggle in the musicians’ union pushed him to the right, turning on the left,
particularly targeting communists.35 In the midst of World War II, however, fascism was an
international threat that he could not ignore. The now-State Senator-elect Tenney planned on
holding a hearing on December 16 to look into recent events and rumors relating to the
sinarquistas. He remarked that he wanted to investigate if there was “an Axis fifth column in our
midst, undermining the morale of our American-Mexican boys and girls.” He also wanted to see
if the youth on trial for the Sleepy Lagoon incident were “stage-managed by Hitler’s fifth
columnists.” Tenney called six witnesses including Guy T. Nunn, Josefina Fierro de Bright, John
Bright, La Rue McCormick, and Oscar Fuss and Philip M. Connelly of the state’s Congress of
Industrial Organizations.36 The date of the hearing arrived and none of the witnesses showed up,
fearing his motives and that they themselves would be blamed. In their place, they sent telegrams
excusing themselves from the hearing. The witnesses explained that the FBI and other federal
governmental agencies were investigating the sinarquistas and that they saw nothing to come
from the state hearing. Tenney issued a subpoena to have the witnesses appear.37 He planned on
holding a meeting on the sinarquistas one way or another to get to the bottom of the matter.
Tenney responded to allegations that this particular session was targeting Mexicans in the
state. Tenney explained that “The Mexican people and Americans of Mexican origin are not
under investigation by the Assembly committee investigating un-American activities in

35

Starr, 302-303.

36

“Influences Behind Gang Wars Here to Be Studied,” Los Angeles Times, December 14, 1942.

“Attempt to Link Axis to Gang Wars Dropped,” Los Angeles Times, December 17, 1942; “Legislators Will Hear
Witnesses,” Los Angeles Times, December 18, 1942.
37

187
California.” He asserted that the committee valued Mexicans in the state and their loyalty to the
union. Tenney was instead more concerned about the leftist politics of the witnesses, explaining
that:
It is rather significant that the agitation and turmoil heard for the past several months in
Southern California has been raised by American Communists and close fellow travelers.
It is this group that has continuously demanded an investigation of the so-called
Sinarquista movement, alleging that recent disturbances among Mexican-American youth
in Los Angeles is the result of the Sinarquistas. This same group, headed by a known
Communist, La Rue McCormick, has continually alleged that the Sinarquistas are
dominated by, linked with, financed and stage-managed by Hitler’s Nazis.38
Several of the individuals were already openly anti-sinarquista such as the Brights. It was notable
that all – except for Nunn whom worked for the federal government – were part of explicit leftwing organizations. State Senator Tenney, a noted anti-communist, believed that communists
were attempting to smear the UNS. Perhaps the root of the Sleepy Lagoon incident did not lay in
the organization.
Tenney’s subpoena brought at least some of the possible witnesses to the hearing whose
purpose changed meaning. Philip M. Connolly, Oscar Fuss and La Rue McCormick showed up
to face the committee. As Tenney expected, “The witnesses who appeared before us today failed
in every respect to substantiate in any manner, shape or form the charges made by the group.”
He expressed his disappointment that “the group was supposed to protect the Mexican boys on
trial and to expose the fifth column they alleged was at work in the local Mexican community.”39
In the eyes of Tenney and his committee, the hearing tarnished the reputation of the left-wing
witnesses rather than the sinarquistas.
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The People’s Daily World – a communist publication based on the West Coast – was
particularly upset about Tenney’s portrayal of the leftist witnesses. The paper’s editorial staff
pushed back against the committee’s results, arguing that the California Un-American Activities
Committee whitewashed who the UNS was as a movement. Instead of attacking sinarquistas in
the region, its editors expressed disdain over how it took the committee “only a few hours
questioning of three witnesses behind closed doors to make up their minds that Sinarquism is
something dreamed up by the ‘reds’ – just another ‘red plot.’”40 The paper’s staff could not
believe that the committee completely wrote off the organization as fascist based on what they
considered little evidence. According to them, the issue was not the communists, but actually
Tenney’s committee instead who was secretly supporting the wartime enemies. The People’s
Daily World boldly posed this question to its readership: “why should the California legislature
appropriate funds and give authority to a committee that helps the Fascist Axis? That’s a
question which YOU, and all California citizens and organizations, should ask the assemblymen
at Sacramento.”41 The communist newspaper was convinced that the California Un-American
Activities Committee was in cooperation with the sinarquistas by turning the tables on the
communists. The People’s Daily World, just like others on the political left in the Los Angeles
area at the time, kept their aim set on the UNS, yet could not prove the group as fascist.
Finally on January 12, 1943, the Sleepy Lagoon trial that occurred since October came to
an end, however accusations that the sinarquistas were behind the incident did not end. Of the
twenty-two defendants, the grand jury ruled that only five were innocent. The jury deemed the
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remaining seventeen to be guilty, where they faced various prison sentences, with some given
life sentences at San Quentin State Prison.42 Despite the Sleepy Lagoon case and the California
Un-American Activities Committee drawing no conclusive evidence regarding the UNS, those
on the political left kept drawing an association between the movement and juvenile crime.
Carey McWilliams explained afterwards that “there is some plausible evidence pointing to the
conclusion that the local branch of the Sinarquistas is bent on making trouble in Los Angeles and
that the activities and propaganda of the Sinarquista movement have had some effect upon
Mexican youth in Los Angeles.”43 Similarly, the Citizens' Committee for the Defense of
Mexican American Youth did not end its work nor its focus on the sinarquistas following the
trial. The committee released a statement, focusing not on the incident, but rather the case itself.
It explained the trial“aided the offense of the Los Angeles Sinarquist movement. It aided in
creating an atmosphere of hostility and distrust toward the Mexican-American population.”44 The
trial may have ended, but the targeting of the UNS did not.
Ernesto Félix Díaz Escobar had previously visited Los Angeles from Mexico in October
1942 representing the Comité Nacional Antinazifascista, yet it would be his brother and
committee president Alfredo who would double down on sinarquismo as a threat to the U.S.
Alfredo Félix Díaz Escobar had already led the charge against the sinarquistas in Mexico and he
did not lose sight of sinarquistas in the U.S. He traveled to the U.S. where he visited the
headquarters of the OCIAA in Washington, D.C. in an attempt to sway both Nelson A.

42

Obregón Pagán, 89.

43

Carey McWilliams, “Los Angeles’ Pachuco Gangs,” The New Republic, January 18, 1943.

Citizens' Committee for the Defense of Mexican-American Youth, “Social Conditions of Mexican American
Youth,” March 2, 1943, Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee Records, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA.
44

190
Rockefeller and public opinion. Díaz Escobar claimed that the UNS was a fascist fifth column
against democracy with ties to both Nazi Germany and the Falange Española that had 50,000
members in California. He argued how “leaders of the movement take advantage of historical
incidents to drive a wedge in the Good Neighbor Policy. They point to injuries done [to] LatinAmericans by Yankee imperialists, and lead the people to believe that those injustices came from
the American people as a whole.” He was surprised that the U.S. government did not take the
steps to cancel the organization’s registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.45 Díaz
Escobar sought to bring about fear in Americans that the UNS were not only in large numbers in
the U.S., but working to create dissension. As for registration, sinarquistas, especially the local
leaders on the ground in the U.S., constantly reiterated that they had official approval from the
U.S. government. To take away registration would allow the group to lose legitimacy. Díaz
Escobar wanted to see the end of the UNS in both Mexico and the U.S.
As with others who attacked the UNS during wartime, the sinarquistas pushed back, on
the defensive. Almost always such individuals were men, but Ana P. de Hernández, a sinarquista
from Davenport, Iowa responded directly to Díaz Escobar. She believed that his distrust in the
UNS had its roots in anti-Catholicism, not seeing Mexican Catholics as having rights. De
Hernández spoke to why a believer like herself was in the U.S. rather than in her home of
Mexico: “We have emigrated to a country perhaps hostile to the Mexican peon, and we have
done so with the hope of returning as soon as the dissolving passions of certain parties have
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subsided.” Like the majority sinarquistas in the U.S., de Hernández arrived to the country as a
46

result of religious turmoil in Mexico, whether it was the Mexican Revolution or the Cristero
Wars. She validated her existence as someone who was displaced because of violence, but who
sought to return to her homeland. Male leaders of the El Paso committee also responded to Díaz
Escobar. Pablo Acevas, the head of the organization committee and Marcelino Ramirez, head of
the information committee, said, “there is nothing secret about us.” They noted how “we have a
program of Social Justice.” Rather than being fascists, the two simply noted how the UNS
opposed communism and that Díaz Escobar’s comments were “Communist inspired.”47 The El
Paso committee operated openly and on behalf of a cause back in Mexico. Despite defending
themselves, sinarquistas in the U.S. still could not catch a break from the organization’s
opponents.
Alfredo Félix Díaz Escobar’s Comité Nacional Antinazifascista was not the only
Mexican organization seeking to tarnish the reputation of sinarquismo in the United States. The
Confederación de Trabajadores de México which claimed the UNS to be a fifth column in
Mexico back in 1939 aimed to do the same for the movement in the U.S. The CTM perpetuated
the notion that the sinarquistas were trying to take advantage of the resentment that young
Mexicans in the U.S. faced. The confederation warned the people of Southern California that
sinarquismo was “the strongest Fascist movement in the Americas and has spread to the
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Southwestern United States.” The CTM argued how the threat of the UNS was real and that
48

Californians needed to be wary. This danger was among them.
The Zoot Suit Riots, Youth Delinquency and the Sinarquista “Fifth Column”
The Zoot Suit Riots, like the Sleepy Lagoon murder and respective trial before it, placed
the sinarquistas once again at the center of blame for juvenile crime. The riots were a ten-day
outbreak of violence in Los Angeles by whites against Mexicans that took place between June 3
and June 13, 1943. They were the result of fears stoked by the Sleepy Lagoon incident. The press
in the city did not let up on characterizing Mexican youth – men and women alike – as involved
with gang activity. As such, the media drew an association between young Mexicans and the
popular clothing that many wore at the time – zoot suits – outfits characterized by drape pants
and fingertip-length coats. White military personnel who recently returned from overseas, in
instances joined by Los Angeles civilians and police, searched for Mexican zoot suiters. Once
they found them, they beat them and stripped them of their clothing.49The event clearly
represented the embedded racism against Mexicans in the city. Even the press portrayed the
attackers as not white servicemen and allies, but Mexican “gang members.” Mexican youth were
supposedly incited once again by the sinarquista fifth column.
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The Zoot Suit Riots were not even over when rumors emerged about the role of the UNS.
On June 10, the Reverend Francisco Quintanilla of the Mexican Methodist Church of Watts, also
known as the “little Mayor of Watts,” came out blaming the riots on the fifth column. He
claimed that a man came to talk to him in broken English about having interest in the Mexican
population of Watts. Quintanilla refused his request to speak, but the next day the man was
talking to a group of Mexicans on a corner near his church. He swore “that man was an enemy
agent.” He believed that “these propagandists urge our Mexican youth to commit crimes, to build
up police records so that they not be accepted by the armed forces.”50 The rhetoric that
Quintanilla utilized against the Axis was similar to language used during the Sleepy Lagoon
incident. The only difference was that criminal behavior would prevent participation in the U.S.
Armed Forces. He saw the Axis fifth column as the source of the riots.
Such speculation led to an investigation into determining the cause of the Zoot Suit Riots.
Governor Earl Warren and Attorney General Robert W. Kenny created a Governor’s Committee
who quickly met and reported on their findings, which they sought to make as objective as
possible. The committee found that the problem was American youth and not one single ethnic
or racial group. Zoot suiters were not specifically people of Mexican descent, criminals or
juveniles. The committee instead saw the issue laying more in class and “slum surroundings.” If
anything, the group believed that the press exaggerated the problems from the riots and that the
guilty must be punished regardless of what clothes they wore, including the military. As for the
sinarquistas, the Governor’s Committee found no influence at all. Carey McWilliams created a
provisional committee of citizens to follow through on recommendations made by the
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Governor’s Committee. These included the training of law enforcement to work with minority
groups, establishing more correctional and detention facilities, as well as making sure that
lawyers continued to protect the rights of youths arrested.51 The Governor’s Committee saw the
issue rooted in youth who grew up in poverty and not an internal enemy like the UNS.
Despite no proof, the California Un-American Activities Committee pushed forward for
further investigations into the group in June 1943. State Senator Jack B. Tenney hoped to finish
what he started in December of the previous year. His colleague, State Senator Hugh Burns,
claimed that the committee learned of information that the UNS originated in Mexico under
German influence.52 The California Un-American Activities Committee would either discover or
put to rest such talk of sinarquista influence on juvenile criminal activity.
The committee convened on June 21 in Los Angeles’ State Building with the leadership
of the city’s sinarquista regional committee, Pedro Villaseñor and Martín Cabrera, to look into
such matters. Committee chairman Tenney singled out Villaseñor, who recently stepped down as
the regional sinarquista chapter chief in April. Tenney questioned him about the organization, its
leadership and its symbolism. The state senator pointedly asked Villaseñor if reports that the
UNS was controlled by the Axis were true, and he said, “of course not,” flatly denying any
connections to international fascism. Tenney probed further about who oversaw the regional
committee chiefs and Villaseñor said it was the UNS national committee president Manuel
Torres Bueno and no one else, continuing to reject any notions of outside interference.
Committee members kept quoting articles which characterized the sinarquistas as fascist and yet
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Villaseñorstood firm, rejecting such claims. He attributed all such attacks on the organization as
stemming from communists.53
The committee also questioned Villaseñor about how the UNS operated within the
context of the U.S. and its impact on Mexican youth. Chief Counsel Richard E. Combs asked,
“what is the objective, for instance, of your regions in California and Texas, if it is a nationalistic
movement for Mexico?” Villaseñor replied that it was important to have “the moral support for
the people of Mexico, they are working in the organization. And another thing, to bring to the
American people the truth about what is going on over there [in Mexico].” As for numbers
within California, he said that 400 existed in Southern California and not more than 800 resided
within the entire state. He could not speak to sinarquista affairs in Texas or elsewhere in the
U.S.54 The numbers that he mentioned for California contrasted with the 50,000 that Alfredo
Félix Díaz Escobar noted earlier in the year, and therefore less of an internal threat that
Californians once assumed. The hearing with Villaseñor ended with Tenney asking about the
source of youth criminal activity. He attributed it not to the movement, but to “motion pictures –
many of the boys that I know they take those things from the motion picture, especially the
gangster picture they see in the show.”55 By the end of his hearing, Villaseñor distanced himself
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and the UNS from any wrongdoing, whether being affiliated with the Axis or in encouraging
Mexican criminal activity.
The next witness from the regional branch of the UNS to meet with the California UnAmerican Activities Committee was Martín Cabrera, the current sinarquista chief for Los
Angeles. The committee proceeded to ask Cabrera similar questions as before in relation to
committee structure, ideology and the movement’s hierarchy. When asked about the role of the
UNS in gang crime, he did not simply deny the group’s involvement, but like Villaseñor, placed
the blame on the communists. Cabrera explained how “it is almost a rule whenever they try to
put the blame on somebody else, it is a general rule, because they have something themselves.”
In doing so, he provided the committee with an example from the People’s Daily World that
targeted the UNS. He also attributed such activity of Mexican youth as based in poverty.
Cabrera explained that “it is deep rooted, but I think it is, I think it starts in the home. Most of the
boys belong to poor families. They are poor families, the father and mother are poor people
without any education, without any instruction worth while, so they have nothing to teach their
children.” When committee members asked about organizational symbolism relating to
international fascist movements such as uniforms and armbands, Cabrera denied their use in
Southern California. He also openly denied any association between the UNS and the Falange
Española.56 Cabrera, like Villaseñor, not only rejected the UNS as an Axis fifth column involved
in the Zoot Suit Riots, but he placed the blame on communists.
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As with the California Un-American Activities Committee session in December 1942, the
Tenney committee once again achieved the goal of tarnishing the image of local activists on the
left. The committee continued to have a hearing on the sinarquistas and left-wing organizations
in relation to the riots on June 22 and June 23. McWilliams turned over material on the
sinarquistas which he gathered from a governmental agency. He denied an allegation from
committee members that he was a communist. Herbert Ganahl, attorney and member of the
National Lawyers Guild, described to the committee that he had a feeling that the Zoot Suit Riots
were sinister and Axis-inspired. He believed that the UNS played a role in instigating because
the movement was “fascistic” in tendency, yet he had no proof.57 The reason why the UNS was
under investigation by the committee in the first place was a result of reports by individuals
largely on the left such as Josefina Fierro de Bright, Guy T. Nunn, and Carey McWilliams,
however those proved naught. This only fed into State Senator Tenney’s anti-communism and
the notion that communists sought to spread lies and dissension among Californians, and
Americans more broadly.
Nonetheless, the sinarquistas still had a tarnished reputation by mid-1943. The notion that
the UNS was a fascist internal enemy to the U.S. did not disappear. The U.S. press latched onto
this idea for years, especially with the Sleepy Lagoon incident and Zoot Suit Riots. In The New
Republic, Enrique L. Prado dedicated an entire piece to sinarquistas in the U.S. He believed that
“sinarquismo, with its utopian program of prosperity and social peace for all, and its extremely
nationalistic aspirations for the future of Mexico, is eminently suited to appeal to our
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underprivileged Mexican minority.” Another article by Ruth D. Tuck for Survey Graphic,
58

argued that it was absolutely necessary to bring Mexicans into U.S. society. After reading UNS
publications, she remarked how “I am inclined to feel that a deleterious effect on Mexican youth
could result from UNS’s insistence on dividing the world into two hostile camps, Mexican and
anti-Mexican, and their glorification of a rather shoddy virility for boys.”59 Prado and Tuck
reiterated prior rhetoric on the lack of incorporation of Mexicans into the U.S. More than a year
after individuals like Sánchez, McWilliams and Fierro de Bright argued to the OCIAA that
Mexicans in the U.S. were ignored and served as targets of the Axis, they believed that
something still needed to be done. The UNS continued to serve as a specter haunting the
country’s Mexican population.
The idea that the Unión Nacional Sinarquista was an Axis-aligned foe to the United
States did not disappear even with several attempts by the group to portray otherwise. The setting
of the “Mexican problem” and increasing repression with Sleepy Lagoon and the Zoot Suit Riots
divided the Mexican population in the American Southwest. Politically liberal and leftist
Mexicans turned the attention on the sinarquistas, who endured a targeted campaign against
them. By mid-1943, they could not shake off the reputation of being a fifth column.
Sinarquistas and Conservative U.S. Catholics Push Back
Sinarquistas in the U.S. did what they could to respond to accusations that the UNS was
not a fifth column, but in order for them to survive they needed to push back. Between 1941 and
1943, sinarquistas in conjunction with conservative American Catholics launched a public
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relations campaign that was years in the making. The movement wanted to sway hearts and
minds in the U.S. since the late 1930s and now amid growing pressure against the organization,
it had to seize upon the opportunity. Together, both the UNS and conservative U.S. Catholics
created their own material and wrote their own articles to clearly delineate what the group was.
They kept their eye on negative press and any opportunity they had to shoot it down, they did.
They even coordinated a sinarquista tour at college campuses to convince youth of sinarquismo’s
motives. This was the chance for the UNS to swing American public opinion in their favor,
however the group faced limitations within the context of growing negative sentiment.
Conservative U.S. Catholics and the UNS Collaborate to Amplify the Sinarquistas’ Message
Frank Gross, the lay Catholic German American “Sinarquista Gringo” in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, stayed steadfast in his loyalty to the UNS. The United States Department of State
required him to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act because of his involvement
with the organization. He registered under protest, explaining that he was not serving another
country. Rather, Gross explained that “I feel that my friendship with certain gentlemen in
Mexico and the resulting correspondence and favors are on the contrary to be classed as truly
patriotic endeavors to promote international friendship which our government now is so strongly
urging.”60 He believed that him and his voluntary work with the UNS was not undermining the
security of the U.S. but rather strengthening it. Gross kept in regular contact with sinarquista
leaders Carlos Fernández, José Neder Quiñones, and Antonio Santacruz in Mexico, doing
everything he could from his home office to promote the organization. A critical component of
his work was making UNS publications accessible to Americans. Gross and fellow Milwaukeean
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Reverend Ramón José Miller continued their translation work for the UNS, converting material
from Spanish into English to be disseminated among Americans. They translated the
organization’s program summary, its sixteen points and its ten rules for sinarquista men and
women.61 Gross aimed to extend the “correct” narrative of the UNS, whether through translation
or dissemination of material, direct from its national leadership in Mexico City.
In his translation work, Gross made a point of making additions to the publications that
directly related to the U.S., rather than keep them centered solely on Mexico. He made sure that
the English-language material directly related to a U.S. audience.62 In addition to reiterating the
movement’s opposition of communism and fascism as well as a push for a Christian social order,
the booklet laid out its role in the U.S. The document noted how “Sinarquism is loyally
endeavoring to co-operate with the attitude and point of view of the United States and hopes, in
turn, the United States will constantly keep in mind the position of Mexico, her traditions and the
religious faith of her people.”63 However, he believed that these revised English-language
publications were useless if they could not have an impact on a broad audience.
Gross thought that in order to sway more people towards the movement, the UNS and
U.S. Catholic allies needed to reach out beyond their sphere of influence. He took it upon
himself to contact both Catholic priests and Protestant pastors from across the U.S. from
churches in Montana to Maryland. Upon further interest from the religious leaders, he followed
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up by sending them the English-language material he helped create. One individual that he
contacted was the Reverend Charles S. McFarland, the executive secretary of the pan-Protestant
movement, the Federated Council of the Churches of Christ in America. McFarland traveled to
Mexico during the anti-clerical administration of Plutarco Elías Calles, hoping to ally with the
president, but instead found himself disillusioned. As McFarland wrote Chaos in Mexico about
the church-state conflict there, Gross hoped that he could “convert” him into becoming a
supporter of the UNS. Gross was glad to hear back from McFarland about his interest in the
movement.65 The outreach to religious leaders like McFarland was just the beginning. Gross
encouraged sinarquista chiefs in the Southwestern U.S. to disseminate the pamphlets even
farther. With his aid, sinarquistas in the U.S. heeded this suggestion, contacting the chief editors
of all leading magazines and newspapers, the chairs of college history departments, and selected
public officials. The material reached all of these respective entities, however only a few actually
gained traction with the select publication and promotion of the movement in metropolitan
newspapers.66 As Gross feared, word of sinarquismo stayed within Catholic circles.
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Although some U.S. Catholic priests came out in favor of the UNS in the past, more
showed up during this period of deepening wartime scrutiny. One such individual was Reverend
William Eugene Shiels, S.J., a writer for the Jesuit magazine, America. Shiels learned about the
sinarquistas as a result of the support network that the NCWC established back in the late 1930s.
In his article for the publication in April 1942, Shiels painted a favorable overview of the
movement. He explained that “they are distinctly positive in their principles and in their activity,
builders of a restored individual and national life rather than critics of their fellowmen” and how
“they have had a pronounced effect on their people.” Shiels explained to his American Catholic
readership how the organization gave new hope to Mexicans that a new profoundly Catholic
society was possible in their country.67 Shiels’ article was well-received. Gross read Shiels’ piece
and absolutely loved it. He told him how “it is the first correct exposition of the movement that I
have seen in any publication in this country.”68 Sinarquista leadership even touted Shiels’
endorsement of the movement to its transnational readership in El Sinarquista. The paper’s
editors Alfonso Trueba Olivares and José Neder Quiñones explained that amid negative U.S.
press of the UNS that Shiels’ article was a shining light. They noted how the “article reveals the
truth about Synarchism and its author expresses the sympathy that inspires him this great
Mexican Popular Movement, whose virtues he appreciates and extols.” The editors even
reprinted some of the piece in Spanish for its readership, particularly the portions that gave
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nothing but praise of the group. Therefore, Shiels’ piece praising the UNS reached a broader
69

audience that originally intended.
Support of the UNS among priests transcended religious orders. While the Jesuit Shiels
supported the sinarquistas, so too did a Benedictine priest. Reverend Alcuin Heibel, O.S.B. of
Mount Angel Abbey originally traveled to Mexico given his interest in agriculture, but by doing
so, he learned about the UNS. Swayed by the Catholic ideals of the movement, Heibel took it
upon himself to be a goodwill ambassador on behalf of sinarquismo in the U.S. and dispel any
negative sentiments of the group. At the end of 1942, he expressed how “the radical or influential
leftist elements in Mexico are fighting it desperately and accuse it of being everything antiMexican. The fact is that synarchism is a purely social movement headed in the direction of
Christian democracy.”70 As with Gross, Heibel’s interaction with sinarquistas themselves caused
him to disseminate the “true” narrative of what sinarquismo was.71
Heibel believed that writing his own book on the movement, he would reach a wider
audience in the U.S. than simply speaking to the press. His work, Synarchism, "The Hope of
Mexico's Poor," encapsulated an entirely positive message about the UNS. Heibel explained that
“the purpose of this book is to picture to Americans the history of Mexico’s present and
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encourage willingness to be understanding and helpful neighbors in Mexico’s future.” His book
72

demonstrated his focus on agriculture. He laid out a history of Mexico from the colonial period
to the contemporary moment, describing how “Indian peasants” were consistently disregarded
and left at the bottom of Mexican society. He argued that only the sinarquistas could uplift the
country’s poor through private investment, rather than communal ejido land as implemented by
the postrevolutionary state.73 Ultimately, Heibel emphasized that the sinarquistas shared more in
common with Americans than they might have been led to believe by the American media. He
asserted that “the freedoms the synarchists are trying to get for their fellow Mexicans are the
very ones we Americans treasure so highly: freedom of religion, education, speech and the
freedom to organize for economic improvement, be it for the business-man, the laborer or
farmer.”74 Reverend Heibel’s book sought to dispel and push back against the notion that the
sinarquistas were anti-American, but that they sought the support of average people in the U.S.
with similar goals in life.
Although not a priest like Shiels or Heibel, John W. White was one such lay Catholic
who also advocated for sinarquismo. The journalist found out about the organization as a result
of Gross’ outreach to media outlets earlier in the year.75 His piece in the Catholic publication,
The Sign, situated the sinarquistas within the context of the Mexican church-state conflict. He,
like those before him, had a similar rosy view of the sinarquistas who would bring hope and
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balance back to the country. He claimed how “they plan to wipe out revolution in Mexico by
improving the economic and social status of the agrarian masses and by making the members of
this class better Mexicans, better democrats, and better men.”76 White’s subsequent book, Our
Good Neighbor Hurdle, continued to portray the sinarquistas as balancing out the situation in
Mexico, pushing for Catholics whom the Mexican state persecuted to come back into political
life. White also shared the notion that Gross previously pushed – that the UNS cooperated with
the U.S.77
The UNS and conservative American Catholics collaborated to create material beyond
just the press. Film was an enormously popular way to reach the masses and the UNS utilized the
medium as best as it could to its advantage. Daniel E. Doran of Los Angeles’ Catholic Film and
Radio Guild showed documentary films in November 1942 to depict the activities of the
Sinarquista movement. The guild hosted screenings to officials and civic organizations in the
region to portray how the movement was pushing for “social justice” ideals in Mexico.78 The
films depicted the UNS as closing the gap between rich and poor, without resulting to the
extremes of communism or fascism. This sinarquista material painted the group as rooted in
Mexico, yet benevolent to the U.S.
Despite these concerted efforts, anti-sinarquismo gained momentum. The national press
published nothing but negative content on the UNS into early 1943. Time argued how Falange
Española-inspired Hispanidad pitted Latin Americans against the Good Neighbor Policy. The
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publication drummed up fear in the sinarquistas as Nazi-inspired “Mexican blackshirts.” Frank
79

Gross was furious at Time, even contacting the magazine’s editors. He responded that “your
January 11th article on the Synarchist movement in Mexico is such a thorough perversion of the
truth that I challenge practically every statement in same.”80 Gross was particularly upset as the
sinarquistas could not shake off negative press, no matter how hard he tried. Yet, anti-UNS
sentiment did not disappear. Writer and avid anti-fascist Anita Brenner described in Harper’sthat
the sinarquistas was a “peasant league based on ex-Cristeros, which says it defends religion,
property, and the fatherland against bolshevisim (thus wrapping the Nazi-Franco formula in the
Mexican flag).”81 Alfredo Félix Díaz Escobar’s visit to the U.S. and denunciation of the group in
March 1943 only made matters worse.
U.S. Catholic periodicals and writers continued to defend the group. The Jesuit
publication, America, once again praised the movement. The editors argued how the UNS was
not fascist as it taught and practiced freedom – such as freedom of religion – and worked to
colonize barren lands in the northern Mexican state. They saw Díaz Escobar and the political left
in Mexico as the “real” fascists as they actively engaged in suppressing the movement. The
periodical’s editors also called out the U.S. government for prohibiting the transport of copies of
El Sinarquista at the U.S.-Mexico border, but not that of other publications such as Hoy,
Excelsior and El Universal.82 In the Catholic Digest, Reverend John O’Brien explained the
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history and purpose of the UNS, completely denying that its connection to fascism. He gave
nothing but support, arguing that “synarchism is, in the opinion of many, the hope of Mexico and
the most promising means of enabling her to develop into a great democracy in accordance with
the instincts, traditions, and genius of her people.”83 The U.S. Catholic press showed unwavering
support for sinarquismo, despite the period being particularly difficult for the organization.
Yet this was one of the multiple issues that Frank Gross saw in regards to the UNS public
relation campaign in the U.S. He still viewed the promotion of the UNS as only within Catholic
circles. For the counter-narrative truly to make an impact, it had to reach the secular press.84
Additionally, the mainstream media continued to repeat anti-sinarquista talking points which
consistently angered Gross. He was responsible for swaying U.S. media and could not help but
feel as if he was failing. He encouraged the UNS national committee leadership to write up a
series of refutations on what he considered were some of the “most dangerous accusations.”
These included sinarquismo as pro-fascist, as anti-U.S., and as anti-Semitic.85 The Catholic press
had already took up these issues ad hoc, but the organization needed to be prepared with
consistent speaking points for any and all media. The UNS leadership did come up with speaking
points, but together with conservative U.S. Catholics, they determined it would be more
advantageous to have sinarquistas explain the movement directly.
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Sinarquista Leaders Tour the U.S.
Also in the first half of 1943, leaders from the UNS national committee believed that
such public relations via the press could only go so far, so they envisioned a sinarquista tour of
college campuses in the U.S. The goal was to convince young adults, especially Mexican
Americans and American Catholics, towards the movement and against the postrevolutionary
Mexican state.86The group hoped that by continuing to stress a religious identity rather than a
political one, the Americans they reached out to could both counteract negative publicity against
the organization, as well as gain support of the U.S. government against the Mexican
government.
Sinarquista leader Antonio Santacruz and Reverend Heibel drew up the idea of a tour.
The plan was to have four sinarquista “students” visit the United States including Roberto
Carriedo Rosales, Juan Ignacio Padilla, Alfonso Trueba Olivares, and Efrain Pardo. Juan Ignacio
Padilla was a law student as well as the national director of colonization, supervising fundraising
efforts for the sinarquista colonies in northern Mexico. Alfonso Trueba Olivares was a fellow
law student, director of El Sinarquista and brother to José Trueba Olivares, directing the colony
of Villa Kino in Sonora. Efrain Pardo was also a student – in medical school, however Roberto
Carriedo Rosales was a professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (National
Autonomous University of Mexico or UNAM). Santacruz and Heibel planned to have the four
sinarquistas visit in February and over the course of January, they reached out to various
Catholic university presidents to see if they expressed interest in hosting them. Among those
who agreed were Reverend Hugh O’Donnell, C.S.C. of Notre Dame University, Reverend
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William H. McCabe, S.J. of Rockhurst College and Reverend Robert I. Gannon, S.J. of Fordham
University.87 Santacruz and Heibel reached out to the NCWC’s Montavon, however the issue
was that the four visitors did not have an official sponsor for the trip and therefore could not
come.88
As Santacruz and Heibel worked out the travel logistics, the UNS had other individuals
already based in the U.S. to represent the movement in the meantime. Two Notre Dame students
from Mexico, Francisco Cabrera and Rafael Alducin, accompanied by the Reverend William F.
Cunningham, C.S.C., spoke on panels about Latin American affairs to groups of college students
in the Midwest. On March 19, La Santa Teresa club hosted a conversation centered on the
contemporary problems of Mexico at Notre Dame. Alducin commented on the Mexican
Constitution that resulted from the revolution, while Cabrera informed the group about the
sinarquista movement.89 Then, the two men traveled to Chicago under the auspices of the Notre
Dame La Raza Club where they spoke at an assembly at a Catholic women’s college, Mundelein
College, in celebration of Pan-American Day in early April. Cabrera repeated his talk, outlining
the sinarquista movement, “which is combatting Communism in Mexico.”90 Both campus
newspapers, The Notre Dame Scholastic and The Skyscraper, framed these men as authorities of
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Latin America, depoliticizing their particular perspectives and the political project they were
advancing with their remarks.
The federal government found out about and expressed skepticism about these public
talks and the planned tour on sinarquismo. Analysts of the Military Intelligence Division of the
Department of War did not find it surprising that the UNS would receive support from U.S.
Catholic leaders and visit Catholic schools. They also realized that such efforts existed in light of
criticism, particularly from Díaz Escobar.91 The Military Intelligence Division staff did not
advocate to prohibit the tour, however they were wary about the effects of proselytizing,
surveilling such efforts.
By April, Santacruz and Heibel secured a sponsor for Carriedo Rosales, Pardo, Padilla,
and Trueba Olivares to tour the U.S. Bishop Edwin V. O’Hara of Kansas City, Missouri agreed
to be the sponsor of the trip. Coincidentally just a month before, he founded the Inter-American
Institutefor the purpose of interpreting Latin America to the U.S. He sought to promote “a better
understanding among the nations of the Western Hemisphere on the basis of their Christian
tradition.” O’Hara emphasized the importance of religion, believing that Americans did not
respect the Catholic identity of Latin Americans. He too expressed concern that Latin Americans
thought that Americans were atheistic and lacking morals. The institute sponsored such activities
as exchange of professors and students, lecture tours and promotion of travel. Among the
individuals that he consulted were Reverend Luigi Ligutti who supported the institute on rural
matters and Reverend Hugh O’Donnell, C.S.C. of Notre Dame Universitywho provided
knowledge on scholastic matters. Bishop Joseph Schlarmann contributed one thousand dollars
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towards the project. O’Hara’s Inter-American Institute was the U.S. Catholic answer to the
92

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy and Office of the Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs. The OCIAA, in particular, appeared to be swayed by individuals such as
Carey McWilliams and Josefina Fierro de Bright. Rather than a secular pan-Americanism based
on bringing together the Americas around democracy, O’Hara’s institute sought to unite the
Western Hemisphere via a share religious identity of Catholicism. As a result of the institute, the
four sinarquistas began their tour of the U.S., showing Americans how they were organizing to
bring Catholic religious life back to Mexico.
The men began their tour in the Midwest, speaking to college audiences as well as U.S.
Catholic leaders. The four sinarquistas first visited Bishop O’Hara’s institute as well as
Rockhurst College in Kansas City. Shortly thereafter, they made their way to St. Louis. At Saint
Louis University, they lectured on sinarquismo and answered questions at an open forum.93 The
men then went to Chicago and onward to South Bend, Indiana. Theyheld an assembly with a
large group of students and faculty at the University of Notre Dame and St. Mary’s College. The
men articulated that sinarquismo was attempting to bring Catholicism and a “real democratic
order” to Mexico. Efrain Pardo spoke to the crowd, explaining that“we seek no fame, nor power
or wealth, but only to bring happiness to our country by restoring a Christian brotherhood.”
Pardo addressed the accusations by Díaz Escobar and others that the group was fascist. He
argued that “because like some leftist groups we use a salute and sing songs an American
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magazine has called us fascists. This is like saying birds sing, girls sing, and therefore birds are
girls.”94 The men appealed to the Catholicism of their young college-aged audience. They
provided their take on the situation in Mexico, rejecting the narrative that was being circulated in
major U.S. news outlets. The men concluded their trip in the Midwest in Central Illinois, in
Champaign and then Peoria where they met with Bishop Schlarmann, one of the institute’s
benefactors.95
The four sinarquistas then continued onward to the east and south. They visited Loyola
University in New Orleans, heading onward to Washington, D.C. In the U.S. capital, the men
kept busy attending a variety of events in the city including talks at Georgetown University and
the Catholic University of America, as well as at a luncheon hosted by the Confraternity of
Christian Doctrine, who focused on religious education towards youth. From Washington, D.C.,
the men traveled to New York where they spoke at Fordham University in New York and then
finally wrapped up their trip in San Antonio.96The Reverend John L. Morkovsky of the
Archdiocese of San Antonio accompanied the men as went to several Catholic schools in the city
where they spoke to students about the movement. The visiting sinarquistas even made their way
to the offices of the conservative, Catholic-sympathizing newspaper, La Prensa.97 They worked
to disseminate the organization’s message as much as possible, especially to those who would be
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receptive. While the tour largely focused on Catholic students, the men made a point of utilizing
sympathetic media as much as possible. By the end of April, the four sinarquistas wrapped up
their tour heading back home to Mexico.
Not everyone took kindly to the tour, including Hispanics in other parts of the United
States. O’Hara’s Inter-American Institute and the UNS portrayed the visit of the four sinarquistas
as a goodwill tour bridging Mexico and the U.S. Outlets like Pueblos Hispanos – a Spanishlanguage paper based out of New York – communicated quite the opposite. The paper
communicated to its readership that elements of the U.S. Catholic Church were complicit in
promoting the propaganda of the “pro-Hitler” agents. According to Mexican Deputy Cesar
Garizurieta of Díaz Escobar’s Comité Nacional Antinazifascista, whom the publication
interviewed, such a tour was “an act of treason to the motherland and of disorientation for
democratic Americans.”98
Both the sinarquistas’ public relations campaign and its U.S. tour were large in theory
and yet they had their limitations in practice. The Unión Nacional Sinarquista saw that negative
sentiment was only increasing and hoped to push back. Frank Gross dreamed up a massive
campaign not only to influence the press, but also those in academia and government. Catholic
outlets picked up on sinarquismo and defended the movement, yet it was too late for the rest as
those opposing the movement had the upper hand. The tour similarly focused too much on the
Catholic sphere of influence. Although the organization gained some supporters along the way,
the delayed counter-attack appeared to be nothing but a response to the Sleepy Lagoon incident
and Zoot Suit Riots.
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Conclusion
The period between the end of 1941 and mid-1943 was the beginning of the end of the
Unión Nacional Sinarquista in the United States. The onset of total war in the U.S. united various
forces around the war effort. The group, which already had a reputation of being associated with
international fascism, became the subject of attacks through a series of upheavals in the city of
Los Angeles. The sinarquistas in conjunction with conservative U.S. Catholics attempted to
develop a public relations campaign and tour of the U.S. to dispel allegations that the movement
had ties to the Axis. The limited scope of both towards predominantly Catholics and the lateness
of such efforts prevented the UNS from shaking off the reputation of being an internal enemy
within the nation.
While this period was the beginning of the end for the Unión Nacional Sinarquista, the
movement faced a multi-decade downfall between 1943 and the mid-1960s. Overwhelming
negative sentiment built up against the organization as a fascist fifth column. Opponents on the
political and in the press denounced the group even more than before, which the United States
government took note of implementing further investigations and censorship. Catholics also
started to turn their backs on the organization, denouncing sinarquismo. These factors combined
with an internal split in the movement led to its eventual decline in the United States.

CHAPTER FIVE
DISSOCIATION FROM SINARQUISMO – 1943-1966
If anyone will study the Sinarquista movement thoroughly he will learn that since its
organization six years ago the members have constantly preached not only internal unity
and peace but also strongly advocated mutual respect and friendly relations with foreign
nations, particularly with our country. In the fact, the Sinarquistas go farther by insisting
that it is the moral duty of the Mexicans to love us, maintaining that the precept of loving
one’s neighbor applies not only to individuals but also to nations.1
Frank Gross, the “Sinarquista Gringo” of Milwaukee, Wisconsin responded directly to
the growing backlash against the Unión Nacional Sinarquista in the Milwaukee Journal in July
1943. In the aftermath of the Sleepy Lagoon incident and Zoot Suit Riots and in the middle of
World War II, the press, political left, and the governments of both the United States and Mexico
largely saw the UNS as a fascist threat. Gross countered that the movement did not prove to be
an enemy, but rather that the organization was an ally. According to him, the UNS wanted peace
within Mexico and between Mexico and the U.S. Such defense of the sinarquistas proved to be
too little, too late by mid-1943. The reputation of the UNS as a fifth column did not disappear,
and internal issues within the group made matters worse. The sinarquistas were in decline.
During the remainder of World War II from July 1943 to the end of the war in September
1945, a battle ensued between supporters and detractors of sinarquismo. The sinarquistas
distanced themselves from recent events by publicly embracing people of different races and
ethnicities. Committees in the U.S. maintained their activities, working to bring even more
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people into the movement. Despite such efforts by the sinarquistas and allies to combat negative
sentiment in the midst of the war, the opposition persisted and reached a peak in 1944. Former
American Catholic allies openly withdrew their support for the movement.
From 1945 to 1966, the Cold War in conjunction with a split within the organization
hastened its decline. Anti-communism became more mainstream than ever before. The group
therefore stood out less than before to potential new members. Within the UNS, disagreement
about the direction of the movement led to two transnational factions that maintained members in
the U.S. The principal group oriented towards electoral politics, whereas the dissident
organization focused more on religion and social matters. By the early 1950s, both were losing
members and the division disappeared. Some Mexicans still identified as sinarquistas in the U.S.
by the mid-1960s, but the UNS fell into disarray.
During this roughly two-decade span of time, sinarquistas in the United States faced a
long downfall. External plus internal factors ultimately brought the movement to its end in the
country. Continued attacks on the Unión Nacional Sinarquista combined with the internal split in
the organization and the co-optation of its anti-communism in mainstream politics led to the
eventual demise of sinarquismo in the United States.
Wartime and the Continued Debate Over the UNS as a Fascist Enemy
The Sleepy Lagoon incident of August 1942 and the Zoot Suit Riots of June 1943 firmly
placed the UNS as an internal threat in the eyes of Americans. The opposition to the UNS
painted the movement as having ties to European-based fascism and therefore sinarquistas
residing in the U.S. were traitors undermining the war effort. In the years that followed,
sinarquistas and allies sought to shake off the notoriety that they gained over time. Despite such
efforts, the stigma did not go away, but was instead amplified.
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Sinarquistas Negotiating the Aftermath of the Zoot Suit Riots
The official organ of the UNS, El Sinarquista, did not stay silent in the aftermath of the
Zoot Suit Riots, seeking to distance the movement from accusations that it was instigating
violence during World War II. Editors Alfonso Trueba Olivares and José Neder Quiñones
launched a campaign pairing an anti-racist stance alongside one against fascism. In the months
that followed the riots in June 1943, they published a series of articles denouncing what took
place as an attack on persecuted races. In a piece on July 1, Trueba Olivares and Neder Quiñones
wrote how “there are many in the United States who have racial hatreds, hatred that has
manifested itself in the recent riots in Los Angeles.” In contrast, they framed the sinarquistas as
supporting equality of races and that “Jews, blacks, Indians, or mixed race peoples deserve
protection.” The editors therefore contended that the sinarquistas were anti-Nazi as they did not
believe in the persecution of Jewish people.2 In another article on July 15, Trueba Olivares and
Neder Quiñones spoke out against negative U.S. press about sinarquismo, particularly from
journalist Betty Kirk. They argued that the UNS was not a fifth column who fueled Mexican
youth criminal activity. Instead, the editors reiterated that the sinarquistas always protested
against racial discrimination and German Nazism.3El Sinarquista’s editors Trueba Olivares
moved away from the anti-Semitism and racially-tinged language featured in the publication
some years before.

The article in El Sinarquista noted that “Hay en Norteamerica muchos que tienen odios raciales, odios que se han
manifestado en los recientes disturbios de Los Angeles.” It also mentioned that “Judíos, negros, indios o mestizos
merecen protección.” “Aqui no Debe Haber Razas Perseguidas,” El Sinarquista, July 1, 1943.
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Although the Southern California regional sinarquista committee in Los Angeles,
California received a considerable amount of attention in 1942 and 1943 because of the bouts of
violence, the El Paso, Texas regional committee was the hub of sinarquismo in the U.S. The
UNS national committee in Mexico City led by sinarquista president Manuel Torres Bueno
designated the chapter with its chief, Ramón L. Ramírez, as the main point of contact. In the
hierarchical tradition of the UNS, Ramírez transmitted instructions to lower committees, making
sure that they followed through, and then he reported back to leaders in Mexico City about
progress in the respective chapters. The El Paso regional committee also served as the
distribution source for El Sinarquista and other printed materials including 16 Points of the
Sinarquist Doctrine, Sinarchism: Summary of its Program, Viva México (Long Live Mexico),
México en 1960 (Mexico in 1960), Canciones Sinarquistas (Sinarquista Songs), The Mexican
Scene, and Sinarquismo es la única salvación de México (Sinarquismo is the only salvation of
Mexico).4
UNS committee leaders elsewhere did not lose sight of growing the movement within the
U.S. Chief J.M. Gómez of the local San Diego, California chapter sought to create more
committees in the region, particularly closer to the border with Tijuana, Baja California. He
toured the nearby communities of National City and Bonita, talking to Mexicans that resided
there, seeking to convert them to sinarquismo. Gómez connected with fellow Mexicans from
Jalisco, bonding over their home state, as well as longing to return.5 Sinarquistas in the U.S. like
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Gómez aimed to expand the organization and build upon the pre-existing transnational Mexican
community in the country.
As such, sinarquista committees in the U.S. continued to foster a particular Mexican
nationalism through the movement. One of these ways was through maintaining a cult of
martyrdom to members that gave their lives. El Sinarquista described how the San Diego
municipal committeeunder Chief Gómez “organized several events in memory of those who
knew how to give their lives in the struggle for the rule of justice in this country.”In places like
San Diego, “Mexico is loved as much or more within its borders, as outside of them.”6 By
participating in rituals to honor the fallen in Mexico, sinarquistas sustained a tie to their home
country although they lived in the U.S. Sinarquistas also kept supporting the sinarquista colonies
in Northern Mexico in María Auxiliadora, Baja California Sur and Villa Kino, Sonora. In
California, sinarquistas in the Bakersfield, Fresno, Pittsburg, Richmond, La Verne, Los Angeles,
Oxnard, Pomona, San Diego, and San Fernando committees donated to the colonization effort. In
Texas, members in the Edinburg, El Paso, McAllen, Milla, and Ysleta committees also worked
to sustain the colonies through donations.7 Collectively, these activities kept sustaining the
movement and its ties to Mexico.

The newspaper noted that “los sinarquistas organizaron varios actos en memoria de quienes supieron dar la vida de
la lucha por el imperio de la justicia de esta Patria.” It added how “Se ama tanto o más a México dentro de sus
fronteras, como fuera de ellas.” “Noticias de Toda la República,” El Sinarquista, August 12, 1943.
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Frank Gross of Milwaukee, Wisconsin did not let up on his commitment to the movement
either. He remained in correspondence with UNS leaders, as well as continued to work to sway
the public narrative in favor of the movement. Gross proclaimed that “I am just another voice in
the wilderness crying for justice for the Sinarquistas.” He noted that “I receive no salary or any
compensation whatsoever – spend my money for postage, magazines, etc. – take no orders from
anybody, but do as I please as a free agent.”8 Because of his dedication to the Mexican migrant
community in Milwaukee – and conservative Catholicism – Gross maintained his involvement
with sinarquismo.
The Opposition to Sinarquismo Persists
However, negative media around the UNS only grew on the heels of the Zoot Suit Riots,
reiterating the notion that the movement was an internal enemy to the U.S. Journalists like Allan
Chase perpetuated the depiction of the organization as a fascist threat. Chase argued that
Franco’s Spain was orchestrating the spread of fascism across the Americas, but did so in much
more extensive detail than past writers like Betty Kirk. His book, Falange: The Axis Secret Army
in the Americas, documented the activities of the Falange Española in Puerto Rico, Cuba,
Venezuela, Argentina, and Mexico to undermine the U.S. Chase argued that sinarquistas José
and Alfonso Trueba Olivares, respectively the head of the Villa Kino colony and editor of El
Sinarquista, were both members of the Falange. He believed that if Spain survived the war as a
purveyor of fascism, the Americas would be extremely vulnerable with the roots that the Falange
planted throughout the region.9 Chase described that within the U.S., the UNS was calling for its
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members to sacrifice their lives and give up their blood on behalf of the movement. Mexicans
were to dedicate themselves to the movement and not in war activities such as civilian defense or
the American Red Cross. He was convinced that the group attempted to bring about division
within Mexicans in the U.S.10
Fellow journalist Selden Cowles Menefee similarly latched onto the idea of the UNS as a
tool of the Axis in a piece in The Washington Post. He wrote that the group was a “Fascist
movement which has worked closely with the Nazis.”11 Menefee elaborated on the idea in his
book, Assignment U.S.A., situating the sinarquistas in the midst of home front during World War
II. He described the UNS as a “religious-fascist Sinarquist movement of old Mexico” working
with both the Nazis and Falange Española in making “some headway in the lower Rio Grande
district.” Menefee argued that not only did the sinarquistas organize along the U.S.-Mexico
border, but that they organized “among disgruntled Mexicans in Los Angeles,” making a
reference to the incidents earlier in the year.12 He firmly echoed the idea that the sinarquistas had
ties to European-based fascism as other journalists had in the past, all the while adding on the
layer of them as instigating domestic disturbances.
Conservative American Catholics maintained their support of the UNS and even
responded to journalists like Menefee. Paul Dearing, the director of the Bureau of Information
for the NCWC, took on a role similar to what Frank Gross had done by providing counterarguments against negative sinarquista press. He responded to Menefee in The Washington Post,
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articulating that “Sinarquista is a social movement offering a genuine hope of self-government to
Mexicans.” He denied Menefee’s connection between the UNS and fascism, arguing that
“Sinarquista is as anti-Fascist as our own Republican Party” and that the “Sinarquistas want no
outside totalitarian doctrines interfering with Mexican life.” He believed that “they are not
interested in Spanish falangism.”13 As opposed to Menefee, Dearing attempted to articulate that
the sinarquistas were not fascists.
Dearing did not only respond to Menefee, but to Lloyd Mallan from the Committee on
Cultural Relations with Latin America, Inc. The committee formed in 1926 by a group of
scholars who sought for Pan-American unity across the hemispheres. Mallan described the UNS
in the world affairs publication, Current History, as “a strong anti-United States, pro-Axis
political organization.” He depicted the sinarquistas as among Mexican populations in the United
States, with their stronghold in Los Angeles. According to Mallan, “the Sinarquistas are now
more active than ever, spreading disorganization and confusion among the Mexican people,
taking advantage of every traditional prejudice, United States as well as Mexican.”14 He seized
upon much of the rhetoric of the press during the Sleepy Lagoon incident and Zoot Suit Riots.
Dearing read the piece, to which he countered that Mallan was disseminating communist
“misinformation.” He argued that “certainly the fact that the Sinarchists have often and openly
condemned communism and other totalitarian doctrines should go a long way toward explaining
the anti-Sinarchist propaganda of Leftist groups in the United States.”15 While Mallan declared
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that the UNS was pro-Axis, Dearing defended the movement, essentially writing him off as a
communist sympathizer.
Reverend William Eugene Shiels, S.J. similarly defended the group as he had earlier in
1942, trying not only to decouple sinarquismo from fascism, but to demonstrate members as
exceptional Mexicans in the context of the U.S. Shiels wrote in America magazine that “no one
thinks them interested in or capable of causing us any political embarrassment.” He believed that
“without a doubt, the Unión exists primarily to better the status of those within Mexico. It is a
Unión Nacional, not an Internationale. But its purposes have not the least aim to injure or
offend the United States.” Shiels did his best to situate the UNS as a progress-driven nationalist
movement, and not an internationalist one being controlled by European fascism. He instead
considered sinarquismo as “the embodiment of the best Mexican ideals.” Shiels argued that:
We have, of course, many other Mexicans of a different character, men who have come
here for profit for their careers. Some few of these, from motives of attachment to ideas
other than those of their native country, find severe fault with the Sinarquistas. These
few are rarely Catholics, a sure line of division when we meet those who come from
below the Rio Grande. Sinarquistas are frankly Catholic, and the division never fails to
raise fires of contention when it is aired in public.16
He believed that the sinarquistas were morally sound as opposed to other Mexicans who were
after their own interests. Both Dearing and Shiels questioned the prevailing reputation of the
sinarquistas and attempted to insert a different perspective into the public discourse.
The leadership of the Mexican Catholic Church, alternatively, was distancing itself from
the sinarquistas because of its supposed connection to fascist politics. Archbishop of Mexico
City Luis María Martínez said that the Mexican Catholic Church did not have any ties to political
parties. The archbishop specifically noted that the Church was not linked to pro-Catholic
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movements such as the PAN or the UNS. He stated that “the aim of the church is to remain in the
spiritual field.” Instead of politics, Archbishop Martínez claimed that “the Catholic church in
Mexico is disposed to collaborate sincerely and efficiently with the civil government for the
good of the country in the field which corresponds to its mission.”17 While many conservative
U.S. Catholics were not losing sight of its support for sinarquismo, the Mexican Catholic
leadership announced its public denunciation of the movement.
Beyond the press, the U.S. federal government sought to look deeper into who the
sinarquistas really were. The United States Department of State ordered William F. Blocker, the
American Consul General of Ciudad Juárez, Mexico to travel to Los Angeles to engage with
local, state, and Mexican government officials in the city. From the Mexican Consulate of Los
Angeles, he interviewed Adolfo de la Huerta, Alfredo Calles, and Ernesto Romero, whom
believed that the incidents arose from the lack of enough state and county facilities for juvenile
correction. They believed that this allowed the sinarquistas as Axis propagandists to take
advantage of gangs. When Blocker reviewed U.S. Naval Intelligence Office material on the riots,
he thought otherwise. The office reported how the sinarquistas “were for Mexico first, last and
always, and were opposed to giving any aid to either the Axis or the United Nations.” Instead,
Blocker looked into how the Americanpolitical left, including El Congreso, targeted the
sinarquistas. He believed that El Congreso’s Josefina Fierro de Bright spread the rumor that Axis
powers were involved in the riots. Upon his collection of evidence, Blocker came to the
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conclusion at the end of his investigation in Los Angeles that he did not “believe that the
Sinarquista element had any connection with the affair.”18
Despite this one State Department-produced report, the U.S. government as a whole was
still wary of sinarquismo and kept up its surveillance of the UNS as a threat in the midst of
global war. Its concerns came from mounting pressure towards censoring the movement even
more than before. The wartime United States Office of Censorship maintained its inspection and
ban of any sinarquista material, especially of El Sinarquista, en route to the U.S. The House of
Representatives worked towards imposing stricter censorship upon material. Milton N. Kemnitz,
Executive Secretary of the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties provided a testimony
to Congress, denouncing “organized bigotry” along the lines of groups like the sinarquistas. He
argued how:
In some sections of the country, the victims of race and religious hatred are Mexicans and
Catholics. In the South the Ku Klux Klan has long carried on a campaign against the
Catholics and in the Southwest such a campaign has been waged against the Mexicans by
the Sinarquist movement. Like Hitler’s Nazis, these native Fascist movements seize
upon any latent local prejudice and fan it into disruption and violence.19
Pressure for censoring sinarquismo did not simply come from the fear of a fifth column within
the U.S., but also from politicians in the Mexican government. El Comité por la Defensa de la
República Mexicana (The Committee for the Defense of the Mexican Republic) also urged the
House of Representatives to ban El Sinarquista as the paper called the Chilean Embassy in
Mexico a center of communist activity, and therefore harmed another country in the Western
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Hemisphere. Censorship of sinarquista material did indeed persist because of such efforts,
however that still did not fully prevent El Sinarquista or UNS pamphlets from being
disseminated, and therefore read.21
The United States Department of Justice also continued to monitor the organization as it
had in the past. The department tracked FARA registrations that representatives of sinarquismo
in the U.S. had to complete since 1940 for “engaging in propaganda activities” for foreign
agents. The Justice Department required representatives of sinarquismo to file an initial
registration statement, and then one every six months thereafter. Registration required basic
contact information, as well as organizational background, finances, and activities.22 Among
those registered included Ramón L. Ramírez, who registered as the spokesperson for
sinarquismo in the U.S., with the regional sinarquista committees of McAllen, Los Angeles, and
Bakersfield and the respective local chapters beneath them. The Justice Department noted all the
names of Mexican leaders in these various locations, as well as Frank Gross in Milwaukeee. The
department also expressed interest in the publications either being produced or disseminated in
the context of the U.S.23
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Sinarquistas in the U.S. used the registrations as a sign of legitimacy that the U.S.
government officially recognized the presence of committees. The El Paso regional sinarquista
committee continually placed a stamp on El Sinarquista and other organizational materials that it
disseminated. The stamped note read: “Registered in Washington, D.C. dated May 31 Under No.
123.”24 However, the Justice Department outright denied the assumption that the government
sanctioned the movement. The department mandated the El Paso committee to change their
wording, explicitly including this statement in its place: “A copy of this has been filed with the
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. where the registration statement filed by the
Sinarquist Regional Committee of El Paso, Texas, as an agent of Union Nacional Sinarquista in
Mexico, is available for public inspection. The fact of registration should not beconsidered as
approval by the U. S. Government of the contents of this material”25 FARA approval was not a
sign of government approval of the UNS, but rather an indication that the Justice Department had
an eye on the group.
The department’s FBI utilized FARA registrations in an extensive report that the agency
issued on the UNS in mid-1943. The FBI listed all of the sinarquista committees throughout
California, Texas and Chicagoland, noting as well plans for future chapters in Colton, California
and Phoenix, Arizona. The agency pushed back against numbers proposed by anti-sinarquista
Mexican Deputy Alfredo Félix Díaz Escobar, who claimed earlier in the year that there were
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50,000 sinarquistas in California alone. Instead, the FBI cited that based upon its investigation,
there were no more than 700 members in the United States. Not only were the numbers low, but
the agency noted that despite plans to open new committees, that there was a decline in
sinarquista activity in the country. The FBI attributed the diminishing membership to the lack of
appeal to the Mexican working-class community, as well as due to the continued prohibition of
the mailing of El Sinarquista by the Office of Censorship. Similar to William F. Blocker’s report
for the State Department, the bureau did not find any evidence that the Falange Española or Nazi
Germany used the UNS as a puppet nor that sinarquismo was a fifth column to the
U.S.26Nonetheless, the FBI articulated that the militant nationalist organization was still worth
observing as to future reports showed otherwise.
The United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS), like the FBI, also had an interest in
the UNS. The office formed during World War II in 1942 under the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the
Department of War, replacing the Office of the Coordinator of Information. The department
centralized intelligence activities, including that on the sinarquistas. By 1943, the OSS mapped
the transnational nature of the organization, including all of the chapters and colonies in both
Mexico and the U.S. OSS maps noted railroad and highway routes linking the various bases of
sinarquismo in the two countries. In the U.S., the office documented committees in California,
New Mexico, Texas, Illinois, and Indiana. The OSS in particular showed a concentration of
sinarquista activity in and around Los Angeles, spanning Los Angeles, Ventura, and San
Bernardino Counties.27 Much of the information either came from FARA registrations or from El
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Sinarquista as part of its regular documentation of committee activities. The department at
once demonstrated the widespread reach of the UNS in the U.S., while also showing its vast
influence throughout Southern California.
As the OSS monitored the activities of U.S. sinarquistas in El Sinarquista, the office also
obtained and read the organization’s other publication, Orden, as well. The UNS started
producing Orden the previous year in 1942 and the government similarly used information from
the periodical against the movement. The July 1943 issue of the magazine featured an interview
with Jesús Guisa y Azevedo, a critic of the postrevolutionary Mexican state. In the piece, he
critiqued democracy claiming that it “has destroyed the civilization of those peoples who
adopted it” and that “the history of Greece is obvious proof of the evil of the electoral regime.”
The OSS took such comments to be endorsed by the UNS, although the movement openly
supported democracy in other instances. Analysts from the office explained how “the effects on
the reader is not only to set him against democracy as an intellectual concept but more concretely
to turn him against the United States and Mexican cooperation with the United States.”29 The
OSS saw a periodical like Orden therefore as a tool in further dividing Mexicans in the U.S.,
drawing on a fear from previous years about the UNS as threatening the war effort.
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Sinarquistas and Allies Defend and Maintain the Movement
Through the end of 1943 and into the beginning of 1944, the UNS and Bishop Edwin V.
O’Hara’s Inter-American Institute coordinated another speaking tour of Catholic colleges and
universities in the U.S. to push back against the negative sentiment. This tour, however, did not
consist of sinarquista leaders from Mexico traveling from campus to campus, but was instead
more haphazard. Individuals – either from Mexico or exchange students – spoke on behalf of the
UNS. Reverend Aniceto Ortega, S.J. and José Trueba Olivares accepted an invitation from
Bishop O’Hara and Bishop Joseph Henry Leo Schlarman to come to the National Pontifical
Seminary of Our Lady of Guadalupe, more commonly known as the Montezuma Seminary, in
New Mexico. The NCWC purchased the property in 1937, which was managed by Mexican
Catholic hierarchy, to train Mexican priests in exile.30 However, Reverend Ortega and Trueba
Olivares were at the seminary, and in the U.S., for more of a political role than a religious one.
They attended “a week of Agricultural Conferences” with “the purpose of improving the lot of
our Mexican peasants,” speaking against land reform being enacted by the postrevolutionary
Mexican state. Following their time at Montzeuma Seminary, they went on to Los Angeles,
Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Chicago “for the benefit of Inter American relations among
Catholics.”31 Their visit to those cities was dedicated to spreading a positive perspective on
sinarquismo under the guises of the Bishop O’Hara’s Inter-American Institute.

Anne M. Martinez, “‘From the Halls of Montezuma’: Seminary in Exile or Pan-American Project?” U.S. Catholic
Historian, 20, no. 4 (2002): 35, 38-39.
30

31

Letter from Aniceto Ortega to William Montavon, August 4, 1943, Box 72, Folder 3, USCCB Legal Department
Records, CUA Archives; Letter from Antonio Santacruz to Frank Gross, July 26, 1943, Box 1, Folder 13, Frank
Gross Papers, Marquette Archives; Letter from O.C. Alvarez to Frank Gross, August 19, 1943, Box 1, Folder 13,
Frank Gross Papers, Marquette Archives; Letter from Frank Gross to Carlos Fernandez, August 27, 1943, Box 1,
Folder 3, Frank Gross Papers, Marquette Archives. O.C. Alvarez is a pseudonym for Antonio Santacruz.

231
C.J. McNeil from Kansas City, Missouri’s The Catholic Advance sang the praises of the
Inter-American Institute’s work over the course of 1943, particularly about fostering fraternity
among Catholics. McNeil proclaimed “with all respect to the State department, it can be said
with complete assurance that the most important agency now working for good will and unity
among all the Americas is the Inter-American institute established here by Bishop Edwin V.
O’Hara.”32 This was quite the hyperbolic statement as the Office of the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs had been around for three years as opposed to the Inter-American Institute
which was less than a year old.33 Among fellow Catholics like McNeil, aspirations for what the
institute was going to do were quite high.
After having the tour earlier in the year come to South Bend, Indiana, the University of
Notre Dame La Raza Club discussed having a guest speaker discussing sinarquismo in
September, but then voted against doing so. The members decided that they did not want to have
any political or religious controversy.34 Nonetheless, a few months later in November, they went
ahead and led a discussion on the sinarquistas at nearby St. Francis College in Fort Wayne,
Indiana.35 By January 1944, members finally hosted the guest speaker that they originally turned
down. Professor Roberto Carriedo Rosales was part of the original speaking tour in spring of
1943. Now as a visiting professor to Notre Dame, he provided an overview of the history of
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Mexico, but was really set on talking about the sinarquistas. According to Carriedo Rosales,
sinarquismo was a movement to teach “the average Mexican” to become a land owner, providing
a knowledge of farming to work and own the land. Carriedo Rosales concluded his talk at the
University of Notre Dame pushing for a “more comprehensive” understanding of inter-American
relations based upon Christian brotherhood, echoing O’Hara’s institute and the notion of a
Christian Pan-Americanism.37
In New York City at Fordham University, exchange student Rainaldo Tefel provided
another favorable perspective on sinarquismo, albeit with more explicitly religious overtones. He
insisted that the sinarquistas were neither Fascists nor Nazis, but that they were “truly Catholic”
who took “the Gospels as their inspiration.” Tefel explained that the UNS was not declining, but
rather on the rise in the midst of opposition. Many sinarquistas died for the movement in the
name of Christian Justice, proving the words of early Christian author, Tertullian, to be true: “the
blood of martyrs is the seed of Christians.” Tefel really believed the rhetoric that the sinarquistas
were fighting on behalf of a just cause. He described that “they are working in defense of their
country and its culture; they are the hope of Mexico. When they succeed in their program of
Christian Social Justice then the Virgin of Guadalupe will be, in practice as well as in theory, the
Queen of the Spanish Americas, and new standards with silver crosses will fly in a purged
American sky.”38 Tefel sought to persuade an audience of Catholic students that the sinarquistas
were not fascist nationalists, but rather crusaders for Christ in a secular Mexico.
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Aside from the informal tour attempting to sway Catholics towards the movement,
sinarquistas on the committee level maintained a commitment to the movement in early 1944.
Donations for colonization continued to come in from committees throughout California, along
the border in Texas, and in Chicago.39 However, contributions to the colonies started to dwindle
as the settlements were failing. Instead, members in the U.S. began to give financial support for
families of fallen sinarquistas. As was the case prior to the start of the colonization project in
1941, the organization’s members returned to honoring sinarquista martyrs. Sinarquistas from
these same regions in the U.S. donated to the revived cause.40
In addition to supporting the organization back home in Mexico, members worked to
sustain and build their movement in the U.S. Chapters in the Southwestern U.S. and Chicagoland
held their regular meetings, in addition to proselytizing to Mexicans in the respective regions to
join the cause.41 Sinarquistas not only worked to expand among fellow Mexican migrants, but
even aimed to recruit a particular segment of that community – braceros. The bracero program

39

Donations were made by committees in Azusa, Bakersfield, Chicago, Pittsburg, Richmond, San Diego, San
Dimas, San Pedro, San Fernando, San Francisco, and Santa Ana in California, El Paso, Laredo, McAllen, and Ysleta
in Texas, and Chicago in Illinois. “Donativos Para la Colonización,” El Sinarquista, January 6, 1944; “Donativos
Para la Colonización,” El Sinarquista, January 13, 1944; “Donativos Para la Colonización,” El Sinarquista, January
27, 1944; “Resultado de la Tercera Colecta Nacional Pro-Colonización,” El Sinarquista, February 17, 1944;
“Resultado de la Tercera Colecta Nacional Pro-Colonización,” El Sinarquista, February 24, 1944; “Resultado de la
Tercera Colecta Nacional Pro-Colonización,” El Sinarquista, March 9, 1944; “Donativos Para las Colonias,” El
Sinarquista, March 23, 1944; “Donativos Para las Colonias,” El Sinarquista, April 20, 1944.
40

Support came from Antioch, Bakersfield, La Verne, Los Angeles, Ontario, Pacoima, Pittsburg, Pomona,
Richmond, San Fernando, San Francisco, and San Gabriel in California, and El Paso and McAllen in Texas.
“Auxilios para las Familiae de Caídos,” El Sinarquista, March 23, 1944; “Auxilios para las Familias de Los
Caídos,” El Sinarquista, March 30, 1944; “Auxilios para las Familias de Los Caídos,” El Sinarquista, April 6, 1944;
“Auxilios para las Familias de Los Caídos,” El Sinarquista, April 13, 1944; “Auxilios para las Familias de Los
Caídos,” El Sinarquista, April 27, 1944.
“Noticias de Toda la República,” El Sinarquista, February 26, 1944; “Noticias de Toda la República,” El
Sinarquista, March 9, 1944; “Noticias de Toda la República,” El Sinarquista, April 20, 1944; “De Texas a Quintana
Roo Avanza Nuestra Ofensiva,” El Sinarquista, May 18, 1944; “Noticias de Toda la República,” El Sinarquista,
May 25, 1944; “Noticias de Toda la República,” El Sinarquista, June 8, 1944.
41

234
started in 1942 and grew out of bilateral agreements between the Mexican and U.S.
governments, allowing for Mexican men to come to the U.S. and work in short-term positions,
predominantly in agriculture and the railroad.42 In the Bajío, some UNS committees like the one
in Puruándiro, Michoacán helped determine which individuals would receive eligibility cards to
become braceros.43 Sinarquista committees from throughout California similarly sought to have
influence over braceros once they were in the U.S. They aimed to recruit braceros in the U.S. to
join the movement, highlighting their experiences.44 They viewed braceros as Mexicans like
themselves who were temporarily separated from their country of origin and would return soon.
Their recruiting of braceros, however, would not go unnoticed. Sinarquista Chief J.M. Gómez of
San Diego, California in early 1944 visited the nearby town of Bonita to specifically bring
braceros residing in that community into the movement. Some of the braceros reported his
actions to the Mexican Consulate in San Diego. As a result, Mexican Consul Eliseo Ruiz Russek
sought to prevent Gómez from proselytizing.45 The U.S. Office of Censorship did its part to slow
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the spread of sinarquismo and bring about the decline of the UNS in the country, which was only
aided by actions like this on the part of the Mexican state. In the eyes of the two governments,
the braceros were to solely provide their bodies for labor and for modernization.46 They did not
envision the braceros to give themselves for politics as the sinarquistas sought.
A Tidal Wave of Opposition to the UNS in 1944
However, the opposition to sinarquismo did not let up, especially as the Mexican political
left perpetuated the idea that the UNS was a fifth column while also implicating U.S. Catholic
leadership. The Confederación de Trabajadores de México utilized its English-language
publication, Mexican Labor News, aimed towards U.S. audiences to solidify this notion in late
1943. The periodical noted how American Catholic groups were supporting the sinarquistas in
pushing for a “New Christian Order.” The CTM cited notable American conservative Reverend
Fulton J. Sheen as saying that “Mexico needs a revolution” and that “only the religious faith of
the people and their Catholic tradition can save Mexico.”47 Instead of fostering inter-American
unity across the hemisphere, the CTM’s Mexican Labor News articulated to U.S. readers how the
sinarquistas and their allies were doing the opposite, damaging the Good Neighbor Policy.
News reports proliferated over the course of 1944 noting that the organization was a fifth
column aided by American Catholic leaders. Progressive American journalists built off of
Mexican Labor News with several articles. Don Newton in The Chicago Daily News, Arthur
Eaton in The Protestant, and Victor H. Bernstein in PM wrote about Reverend Sheen’s call for a
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“New Christian Order” and for revolution. They described how sinarquistas in the U.S. and
Mexico, as well as their Catholic allies, were pushing for another religious war in Mexico like
the Cristero Wars that came before.48
In addition, The New Republic denounced the “anti-democratic” UNS and the support
that it gained support among Catholics in the U.S. The magazine claimed that “in spite of the
overwhelming evidence of the Sinarquist threat, next to nothing has been done by either the
Mexican or the American government to curb the anti-democratic, pro-Axis activities of this
fascist organization. The only effective opposition to the Sinarquistas has come from the
Confederation of Mexican Workers.” The publication emphasized how the organization was a
threat to political institutions, and yet believed barely any actions were being taken. The New
Republic advocated for both governments to act, as well as suggested “certain politically minded
Catholic clergymen in this country, who have lately given much moral comfort to the
Sinarquistas, that their words and deeds in favor of Mexican fascism are contrary to our
democratic public policy.”49 According to The New Republic, not only did governments need to
respond, so too did American Catholics. It was their responsibility to come to terms with who the
UNS really was.
Heinz F. Eulau, a political scientist and writer for various current affairs publications,
viewed the sinarquistas from a similar perspective as Mexican fascists with aid from the U.S.
Catholic Church. His piece in The Inter-American sought to demonstrate how entrenched the
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UNS was in the U.S. and its institutional American Catholic support to change Mexico’s political
trajectory. Eulau noted how the movement had fifty committees across the U.S., and readership
beyond those committees wherever El Sinarquista and Orden were distributed, often in front of
Catholic churches serving the Mexican community. Beyond UNS materials, he wrote of the
favorable treatment of the organization by the “Southwest’s most important clerical weeklies” –
La Esperanza of Los Angeles, Revista Católica of El Paso, and La Voz of San Antonio. Such
treatment, he argued, was shared on the ground by Reverend Manuel A. Canseco of Our Lady of
Guadalupe Church in Los Angeles. Eulau honed in on Bishop O’Hara’s Inter-American Institute
and its tour in spring 1943. He believed that the tour was not in the name of Pan-American unity,
but the “real task was to make contact with local Sinarquista committees and hold propaganda
meetings.” Eulau advocated for the downfall of sinarquismo in the U.S. only “after democratic
Catholics have expressed their indignation over the continued support, both financial and
spiritual, which sectors of the clergy have given to the Sinarquistas. Otherwise they may well
succeed in creating a dangerous irredentist movement among Mexican Americans.”50
Eulau expanded on his piece in a series of articles in PM newspaper, incriminating a slew
of other Catholics in the U.S. Eulau posited that the sinarquistas “are seeking the creation of a
fascist neighbor to the U.S.A. – and that they are seeking and winning the support of Americans
here, some of whom are equally anxious to create a fascist neighbor to Mexico.”51 He cited
popular anti-communist and fascist-sympathizer, Reverend Charles Coughlin, as having praised
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the UNS back in September 1941 in his publication, Social Justice. Eulau mentioned Reverend
Alcuin Heibel, O.S.B. of Mount Angel Abbey, quoting him as praising how Americans should
support the sinarquistas in the Oregon Journal of Portland. Most notably, he focused in on the
activities of the NCWC and Frank Gross. He detailed how the N.C.W.C. News Service published
stories praising the UNS, as well as material directly from the organization itself. The material
from the NCWC made its way into Catholic publications across the country. As for Gross, Eulau
wrote how his “activities clearly stamp him as one of the most important Sinarquist agents in the
country. According to his own statement, he has given advice to Sinarquist headquarters on the
English translation of the Sinarquist program, on U.S. mailing lists, on avoiding publicity in
Catholic publications, [and] on cultivating the U.S. Embassy staff in Mexico City and American
newspapermen.”52 Eulau compiled all of the ways – both public and clandestine – that American
Catholic allies were supporting the sinarquistas. To him, they were not supporting fellow
Catholics, but instead were sowing seeds of disunity and strife.
Conservative American Catholics responded to this tidal wave of press targeting the
sinarquistas and themselves. Francis A. Fink examined whether sinarquismo was a fascist
movement in the national weekly Catholic newspaper, Our Sunday Visitor. He posited that it was
neither a fascist movement, a political movement, or a religious movement. “No, it is none of
these. Of course, a persistent effort has been made by hundreds of propagandists to lead the
American people to believe that any anti-Communist activity is pro-Fascist activity. But an
analysis of Synarchism will make it very clear that it occupies that middle ground which is the
safest for the preservation of true democracy.” He addressed both politics and religion, citing the
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sinarquista platform as saying that “we have purposely kept out of politics” and that sinarquismo
“is not a religious movement.”53 Fink positioned himself as less of a Catholic, but more as a
defender of democracy. Similarly, Reverend Francis J. Heltshe supported the sinarquistas in The
New York Times, saying that it was equally against communism as it was against fascism. He
contended that “Sinarquism is a frank and open and democratic movement – a spontaneous
movement born of one man’s great vision and a whole people’s great need.”54 Heltshe claimed
that sinarquismo was being slandered and that the American people had to see who the
sinarquistas really were. Even Ricard Pattee of the Inter-American Committee of the Catholic
Association for International Peace – a cause similar to that of Bishop O’Hara’s – defended
sinarquismo. He believed that “the military and unaggressive character of Synarchism is the very
antithesis of the militancy and fanfare of the Falange. As an expression of Mexican
traditionalism, enveloped in the modern garb of social justice and agrarian reform, it merits the
attention of Americans.”55 These Catholics sought to demonstrate that sinarquismo was more of
a benevolent civic organization that one seeking to transform Mexico.
However, not all Catholics continued to view the UNS favorably during this time,
especially those with a progressive political bent. The editor of Commonweal magazine, Edward
Skillin, Jr., critiqued the sinarquistas and how American Catholics received them. Skillin did not
doubt why certain Mexicans in the U.S. chose to be sinarquistas as they faced horrible treatment
in the Southwest. He described that they do what they can to contribute to the movement by
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contributing money to the sinarquista colonies in Northern Mexico and by distributing
sinarquista literature. Nonetheless, he expressed concerns that “any movement with a small
intelligent leadership and a large ignorant and emotional following is all too easily taken over
either by some scoundrel or some agent or some subversive political power.” The UNS was not
innocent as “there is some reason for the application of the fascist label” because he viewed the
organization as not envisioning a democratic state, but a top-down authoritarian one as depicted
in the sinarquista booklet, México en 1960. He believed that the movement focused on opposing
the postrevolutionary Mexican state at all costs: “if Sinarquists succeed in growing considerably
more in numbers, there is real danger of a bloody civil war.”56 As for American Catholics,
Skillin did not think it was “surprising to find that scattered comments on Sinarquism in the US
Catholic press have been entirely favorable.” He argued how “the way rightful respect for
authority and morals becomes an unwarranted respect for the authoritarian principles in politics
is a highly deplorable tendency, and it must be recognized for what it is.”57 Skillin provided a
progressive Catholic voice in a sea of conservative Catholic perspectives. He demonstrated that
American Catholics were not monolithic on sinarquismo, but indeed disagreed about the
movement. Like writers in the secular press, Skillin advocated for Catholics to change course on
the UNS.
Leadership at the Archdiocese of Chicago came out forcibly against fascism alongside
that of the leadership of the Archdiocese of Mexico in Mexico City. The Auxiliary Bishop of
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Chicago, Bernard James Sheil, and the Archbishop of Mexico, Luis María Martínez, came
together to denounce the spread of fascism in the world. In particular, they highlighted that the
UNS and the PAN were “fascist groups.” The sinarquistas, especially, “have deployed extensive
activities among Mexicans in the United States and have also formed organizations among these
elements of our population.” Archbishop Martínez affirmed that neither group had an official
connection with the Catholic Church of Mexico.58 Auxiliary Bishop Sheil, on the other hand,
spoke out against fascism more generally and its embrace of anti-Semitism. He argued that “The
world of the future must be a world in which racial hatred and irrational persecution cannot take
place."59 Together, bothAuxiliary Bishop Sheil and Archbishop Martínez condemned fascism –
and in turn condemned sinarquismo, conflating the two.
Most notably, even the NCWC publicly distanced itself away from the UNS. Legal
Department Director William F. Montavon had been close to UNS leaders since 1936, but
mounting negative press, particularly news that implicated the NCWC, caused him to change
course. Not only did the media over the course of 1944 focus on the NCWC, but such coverage
prompted a government investigation. The FBI arrived at the headquarters of the NCWC on May
25, 1944, asking for Montavon and inquiring into UNS printed materials. Federal law
enforcement inquired into an on-site printing press, particularly one that was producing the
pamphlet, México en 1960. Montavon was not present, but NCWC staff notified the FBI that the
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organization did not have a print shop nor did it produce the material. This was not the only
instance that the office received multiple requests for sinarquista publicity in 1944, particularly
for the movement’s program.61 Montavon publicly cut off all ties with the group. He responded
that the “NCWC has had no active part in the organization or action of the Synarchist movement
and has issued no statement or literature of any kind regarding Synarchism.”62
By 1945, the disrepute of the UNS gained a firm hold in the U.S. and did not disappear.
Sinarquistas and their American Catholic allies attempted to convince Americans that the
movement was free of issues, but were not successful. In the midst of the war, these nationalist
Mexicans lost much of their support, even from those who had supported them for so long.
The Postwar Era and the Internal Split Within the UNS
Following World War II, changes occurred on multiple fronts. The American state no
longer focused on fascists as it shifted to communists as the Cold War between the United States
and the Soviet Union took hold. The UNS was no longer distinctive for its anti-communism. As
for within the UNS, a division ruptured throughout all levels of the organization, effecting
members in the U.S. Such changes hastened the demise of sinarquismo in the country.
The End of World War II and Its Effect on Sinarquismo
As World War II was coming to an end in 1945, the opposition towards the UNS reached
its apex and increasingly the focus shifted more and more towards communism. President
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt died in April 1945 and the U.S. government under new President
Harry S. Truman still feared fascism. However, with the end of the war in September 1945, a
threat from the past emerged again – communism. The U.S. government targeted communists in
the aftermath of the 1917 Russian Revolution throughout the 1920s during the First Red Scare,
and with the Soviet Union’s growing influence in the world as World War II came to a close, it
did so again. The Cold War shifted U.S. policy towards targeting and containing the spread of
communism – at home and abroad. Rather than fear of a fascist fifth column, the U.S.
government increasingly grew wary about a communist fifth column within its borders. The
federal government, therefore, worried less about the threat of sinarquismo as compared to the
thread of communism.
On the state government level within the U.S., the California Un-America Activities
Committee which formerly highlighted fascist or perceived fascist groups like the UNS back in
1943, likewise shifted towards focusing exclusively on communists in 1945. The committee led
by California State Senator Jack B. Tenney revisited the sinarquistas and their potential role in
the Zoot Suit Riots from two years earlier. His committee reported that the investigation of the
riots “resulted in exposing Communist techniques in fomenting racial prejudices and
antagonisms.” The Tenney committee was “convinced that the Sinarquistas had nothing to do
whatever with the agitation and fomenting of the ‘zoot suit’ disturbances in Los Angeles. The
evidence clearly indicates that the Communist Party selected this organization for the public
spotlight as it went about its vicious work creating a Mexican ‘minority’ in California.”63
Tenney’s committee contended that the sinarquistas received attention because they were anti-
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communist, and thus communists sought to implicate them in the riots. The legislators made a
point of noting how the sinarquistas were a group of Mexican nationals focused on Mexico, and
not the U.S. The state committee removed the blame from the sinarquistas, instead placing it on
the communists.
An incident in late December 1945 likewise shifted focus from the sinarquistas to the
communists. Vicente Lombardo Toledano and the CTM opposed the UNS from early on in its
founding and had no plans in stopping. Lombardo Toledano was speaking at an open-air meeting
of the CTM when he made the accusation that certain U.S. firms were providing arms and
ammunition to the sinarquistas. He argued that the UNS sought an armed rebellion to install
presidential candidate Ezequiel Padilla against the candidate of the ruling Partido de la
Revolución Mexicana, Miguel Alemán Valdés, in the upcoming 1946 Mexican general election.
Lombardo Toledano welcomed any investigations by the U.S. or Mexican governments into the
accusation. He believed that an inquiry would implicate the UNS and force the Mexican
government to dissolve the group as a subversive force against democracy.64 Despite his
statement, he failed to furnish proof of the sinarquistas smuggling arms from the U.S. to
Mexico.65 This specific claim was very similar to one that Lombardo Toledano invoked back in
1937 of a “Fascist revolutionary plot” to sneak weapons across the border against the Mexican
government, which also lacked evidence.
Lombardo Toledano’s claim caused an uproar in the U.S. government. Leadership from
the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City expressed outrage about what Lombardo Toledano said.
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Ambassador George S. Messersmith communicated to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes,
believing that “there is no basis whatever for such a statement. Knowing him as I do, and how he
is carried away by his own voice and by his feelings when he speaks, it is not surprising at all
that he should have permitted himself to make such an outrageous statement.”66 When
Messersmith talked to Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, Francisco Castillo Nájera, he was
convinced that Lombardo Toledano “destroyed himself” in the recent action.67 Gildardo
González Sánchez, president of the dominant sinarquista faction, reached out to Messersmith,
feeding into the ambassador’s doubts about Lombardo Toledano. González Sánchez asserted that
the labor leader’s charges were “devoid of truth,” and more importantly that he was a dangerous
communist. The UNS president noted that the sinarquistas, on the other hand, were “patriotic”
Mexicans who maintained good relations with the U.S.68 Messersmith and his staff tracked the
wave of publicity that emerged from Lombardo Toledano’s statement. By early 1946, he, like the
sinarquistas, was convinced that “Lombardo is the instrument of Moscow and that he is out to
make trouble for us.”69 Messersmith was in line with the post-war sentiment of the U.S.
government, seeing the sinarquistas as less a threat than communists.
Split Within Sinarquismo
At the end of World War II, a public division emerged among sinarquista leaders in
spring 1944 after years of internal conflict behind-the-scenes. The most radical faction was under
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the leadership of Salvador Abascal, who was forced out of the María Auxiliadora colony – and
ultimately the movement – by individuals such as Manuel Torres Bueno and Antonio Santacruz.
Abascal felt that the group was becoming too moderate and politically expedient, aligning too
much with the Mexican and U.S. governments in the midst of war. He thought that the
organization was compromising its nationalism in favor of internationalism like the Good
Neighbor Policy. Abascal did not want to partake in compromise of any kind, continuing to
advocate for an organized take-over of the Mexican state. Sinarquista president Manuel Torres
Bueno led another, more moderate, faction. He wanted to maintain his power in the UNS,
pursuing Mexican electoral politics rather than any form of violence against the Mexican state.
Torres Bueno sought to turn the movement into a formalized political party. The UNS was
political, but acted outside the confines of the electoral system, and Torres Bueno wanted to
change that. Antonio Santacruz, who was involved in sinarquismo behind-the-scenes since Las
Legiones, led the third and most reconciliatory-minded faction. He sought to collaborate with the
Mexican state. As opposed to Torres Bueno who wanted the movement to be explicitly political,
Santacruz wanted it instead to be both social, as well as religious, forming formal ties with the
Mexican Catholic Church. Of the three camps, the Abascal group disappeared from the UNS
altogether. Salvador Abascal pursued a new path by creating Editorial Jus, a publishing house
focused on books dedicated to conservativism and Catholicism.70 Therefore, two main groups of
sinarquismo remained. The moderate Torres Bueno faction became the principal organization,
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whereas the reconciliatory and religious Santacruz faction became the dissident movement - both
claiming the title of the “Unión Nacional Sinarquista.”71
Both camps of sinarquismo were at odds with one another, and the split of course carried
over into sinarquista committees in the U.S. Torres Bueno led the moderate principal UNS,
seeking to maintain the organization’s commitment to faith, its hierarchical structure, and to
consolidate the UNS as one cohesive political movement. He presided over the faction until May
1945 when he turned over power to engineer Gildardo González Sánchez at the eighth
anniversary of the founding of sinarquismo. González Sánchez followed in Torres Bueno’s path
to unite all of the UNS. He replaced committee chiefs who he saw as disloyal.72 By doing so,
González Sánchez was successful in securing the large majority of sinarquistas, including those
in the U.S. Almost of all of the committees that the UNS established in California, Texas, and
Chicagoland remained in the dominant movement.73As for the reconciliatory dissident
movement, it was originally led by Santacruz and then later taken over by Carlos Athié Carrasco
starting in February 1945. Athié Carrasco, a teacher, never served in the leadership of the UNS
and was completely unknown by the majority of sinarquistas. Nonetheless, he worked to build a
relationship with the Mexican state, emphasizing that his goal was not to contest its political
power, but rather to sustain the Christian principles of the nation by building a social
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organization. The dissident movement did secure some support in the U.S., including a handful
74

of committees that joined the cause. Most notably, the faction received the favor of long-standing
American Catholic allies. Although the NCWC no longer publicly supported sinarquismo, the
organization privately aided the dissident group as Antonio Santacruz had a long-term
relationship with William Montavon. Frank Gross likewise sided with the dissident group
because of his connection to Santacruz.75 Transnational fragmentation of sinarquismo would
persist for years to come.
The Principal Movement
Gildardo González Sánchez led the politically-minded group organized by Manuel Torres
Bueno, seeking to enter electoral politics in Mexico and maintain UNS institutional structures in
the U.S. The organization developed and registered a political party with the Mexican state,
Fuerza Popular (Popular Force), to participate in the 1946 Mexican general election. The party
put forward Jesus Agustín Castro as its presidential candidate as well as various candidates for
the Chamber of Deputies. This was notable as the sinarquistas had refrained from formal politics
since its official founding in 1937 as they did not want to buttress the postrevolutionary Mexican
political system. By 1946, however, the politically-minded group thought that electoral politics
was the way to make concrete inroads in Mexico. Although the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI or the Institutional Revolutionary Party, formerly the Partido de la Revolución
Mexicana) won the presidency with Miguel Alemán Valdés and maintained power in the
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Chamber of Deputies, the presence of Fuerza Popular contested the power of the ruling party.

76

Sinarquistas in the U.S., meanwhile, kept their sights on Mexico while more publicly embracing
the nation they resided in. Despite their location in another nation, they sought to maintain their
affiliation with the Mexico-focused movement that some had been with for approximately a
decade and as such, they supported the group’s entrée into institutional politics.
González Sánchez made a trip to the U.S. to both demonstrate to the sinarquistas there
that the movement was still intact and attempt to show Americans that the group was not a threat.
The president visited sinarquista committees in El Paso, Los Angeles, and San Francisco where
he conferred with local chiefs and showed committee members film footage of the most recent
organizational convention in Mexico. During his time in those cities, González Sánchez wooed
the public in response to the years of antagonism built up against the movement. He asserted that
sinarquismo “is a civic movement to teach the people of Mexico to defend their civil rights.”
“Sinarquistas are opposed to any form of totalitarian government. We favor democratic types of
governments.” Instead, González Sánchez posited that “our movement is for democracy and cooperation between United States and Mexico.”77 The new president sought to bring about
support, rather than distrust, for the group.
The organization under González Sánchez also highlighted the importance of women in
the UNS more than ever before to bring more Mexicans in and sustain the movement. The
president pursued a “national” campaign focused on mobilizing female sinarquistas across
Mexico and the U.S. He created a national female section of the UNS began in 1945 under the
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leadership of Ofelia Ramírez Sánchez, formerly the chief of the women’s group in Celaya,
Guanajuato. The notoriously patriarchal movement previously had local female sections in cities
like Los Angeles and El Paso, but never one on a larger scale until then. One of the major
reasons why González Sánchez created the national female organization was to stabilize and
control what was left of the women’s groups after the split in the UNS.78 Ramírez Sánchez
sought to do exactly that. She conducted a census of the UNS, documenting the amount of
women in each respective committee. Ramírez Sánchez worked to either revive or activate
women’s activities on the local level, bringing structure as well as working to bring more women
into the movement. She sought that each municipal and regional female section would have its
own chief. Ramírez Sánchez laid out a plan that the respective sections would follow which
included educating women creating libraries and schools, distributing pro-sinarquista
propaganda, and raising funds to benefit the movement.79 Female groups on the ground reported
on their regular activities in El Sinarquista, including the one in Los Angeles which was doing
exactly what she set out. Women in the regional female section in the city planned fundraisers,
organized classes, and led the youth group.80Ramírez Sánchez collaborated with González
Sánchez to maintain and strengthen the institutional structure of the organization, particularly in
relation to women.
Even as the leader of the dominant faction of the UNS shifted to Luis Martínez Narezo,
Ramírez Sánchez conducted tours to check in on the progress of the local women’s sections,
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traveling to the U.S. In 1947, she led a tour funded by Cuquita de Carrillo of the local women’s
group of Culiacán, Sinaloa. Ramírez Sánchez saw that the principal reason for the trip was for
female sinarquistas to learn “about the history of Mexico! What did they know about the history
of Mexico! How did they see the situation as Mexicans, of them as Mexicans in the United
States, what they had for or against them, and the situation assinarquistas.”81 Female sinarquistas
aided the movement by “adherence to ideas” and “with some monthly contribution.”82 Ramírez
Sánchez traveled throughout California, visiting San Diego, Los Angeles, San Bernardino, San
Fernando, and ultimately San Francisco.83 She was taken aback by the sheer number of
sinarquistas in and around Los Angeles. As for San Francisco, she believed that the sinarquistas
there were extremely dedicated to the movement. In San Francisco, Ramírez Sánchez met not
only with local female sections, but also with male leaders such as the chief of the Northern
California regional committee, Porfirio Rivera, who continued to be based in Bakersfield.84 She
would return to the U.S. on other occasions to check in on female sections in the
country.85Ramírez Sánchez saw sinarquistas in the U.S. not as an extension of the movement, but
part and parcel of the cause who needed to be fostered.
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Sinarquista committees did indeed continue under the watch of the dominant UNS
faction. In San Fernando, California near Los Angeles, the sinarquista community rose in and
around Santa Rosa Catholic Church. The large majority of parishioners were farmworkers from
Jalisco in the Bajío, having left the region because of insecurity tied to the church-state conflict
of the 1920s. They were in communication with relatives back in Jalisco and many were very
religious. Although decades passed after these individuals left Mexico, they were sympathetic to
a pro-Catholic movement that would reinvigorate the power of the church in Mexico, even
through the means of electoral politics. Parishioner Tomás Gasca sold copies of El Sinarquista
and Orden to churchgoers at Santa Rosa Church. Gasca, and local sinarquista committee leader
José Macías, connected the local religious Mexican community of San Fernando with
sinarquismo. The chapter regularly held its meetings not far from the church on Pico Street.86
In Texas, the El Paso chapter continued to bridge being both a community organization
and a political one. Sinarquistas in the city regularly made their presence known, frequently
holding parades marching through El Paso, carrying the Mexican and U.S. flags, in addition to
the movement’s flag.87 In early 1947, the regional committee participated in El Paso’s annual
New Year’s Day Parade alongside bands, ethnic community organizations, and the El Paso
County Sheriff’s Office. Among many other floats, the local chapter’s entry depicted “Mexico’s
part in the fight for peace.”88 As El Paso was situated along the border with Mexico, the
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sinarquista float connected with many people in the community, whether they agreed with the
movement or not.
The dominant faction of the UNS utilized both of its publications, El Sinarquista and
Orden, not only to communicate with members throughout greater Mexico, but to also further
declare its admiration of and willingness to collaborate with the U.S. government. In the March
1947 issue of Orden, the paper openly praised the president of the U.S. The periodical declared
that “the greatest sinarquista in America” was not one of the group’s leaders or members, but
rather President Harry S. Truman.89 This was a notable shift from the previous ambivalent and
frequently apprehensive stance that the UNS had towards the U.S. government. The dominant
organization saw the government on its side as both were openly anti-communist. The moderate,
reconciliatory stance of the principal movement would only last so much longer in 1947.
In September, the principal movement would transform. The new leader of the dominant
faction, Luis Martínez Narezo, focused less on electoral politics as Manuel Torres Bueno
envisioned, instead concentrating more on community issues. He met with more radical leaders
such as Salvador Abascal, Juan Ignacio Padilla, and Valentín Lozada.90 The UNS could either go
down the path of continuing to be a relatively moderate movement or instead choosing to be an
uncompromising militant organization. The leaders decided on the latter, undoing the reforms
that Torres Bueno implemented, even unseating him from a leadership position in the group.91
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The dominant group was no longer moderate, but instead focused on promoting conservative
Catholic social doctrine.
Just a year after Orden praised U.S. President Truman as “the greatest sinarquista” in the
country, the paper under new leadership reversed its course on the U.S. The new editor of Orden
and conservative Nicaraguan activist who was part of the UNS, Pablo Antonio Cuadra, wrote
against the “false dilemma” that Mexico must choose between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
Cuadra argued instead that Mexico needed to pursue a “third position” of Catholicism and
Hispanidad, as Abascal argued years before.92 Such a stance demonstrated how the dominant
faction firmly rooted itself away from reconciliation.
By the late 1940s, various factors led to a decline in the principal movement. In Mexico,
the group’s entry into electoral politics via Fuerza Popular was short lived as the Mexican
government banned the party in 1949. The Mexican state controlled by the PRI cancelled the
registration that the party received in 1946, claiming that it was seditious, undemocratic, and a
threat to public order.93 The conservative Partido Acción Nacional eclipsed the UNS in electoral
politics and more broadly throughout Mexico. It also took in members who formerly supported
Fuerza Popular. In both Mexico and the U.S., Mexicans who had been sinarquistas were leaving
the movement. Although efforts were made by leaders to sustain the group, they were too little,
too late. Political blows to the organization back home combined with a rapidly shifting ideology
added to reasons why sinarquistas in the principal faction were departing.
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The Dissident Movement
While the dominant movement operated in a transnational context, the minority faction of
the UNS created by Antonio Santacruz and led by Carlos Athié Carrasco also functioned in the
context of the U.S. This branch of sinarquismo believed that the other camp had gone astray by
participating in institutional politics and instead operated as a Catholic social organization, but
still with an anti-communist bent. Carlos Athié Carrasco and his followers presented themselves
on the “right” side of the movement in the “segunda época” or second period of the UNS. They
focused on moral values, the importance of traditional family structure, and the continued
reverence of martyrdom.94 The group still maintained contact with sinarquistas in the U.S.,
conducting a campaign among female members and having sympathetic committees. This branch
of the UNS notably received the support of conservative American Catholics which was missing
in the dominant group.
Athié Carrasco constructed a hierarchical organization similar to what existed before. The
national committee remained at the top, followed by regional, district, and municipal
committees. For the national committee, he appointed former chief of the El Paso regional
committee, José Neder Quiñones, as the National Treasurer of the movement.95 Athié Carrasco
also created a national female section like the principal movement, but this one was led by María
del Carmen Rodríguez. The goal of the female section was to “help the development of women
in all aspects, giving them the opportunity to control their own affairs and specialties.”96 The
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sinarquista president appointed new chiefs in locations vital to the UNS in the U.S. including
José Cleofas Rojas in Bakersfield and José de Jesus Muñoz in El Paso.97 The dissident faction
even held annual meetings with leaders from the various committees representing. Muñoz, for
example, showed up on behalf of the El Paso chapter at the 1946 congress in Querétaro in the
Bajío.98
Although the leader of the female section, María del Carmen Rodríguez, did not lead a
tour of the U.S. as Ofelia Ramírez Sánchez of the dominant movement did, she engaged with
women in the country. She developed the publication, Mejicana, with the tagline, “a magazine
that interests the woman. But…also men.”99 The newspaper allowed female sinarquistas to have
a form of autonomy, while still embracing the patriarchal order of the organization. The
periodical sought to promote sinarquismo without publicly doing so while advocating for
Mexican patriotism. The goal was to counteract other publications that went about spreading
“frivolity, atheism, and bizarre customs.”100 In addition to subscribers in Mexico, readership for
Rodríguez’s periodical included individuals in Bakersfield, Los Angeles, and Pomona in
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Beyond the newspaper, Rodríguez oversaw the activities of

women in these cities. The El Paso women’s committee met weekly with women from nearby
local committees in Ysleta and San Juan attending. The group also aided the women in the
family of sinarquista leader of José L. Soto who were facing financial troubles.102Similarly
women elsewhere reported on their activities to Rodríguez.
As the dissident branch created parallel committees in the U.S., the El Paso regional
committee represented the organization in the city in the eyes of the U.S. government. José de
Jesus Muñoz, José A. Zambrano, and Vicente Arriola collectively filed a FARA registration with
the Department of Justice. In registering with the U.S. federal government, they noted that “the
Regional Council in El Paso, Tex. directs all its activities to organize the people of Mexican
extraction into groups and to teach these groups the Sinarquist Doctrine: The betterment of
existing conditions in Mexico, amongst its people, both economic and social. To form a true
Christian and civil order in Mexico.”103 Muñoz, Zambrano, and Arriola maintained a focus on
transforming Mexico, all the while emphasizing the particular focus of the dissident group on
serving a social and religious function.
Conservative American Catholics like William F. Montavon from the NCWC and Frank
Gross also engaged with the dissident group. Although Montavon no longer publicly supported
sinarquismo as he had in the past, he maintained correspondence with Antonio Santacruz for
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some time. He told Santacruz that “you have been generous in giving your service to the welfare
of others. You have done more than could reasonably have been demanded of you.”104 He was
grateful for Santacruz’s role in sinarquismo and sided with his cause. Similarly, Frank Gross and
Santacruz maintained contact, especially after the organizational split. He did not lose his
dedication to the movement. Gross continued to offer his role as a liaison and translator to the
dissident sinarquistas following the divide.105
The movement still provoked interest and admiration from some Americans. Gross
received mail from sinarquista sympathizers from around the U.S. These Catholics knew about
the organization, but wanted to become involved further. Edward P. Garcia, a lay Catholic and
vocal anti-communist based in Boston, maintained regular correspondence with Gross. He
explained how “I am convinced that it is a truly fine organization opposed to hellish
Communism and that it is fighting for Christian social order in Mexico.”106 Reverend Dennis A.
McGurkin, O.F.M. from Holy Name College told Gross that “Synarchism first engaged my
attention about three or four years ago and I have read practically everything that I could find
that dealt with the Movement.”107 Even at Mundelein College in Chicago, an all-female Catholic
institution, students in a Geography class investigated the movement. Dolores Bresingham, Mary
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K. Kennedy, and Virginia Morris found sinarquismo “to be not just another ism, but a democratic
and Catholic undertaking which has done much to eliminate illiteracy in Latin America.”108
Despite the lingering support for sinarquismo, Gross’ involvement in supporting the
dissident movement dropped off starting in 1946. National chiefs Carlos Athié Carrasco and later
Hernán Leal Cetina gave Gross increasingly less work to do. His days of serving as a liaison by
giving talks, translating documents, and publicly defending the organization were soon behind
him.109
By 1949, Gross was no longer aiding the UNS and therefore no longer saw the
justification in filing as a foreign agent to the Department of Justice. Gross had been filling out
FARA registrations ever since 1942. He reached out to the department on March 16, saying that
he was no longer active and asked “how I can terminate the necessity of making these needless
reports”? He added in defiance, “how can I resign from a position that I never had? It is you who
insist that because I wrote a few letters making suggestions to my friends who were in this
movement in Mexico that I was an ‘official adviser’ of those.”110 William E. Foley from the
department responded accordingly, confirming that that he was inactive. He explained to Gross
that “you did not engage in any activities for or in the interest of the [Unión Nacional
Sinarquista].” Foley noted that “should you resume your activities on behalf of the Union
Nacional Sinarquista, it will be necessary for you to notify this office in order that proper
registration forms may be forwarded.”111 Gross, however, was done with his involvement in the
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movement. After eight years of active involvement as an unofficial representative for the
movement in the U.S., the “Sinarquista Gringo” was no more.
Although Gross no longer participated in the dissident movement, some American
Catholics still lent support. The Claretians provided support to sinarquismo via its Spanishlanguage, Los Angeles-based publication, La Esperanza. Reverend A.E. Vergara, C.M.F.
frequently defended the dissident branch against the dominant movement in 1950. He supported
sinarquista president Leal Cetina and the chief of the regional sinarquista committee of El Paso,
José A. Zambrano, against attacks from the other faction. Vergara argued that the dissident
movement was actually “true” sinarquismo and advocated for the very ideals that the original
leaders laid out in 1937 - motherland, justice, and freedom.112 Vergara defended sinarquismo just
as other Americans, especially religious leaders, had done so in the past. However, just as the
dominant faction was losing supporters, so too was the dissident group.
Between the mid-1940s and the early 1950s, rapid transformations affected the UNS in
the U.S. Cold War policy paired with an organizational split weakened the group. The UNS lost
both its distinctiveness as well as its members. The movement was simply not the same as it
once was.
Remnants of Sinarquismo in the United States
The UNS persisted into the 1950s and 1960s in the U.S., however the end was near. Over
the course of the 1950s, the split within sinarquismo was less defined than before, with members
simply identifying as sinarquistas and not with one faction or another. Chapters across the U.S.
disappeared. By the late 1950s, the sinarquista regional committee of El Paso was for all intents

A.E. Vergara, “Por Teléfono,” La Esperanza, May 21, 1950; A.E. Vergara, C.M.F., “Por Teléfono,” La
Esperanza, June 4, 1950.
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and purposes non-existent. In 1957, committee leadership stopped filing its FARA registration as
a foreign agent with the U.S. Department of Justice, noting that the group suspended all
activities.113 The Ciudad Juárez sinarquista committee in Mexico acted as a proxy for the El Paso
chapter for several years, speaking on behalf of the organization.114
Into the 1960s, sinarquistas remained in the U.S., however the movement was struggling.
The El Paso chapter reemerged. Sinarquista president David Orozco Romo made a trip to Ciudad
Juárez in 1961 where regional chief of the El Paso regional committee, Alberto Molina, was
present. Orozco Romo pushed a renewed sinarquista agenda of anti-communism. He stipulated
how U.S.-based sinarquistas needed to fight communism within the laws of the country to
encourage partnership between the U.S. and Mexico. The UNS president said that sinarquismo
“always will strive for an effective cooperation and spiritual get together of all nations.”115
Orozco Romo revived the moderate stance of the Torres Bueno wing, seeking collaboration
rather than antagonism, hoping that a revived anti-communism would bolster the organization.
The UNS, however, was no longer unique in its vision as anti-communism in the U.S. took hold
among Americans.
By 1966, the issue was less anti-communism, but rather just to keep the organization
alive. In Los Angeles, Pedro Villaseñor was no longer part of a formal committee, however he
still identified loosely as a sinarquista. Villaseñor received letters from movement leadership in
Mexico City asking for financial support. One was from Isidro Vélez Avilés, the UNS president
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at the time, who articulated how “the National Committee is going through a very difficult
economic situation, to such a degree that we are in serious danger that they will ask us for the
house, where our offices are, they cut off the electricity and the telephone; all for nonpayment.”116 The situation was so dire for UNS headquarters that the organization could not
function without the aid of its members. Once again as sinarquista leadership had done before,
the national committee in Mexico City called for monetary support from sinarquistas in the U.S.
like Villaseñor.
Vélez Avilés attempted to appeal to Villaseñor with language that he was still a
nationalist Mexican in the United States longing for his homeland. He expressed that “we know
too well that those who live beyond the borders feel their hearts beat along with ours and that
they also yearn for a great, free, prosperous, and happy motherland.”117 The president utilized the
same language that sinarquistas like Salvador Velasco and Jesús María Dávila used at the
beginning of the movement in the late 1930s. The issue was that by the mid-1960s, the Unión
Nacional Sinarquista no longer had the base of support in the United States that the organization
had decades before. With the lack of people power compounded with the changing political
situation of the Cold War, the movement could simply not sustain itself and survive in the
country.

“El Comité Nacional pasa por una situación económica dificilísima, a grado tal que estamos con el grave peligro
de que nos pidan la casa, donde están nuestras oficinas, nos corten la luz y el telefono; todo ello por falta de pago.”
Letter from Isidro Vélez Avilés to Pedro Villaseñor, August 15, 1966, Box 1, Folder 8, Pedro Villaseñor political
papers, Huntington Library.
116

“De sobra sabemos que cuantos viven allende las fronteras, sienten latir sus corazones junto con los nuestros y
que anhelan también una patria grande, libre, prospera y feliz.” Letter from Isidro Vélez Avilés to Pedro Villaseñor,
August 15, 1966, Box 1, Folder 8, Villaseñor papers, Huntington Library.
117

263
Conclusion
From the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, the Unión Nacional Sinarquista faced a long
decline in the United States. The movement persisted for years, despite major changes inside and
outside of the movement. Nonetheless, increased criticism of the group combined with internal
strife and the onset of the Cold War all led to the group’s demise. However, the organization and
its complicated – and contested – legacy live on today.

CONCLUSION
Val Rodriguez from the Los Angeles, California suburb of Signal Hill wrote a letter to
the editor of the Los Angeles Times in November 1989 in response to an article on correcting
historical injustices. Rodriguez described that while he was attending junior high school on the
Eastside of the city during the Zoot Suit Riots of 1943, the school’s administration banned any
students from wearing the outfits. As a result, he and his classmates staged a walk out. Rodriguez
explained that “the next day was judgement day. Most of the leaders received two swats. I was
asked if I knew what a fascist Sinarquista was. I replied that I thought it was a new Mexican dish
(like fajitas), or a new pan de huevo (Mexican pastry). I took three swats.”1 Rodriguez’s
commentary reflected on the complicated legacy that the Unión Nacional Sinarquista had in Los
Angeles – and more broadly in the United States – years after its height.
Following the 1960s, sinarquistas in the United States generally distanced themselves
from the movement which persisted in Mexico, instead choosing to be more involved directly
with the Catholic Church. From Southern California to Chicagoland, many former sinarquistas
originally learned about the UNS in the first place through their local parishes through the
dissemination of sinarquista publications. When the movement dissolved in the mid-1940s and
beyond, they returned to their home churches.2
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Pedro Villaseñor, longtime leader of the Los Angeles regional committee, was one such
person whose Catholicism lasted throughout his life. He remained loosely affiliated with the
movement as a member and nothing else, completely dropping his public association with the
organization. The UNS national committee reached out to him not only for financial support, but
sought his aid in locating other sinarquistas in the U.S.3 Nonetheless, more than anything else
Villaseñor saw himself primarily as a Catholic. He lived his Catholicism in all that he did. He
attended daily mass at Our Lady of Lourdes Church on the Eastside of the city, and he sent all of
his children to Catholic school. He became a naturalized United States citizen in the late 1950s.
Although Villaseñor was socially very conservative, that did not affect his vote in the 1960 U.S.
presidential election. Rather than voting for a Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, his
Catholicism trumped his political identity and he voted for the candidate of the Democratic
Party, John Fitzgerald Kennedy. As for his family, his children did not follow his conservative
politics. In particular, his daughter Lucila was active in the progressive Chicano movement,
participating in walk-outs, painting murals, and becoming involved in the Raza Unida Party. In
Pedro Villaseñor’s later years up to his death in 1996, his religion continued to play a primary
role in his life where he became a regular parishioner at St. Alphonsus Church, also on Los
Angeles’ Eastside.4 Pedro Villaseñor came to the U.S. as a right-wing Catholic, nationalist
Mexican in exile, but passed away as a Catholic who found community among his brethren in his
new home.

Letter from Adalberto D’Leon to Pedro Villasenor, Box 1, Folder 10, Pedro Villaseñor political papers, Huntington
Library.
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Rosendo Sánchez, a less-prominent, former sinarquista leader shared similar experiences
to Villaseñor in his years following the UNS. Whereas Villaseñor was the regional committee
chief of Los Angeles, Sánchez served as the municipal committee leader of the small community
of Fabens, Texas on the outskirts of El Paso. Sánchez originally left Mexico amid the upheaval
of the Mexican Revolution in 1917. His Catholicism caused him to join the UNS in the U.S., but
it was also his refuge when he left the movement. Sánchez was an active parishioner of Our Lady
of Guadalupe Church in Fabens, as well as a member of various Catholic associations including
the Adoración Nocturna (Nighttime Adoration) and Asociación Guadalupana (Guadalupe
Association). A year before he passed in 1983, he became a U.S. citizen.5 Like Villaseñor – and
other ex-sinarquistas – Sánchez turned to his faith as an integral part of his identity in the U.S.
While sinarquismo disappeared from the United States, it persisted in Mexico in various
iterations. Salvador Abascal remained active as a public writer and publisher, not going
underground as he once did. He made a point of distributing books that casted a positive light on
the height of sinarquismo and a negative perspective on the postrevolutionary state.6 Although he
passed in 2000, one of his children, Carlos Abascal, left a mark on Mexican politics as the
Secretary of the Interior under President Vicente Fox. The faction under Manuel Torres Bueno
that sought electoral politics did not go away. The Mexican government banned Fuerza Popular
in 1949, but it re-emerged as the Partido Demócrata Mexicano (PDM or Mexican Democratic
Party) in the 1970s. The conservative and Catholic PDM reached its height in the 1980s,
possessing over 500,000 active members and twelve seats in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies,
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lasting into the 1990s. Otherwise, the Partido Acción Nacional took any of the remaining
sinarquistas during and after the PDM. The social and religious faction of Antonio Santacruz
lived on through various committees scattered throughout Mexico.
In fact, sinarquismo through the Santacruz faction still remains in Mexico today. The
organization maintains its headquarters in Mexico City, with its national committee there. The
group still has regional and municipal committees scattered throughout the country. The
respective committees throughout Mexico promote their activities to their members through
social media. In July 2021, for example, the regional committee of San Luis Potosí hosted a
regional sinarquista forum, a eucharist, and a musical program.8 In many ways, the UNS
celebrates assemblies today just as the movement did in the past. Although the organization does
not possess a half million members as it once had, it still cultivates a sense of community of likeminded individuals who envision a different Mexico. Sinarquistas currently in Mexico still
believe that conservative Catholicism needs to shape the nation.
This study examines the growth and collapse of the UNS in the United States between the
1930s and the 1960s. Conservative Catholic Mexicans fled Mexico in the first place because of
the conflict in the country between the anti-clerical postrevolutionary state and Mexicans who
supported a strong Mexican Catholic Church. These individuals found refuge alongside their
like-minded compatriots in the U.S. The UNS was an organization that embodied their values
and allowed them to maintain their particular form of nationalism while residing outside their
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home country’s boundaries. The movement organized these individuals into forming committees
in California, Texas, and Chicagoland, in addition to cultivating readers throughout the U.S. of
the various sinarquista publications. The UNS utilized this base of support in the U.S. to
undermine the Mexican state. UNS leaders reached out to and collaborated with conservative
American Catholics to shift public opinion in the U.S. towards their perspective and similarly
subvert the Mexican government. The National Catholic Welfare Conference, Inter-American
Institute, and individuals such as Frank Gross and Heibel Alcuin did their part to amplify the
sinarquista cause. This transnational conservative Catholic community, however, only lasted so
long.
The UNS faced divisions within the movement that tore it apart. Differing visions of
what Mexico should be split the organization’s membership. While some wanted an integralist
and authoritarian Mexico that fused together church and state, others sought for more influence
from the Catholic Church in Mexican society. The third group that emerged believed that the
way towards conservative Catholic influence in society was through formal electoral politics.
Each of these factions replicated themselves in the U.S. at different points in time.
In addition to internal divisions, the fall of the UNS was coordinated by various interest
groups including the U.S. and Mexican governments, the Mexican American left, and the U.S.
media. The Confederación de Trabajadores de México initially claimed that the organization was
fascist and in short time this notion made its way to the U.S. Especially with the onset of World
War II, Americans expressed real fear of fascism and of foreigners undermining the nation’s
security. As the war persisted, the sinarquistas could not exist without being seen as an internal
enemy to the U.S. The reputation of the UNS as fascist combined with a split within the
movement led to its ultimate collapse.
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This dissertation contributes to the historiography in various ways. In terms of the
literature on the UNS, it paints the first whole picture of sinarquismo in the United States from
the movement’s beginnings with its roots in the church-state conflict to its demise in the 1960s.
Not only were Catholic Mexican nationalists in Mexico passionate about changing their country,
but so too were those in the U.S. Through organizing, partnerships, publications, and donations,
they did what they could to transform the situation back home. Sinarquistas in the U.S. were also
misunderstood and utilized as scapegoats during World War II. Future works can further
examine the transnational dimensions of sinarquismo, not just in Mexico and the U.S., but in
other parts of the Americas.
This study also builds on the historiography of postrevolutionary Mexico. It examines
Mexicans during this period beyond the confines of the nation-state, adding onto the work of
scholars like Julia G. Young. This study also complicates how the UNS interacted with the
postrevolutionary state and its various apparatuses, showing that these “enemies” actually
worked with one another to get what they wanted, especially in the context of colonization.
Upcoming research can investigate postrevolutionary Mexico in a variety of ways such as by
examining postrevolutionary leaders in exile (such as Plutarco Elías Calles) or by presenting a
larger-scale history on the Mexican political right in the U.S. during this time.
The scholarship on Western and U.S.-Mexico borderlands history also benefits from this
dissertation. Whereas historians explore the contestation and hardening of this particular
borderland over time, none hone in on World War II or the UNS. Future studies can delve into
the border during this period of total war, examining who transcended it, who was perceived to
be a threat, and how it was policed. For example, Vicente Lombardo Toledano consistently

270
warned about the threat of arms being transported across the border to “enemies” of the Mexican
state like the sinarquistas.
Lastly, this dissertation contributes to the historiography on Mexican Americans in the
U.S. Not only does this work focus on historical actors who did not seek a hyphenated identity, it
complicates oversimplified portrayals of Mexican Americans during the Sleepy Lagoon incident
and Zoot Suit Riots. This study also builds on a growing body of work on Latinx conservativism.
Upcoming scholarship has the opportunity to delve into the effect of transnational Mexicans on
the U.S., explore political and religious conflicts of the Mexican American community, and
examine the many other dimenions of the Latinx political right.
Even though sinarquismo does not exist during this present moment in the U.S., the
history of the movement still matters. Despite sinarquistas no longer residing in the country
today, conservative and religious Mexicans – and migrants more broadly – certainly do. All too
often does the American political system, media, and general public consider the Latinx
community to be uniform – as was portrayed by the U.S. media during the 2020 presidential
election. However, like any population, it is varied, diverse and complex. This dissertation
demonstrates the ideological diversity and intense fights within the Mexican diaspora, as well as
how complicated and contested ideas of Mexicanness are. In an era of widespread growth of the
political right, it is essential to understand the complexities and underlying context behind the
rise – and fall – of such movements like the Unión Nacional Sinarquista.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Archival Materials
Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City, Mexico
Coleción Manuel Ávila Camacho
Comité Organizador Sinarquista, 1937-1938
Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas del Río
Fondo Manuel Ávila Camacho
Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales
Biblioteca Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Mexico City, Mexico
Colección Sinarquistas
California State Archives, Sacramento, California
California Un-American Activities Committees Records
Catholic University of America Special Collections, Washington, D.C.
James A. Magner Papers
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops General Secretary Files
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Legal Department Records
Center for Migration Studies, New York, New York
Department of Immigration Records, 1920-1970
Florida Atlantic University Digital Library
271

272
PRISM: Political, Rights Issues, and Social Movements Collection
Göttingen State and University Library, Göttingen, Germany
Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis Branch Sinarquista Microfilm
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
Record Group 59 – Department of State Central Files
Record Group 75 – Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
Record Group 226 – Military Agency Records
Record Group 229 – Records of the Office of Inter-American Affairs
Record Group 319 – Military Agency Records
National Archives and Records Administration at Riverside, Perris, California
Record Group 181 - Records of Naval Districts and Shore Establishments
Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California
Donald Marquand Dozer Papers
Huntington Library, San Marino, California
Pedro Villaseñor political papers, 1925-1990
Kansas City-St. Joseph Diocesan archive, Kansas City, Missouri
Institution Records
Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas
Robert and Hazel Gomez collection
Marquette University Special Collections and University Archives, Raynor Memorial Libraries,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Frank Gross Papers, 1941-1949
Archbishop Edward A. O’Hara Papers, 1920-1956

273
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, Hyde Park, New York
Harry L. Hopkins Papers
The President's Secretary's File
Syracuse University Special Collections Research Center
Earl Browder Papers 1879-1990
Universidad Iberoamericana, Archivos Históricos, Mexico City, Mexico
Fondo Unión Nacional Sinarquistas
University of Arizona Libraries Special Collections, Tucson, Arizona
De La Torre Family Papers, 1864-2003
University of California, Los Angeles Chicano Studies Research Center, Los Angeles, California
Ron Lopez Sleepy Lagoon Research Collection
University of California, Los Angeles Library Special Collections, Los Angeles, California
Honorable in all things oral history transcript: the memoirs of Carey McWilliams
(Online)
Carey McWilliams Papers, 1930-1940
Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee Records
Social conditions of Mexican American youth (Online)
University of California, Santa Barbara Library Special Collections, Santa Barbara, California
Ronald Dennis Hussey Collection, 1943-1946
University of Chicago Joseph Regenstein Library, Chicago, Illinois
University of Chicago Map Collection
University of Delaware Library Special Collections, Newark, Delaware
George S. Messersmith papers

274
University of Notre Dame Archives, Notre Dame, Indiana.
John A. O'Brien Papers
University of Texas at Austin Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, Austin, Texas
José de la Luz Sáenz Papers, 1908-1998
Revolution and Counterrevolution in Guatemala, 1944-1963
Rómulo Munguía Papers, 1911-1980
University of Texas at Austin Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, Austin, Texas
Anita Brenner Papers, 1923-1981
Books and Pamphlets
Abascal, Salvador. Mis recuerdos, sinarquismo y Colonia María Auxiliadora (1935-1944): con
importantes documentos de los Archivos Nacionales de Washington. Mexico City:
Editorial Tradición, 1980.
Browder, Earl. A Message to Catholics. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1938.
Carrillo, Alejandro. Mexico and the Fascist Menace. Mexico City: PRM, 1940.
Comité Nacional Antisinarquista. La Colonización de Baja California. Mexico City: Imprenta de
la Camara de Diputados, 1941.
Comité Organizador Sinarquista. 1937 Manifiesto del Comité Organizador Sinarquista al pueblo
Mexicano. Memoria Política del México, Instituto Nacional de Estudios Politicos, A.C.,
June 12, 1937,
http://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Textos/6Revolucion/1937MCO.html
Chase, Alan. Falange: The Axis Secret Army in the Americas. New York: G.P. Putnam’s, 1943.
Díaz Escobar, Alfredo Félix. Yo se los dije: el peligro sinarquista. Mexico City, 1948.
Gill, Mario. Sinarquismo, su origen, su esencia, su misión. Mexico: Comité de Defensa de la
Revolución, 1944.
Heibel, Alcuin, Ed. Leaders in Mexican economic and social reform explain: synarchism, "the
hope of Mexico's poor." Mount Angel: Mount Angel Abbey, 1943.
Menefee, Selden Cowles. Assignment: U.S.A. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1943.
Padilla, Juan Ignacio. Sinarquismo: contrarrevolución. Mexico City, Editorial Polis, 1948.

275
Riding, Alan. Mexico: Inside the Volcano. London: Cornet Books, 1989.
Sánchez, George I. Forgotten People: A Study of New Mexicans. Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1940.
Trinidad Cervantes, José. Alba-Patria: Clarinadas Sinarquistas (Mexico City: Union Nacional
Sinarquista, 1940).
Unión Nacional Sinarquista. Canciones y Corridos Sinarquistas. Mexico City: Unión Nacional
Sinarquista, 1940.
Unión Nacional Sinarquista. Historia gráfica del sinarquismo. Mexico City: La Unión, 1947.
Unión Nacional Sinarquista. Program of the National Synarchist Union. Los Angeles: Los
Angeles Regional Committee of the National Synarchist Union of Mexico, 1942.
Whetten, Nathan L. Rural Mexico. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.
White, John W. Our Good Neighbor Hurdle. Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1943.
Government Documents
Constitución Federal de 1917. Political Database of the Americas. Georgetown University
Center for Latin American Studies. March 23, 2006.
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Mexico/mexico1917.html
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. FDR's First Inaugural Address Declaring 'War' on the Great
Depression. National Archives and Records Administration. Updated September 23,
2016. https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/fdr-inaugural
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. Radio Address to the Democratic National Convention Accepting
the Nomination (July 19, 1940). The American Presidency Project. UC Santa Barbara.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-address-the-democratic-nationalconvention-accepting-the-nomination
United States Central Intelligence Group. Central Intelligence Report: Activities of Sinarquistas.
October 30, 1947. Freedom of Information Act, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.
United States Congressional Research Service. Foreign Agents Registration Act: An
Overview. Federation of American Scientists. Updated March 7, 2019.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10499.pdf
United States Department of Justice. Registration Statement Abstract. Registration Number 387.
October 25, 1946. Freedom of Information Act. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Washington, D.C

276
United States Department of Justice. Voorhis Act--18 U.S.C. § 2386.The United States
Department of Justice Archives. Updated January 17, 2020.
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2067-voorhis-act-18-usc2386
United States Department of Justice. Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the
United States on the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended to the period
of June 28, 1942 to December 31, 1944. June 1945.
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. Union Nacional Sinarquista of Mexico
Registration Act. July 14, 1958. Freedom of Information Act, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Washington, D.C.
United States Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. “Church Does Not Support Sinarquismo.”
BBC. Daily Report: Foreign Radio Broadcasts. December 8, 1943.
United States Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. Daily Report: Foreign Radio Broadcasts.
October 27, 1943
United States Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. Daily Report: Foreign Radio Broadcasts.
November 30, 1943.
United States House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on the Post Office and
Post Roads, Declaring Certain Papers, Books, Pictures, and Writings Nonmailable,
November 15 and 16, 1943.
Oral Histories/Interviews
Gil, Carlos B. Interview by Nathan Ellstrand. November 22, 2019.
Gross, Frank. Interview by Arnoldo Sevilla. Milwaukee Mexican-American Interviews, 1974
-1977. Wisconsin Historical Society. May 30, 1974.
Orozco, José. Interview by Nathan Ellstrand. June 1, 2020.
Ramírez Sánchez, Ofelia. Interview by Armando Sandoval Pierres, transcript of oral history by
María Georgina Escoto Molina. Laboratorio de Historia Oral. Departamento de Estudios
de Cultura y Sociedad. División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades. Universidad de
Guanajuato. October 12, 1997.
Villaseñor Grijalva, Lucila, María Elena Villaseñor, and Alicia O. Colunga. Interview by Nathan
Ellstrand. June 14, 2020.
Periodicals
America

277
Ariona Daily Star
Arizona Republic
Borger Daily Herald
The Brownsville Herald
The Burlington Daily Times-News
The Capital Journal
The Catholic Advance
Catholic Digest
Chicago Daily News
Chicago Daily Tribune
The Christian Century
The Christian Science Monitor
Commonweal
El Continental
Current History
El Paso Herald-Post
El Paso Times
La Esperanza
The Evening Star
Fordham Ram
Foreign Affairs
The Fresno Bee
Harper’s Magazine

278
El Heraldo de Brownsville
Hoy
Inter-Amerian Monthly
The Knight’s Spear
Laredo Times
Los Angeles Times
Mañana
Mexican Labor News
Mexican Life
Milwaukee Journal
The Monitor
The Nation
N.C.W.C. News Service
The New Republic
The New York Times
Newsweek
The Notre Dame Scholastic
Novedades
Oakland Tribune
Ogden Standard-Examiner
Our Sunday Visitor
La Opinión
People’s Daily World

279
PM
El Popular
La Prensa
El Progreso
The Protestant
Pueblos Hispanos
San Antonio Express
San Diego Union
St. Louis Globe-Democrat
Satuday Evening Post
The Sign
El Sinarquista
Social Justice
The South Bend Tribune
The Skyscraper
The Spanish-American Shopping News
Survey Graphic
The Tablet
Time
Washington Evening Star
The Washington Post

280
Religious Documents
Leo XIII. Rerum Novarum.The Holy See. May 15, 1891. http://www.vatican.va/content/leoxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html
Pius XI. Acerba Animi. The Holy See. September 19, 1932. http://w2.vatican.va/content/piusxi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_29091932_acerba-animi.html
Pius XI. Firmissimam constantiam. The Holy See. March 28, 1937.
http://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_pxi_enc_19370328_firmissimam-constantiam.html
Pius XI, Iniquis Afflictisque. The Holy See. November 18,
1926.http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_pxi_enc_18111926_iniquis-afflictisque.html
Pius XI. Quadragesimo Anno. The Holy See. May 15, 1931. http://www.vatican.va/content/piusxi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html
Secondary Sources
Articles
Barajas, Frank P. “The Defense Committees of Sleepy Lagoon: A Convergent Struggle against
Fascim, 1942-1944.” Aztlán: A Journal of Chicano Studies 31 (2006): 33-62.
Brewster, Claire and Keith Brewster. “‘Patria, Honor y Fuerza’: A Study of a Right-Wing Youth
Movement in Mexico during the 1930s-1960s.” Journal of Latin American Studies 46
(2014): 691-721.
Campos Carr, Irene. “Mexican Workers in Aurora: The Oral History of Three Immigration
Waves, 1924-1990.” Perspectives in Mexican American Studies 1 (1992).
García, Alberto. “Regulating Bracero Migration: How National, Regional, and Local Political
Considerations Shaped the Bracero Program.” Hispanic American Historical Review 101,
no. 3 (2021).
González, Sergio M., “Interethnic Catholicism and Transnational Religious Connections:
Milwaukee's Mexican Mission Chapel of Our Lady of Guadalupe, 1924–1929,” Journal
of American Ethnic History 36, no. 1 (Fall 2016).
González Flores, José Gustavo. “Los motivos del sinarquista. La organización y la ideología de
la Unión Nacional Sinarquista.” Culturales 3 (2015):49-76.
Leon-Portilla, Miguel. “Paradoxes in the History of Baja California.” The Journal of San Diego
History. 19, no. 3 (Summer 1973).

281
Lucas, Jeffrey K. “Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama and Changing Mexico: A Twentieth-Century
Political Journey.” International Social Science Review 83 (2008): 132-157.
Ludlow, Leonor. "La Union Nacional Sinarquista (mayo de 1937- marzo de 1944).” Estudios
Politicos III, no. 10 (1977).
Martinez, Anne M. “‘From the Halls of Montezuma’: Seminary in Exile or Pan-American
Project?” U.S. Catholic Historian. 20, no. 4 (2002).
Michaels, Albert L. “The Crisis of Cardenismo.” Journal of Latin American Studies. 2, no. 1
(May 1970), 51-79.
Michaels, Albert L. “Fascism and Sinarquismo: Popular Nationalisms Against the Mexican
Revolution.” Journal of Church and State 8, no. 2 (1966): 234-250.
Ortoll, Servando. “Los origenes sociales del sinarquismo en Jalisco (1929-1939).” Encuentro:
Movimientos Sociales 1, no. 3 (1984).
Palmer, Susan L. “The Community-Building Experiences of Mexicans in Aurora, Illinois, 19151935.” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 98, no. 3 (Autumn 2005).
Solis Nicot, Yves Bernardo Roger. “Asociación espiritual o masonería catolica de la U.” Istor
33, no. IX. (Summer 2008).
Young, Julia G. “Creating Catholic Utopias: Transnational Catholic Activism and Mexico’s
Union Nacional Sinarquista.” Catholic Southwest 29 (2018): 3-20.
Book Chapters
Gillingham, Paul and Peter T. Smith. “Introduction: The Paradoxes in Revolution.” In
Dictablanda: Politics, Work, and Culture in Mexico, 1938-1968. Durham: Duke
University Press, 2014.
Morales Suárez, Norma Delia. “Las Mujeres de Cristo Rey, Comunidad Sinarquista del Sur de
Sinaloa.” In Mujeres, Ciudanía, y Poder, edited by Dalia Barrera Bassols. Mexico City:
El Colegio de Mexico, 2000.
Ortoll, Servando. “Las Legiones, La Base, y El Sinarquismo, Tres Organizaciones Distintas y Un
Solo Fin Verdadero? (1929-1948).” In El PDM: Movimiento Regional. Guadalajara:
Universidad de Guadalajara, 1989.
Rogers, Sister Mary Helen. “The Role of Our Lady of Guadalupe Parish in the Adjustment of the
Mexican Community to Life in the Indiana Harbor Area, 1940-1941.” In Forging a
Community: The Latino Experience in Northwest Indiana, 1919-1975. Edited by James
B. Lane and Edward J. Escobar. Gary: Cattails Press, 1987.

282
Savarino, Franco. “The Sentinel of the Bravo: Italian Fascism and Mexico, 1922-35.” In
International Fascism, 1919-1945. Edited by Gert Sorensen and Robert Mallett.
London: Frank Cass, 2002.
Solis Nicot, Yves Bernardo Roger. “La U, un acercamiento desde los archivos vaticanos y
mexicanos.” In Sociedades secretas clericales y no clericales en el siglo XX. Mexico
City: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2018.
Serrano Álvarez, Pablo. “El Catolicismo Sinarquista.” In Religión y sociedad en México durante
el siglo XX. Edited by Martha Pacheco. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios
Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 2007.
Books
Aguilar Camín, Héctor, and Lorenzo Meyer. In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution:
Contemporary Mexican History, 1910–1989. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993.
Alvarez, Luis. The Power of the Zoot: Youth Culture and Resistance During World War II.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.
Andes, Stephen J.C. The Vatican and Catholic Activism in Mexico and Chile: The Politics of
Transnational Catholicism, 1920-1940. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Bailey, David C. ¡Viva Cristo Rey The Cristero Rebellion and the Church-State Conflict in
Mexico. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974.
Balderrama, Francisco E., and Raymond Rodriguez. Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation
in the 1930s.Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995.
Becker, Marjorie. Setting the Virgin on Fire: Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan, Peasants, and
Redemption of the Mexican Revolution. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1995.
Beezley, William H., and Colin M. MacLachlan. Mexicans in Revolution, 1910–1946: An
Introduction. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009.
Blancarte, Roberto. Historia de la Iglesia Catolica en Mexico. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura
Económica, 1992.
Buelna, Enrique M. Chicano Communists and the Struggle for Social Justice. Tucson: The
University of Arizona Press, 2019.
Butler, Matthew. Popular Piety and Political Identity in Mexico's Cristero Rebellion:
Michoacán, 1927-29. London: British Academy, 2004.
Cadava, Geraldo. The Hispanic Republican: The Shaping of an American Political Identity, from
Nixon to Trump. New York: Ecco Press, 2020.

283
Cadava, Geraldo. Standing on Common Ground: The Making of a Sunbelt Borderland.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.
Campbell, Hugh. La derecha radical en Mexico, 1929-1949. Mexico City: Secretaría de
Educación Pública, 1976.
Carpenter, Ronald H. Father Charles E. Coughlin: Surrogate Spokesman for the Disaffected.
Westport and London: Greenport Press, 1998.
Castillo-Muñoz, Verónica. The Other California: Land, Identity and Politics on the Mexican
Borderlands. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2016.
Chang, Jason Oliver. Chino: Anti-Chinese Racism in Mexico, 1880-1940. Champaign:
University of Illinois Press, 2017.
Cohen, Deborah. Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the Postwar United
States and Mexico. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011.
Curley, Robert. Citizens and Believers: Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Jalisco, 19001930. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2018.
Daniel, Cletus E. Bitter Harvest: A History of California Farmworkers. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1982.
Dolan, Jay P. In Search of an American Catholicism: A History of Religion and Culture in
Tension. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Dolan, Timothy Michael. Some Seed Fell on Good Ground: The Life of Edwin V. O'Hara.
Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011.
Dormady, Jason. Primitive revolution: restorationist religion and the idea of the Mexican
Revolution, 1940-1968. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2011.
Escobar, Edward J. Race, Police, and the Making of a Political Identity: Mexican Americans
and the Los Angeles Police Department, 1900-1945. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1999.
Escobedo, Elizabeth Rachel. From Coveralls to Zoot Suits: The Lives of Mexican American
Women on the World War II Home Front. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2013.
Fallaw, Ben. Religion and State Formation in Postrevolutionary Mexico. Durham and London:
2013.
Finchelstein, Federico. Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina
and Italy, 1919-1945. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.

284
Finchelstein, Federico. From Fascism to Populism in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014.
FitzGerald, David. A Nation of Emigrants: How Mexico Manages its Migration. Oakland:
University of California Press, 2009.
Flores, John H. The Mexican Revolution in Chicago: Immigration Politics from the Early
Twentieth Century to the Cold War. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press,
2018.
Flores, Lori A. Grounds for Dreaming: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the
California Farmworker Movement. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
Francis-Fallon, Benjamin. The Rise of the Latino Vote: A History. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2019.
García, Mario T. Católicos: Resistance and Affirmation in Chicano Catholic History. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2008.
Garcia, Matt. A World of Its Own: Race, Labor, and Citrus in the Making of Greater Los
Angeles, 1900-1970. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.
Gil, Carlos B. Hope and Frustration: Interviews with Leaders of Mexico’s Political Opposition.
Lanham: SR Books, 1992.
Gómez-Quiñones, Juan. Chicano Politics: Reality and Promise, 1940-1990. Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1990.
González, Gabriela. Redeeming La Raza: Transborder Modernity, Race, Respectability, and
Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
González Ruiz, Edgar. Los Abascal: conservadores a ultranza. Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2002.
Goodman, Adam. The Deportation Machine: America's Long History of Expelling Immigrants.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.
Griswold del Castillo, Richard, Ed. World War II and Mexican American Civil Rights. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2008.
Gutiérrez, David G. Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the
Politics of Ethnicity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
Hart, John M. Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
Hernández García de León, Héctor. Historia política del sinarquismo, 1934-1944. Mexico City:
Miguel Angel Porrúa, 2004.

285
Horne, Gerald. Black and Brown: African Americans and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920.
New York: New York University Press, 2005.
Joseph, Gilbert M., and Jürgen Buchenau. Mexico’s Once and Future Revolution: Social
Upheaval and the Challenge of Rule Since the Late Nineteenth Century. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2013.
Johnson, Benjamin Heber. Revolution in Texas: How a Forgotten Rebellion and Its Bloody
Suppression Turned Mexicans into Americans. New Haven: Yale University Press,
2003.
Jones, Halbert. The War Has Brought Peace to Mexico: World War II and the Consolidation of
the Post-Revolutionary State. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014.
Kanter, Deborah E. Chicago Católico: Making Catholic Parishes Mexican. Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 2020.
Kloppe-Santamaría, Gema. In The Vortex of Violence: Lynching, Extralegal Justice, and the
State in Post-Revolutionary Mexico. Oakland: University of California Press, 2020.
Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution. Two Volumes. Lincoln and London: University of
Nebraska Press, 1986.
Krauze, Enrique. Mexico: Biography of Power. New York: HarperCollins, 1997.
López, Rick A. Crafting Mexico: Intellectuals, Artisans, and the State After the Revolution.
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010.
Loza, Mireya. Defiant Braceros: How Migrant Workers Fought for Racial, Sexual, and Political
Freedom. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016.
Mabry, Donald J. Mexico’s Acción Nacional: A Catholic Alternative to Revolution. Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1973.
Martínez, Anne M. Catholic Borderlands: Mapping Catholicism Onto American Empire, 1905
-1935.Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014.
Mazón, Mauricio. The Zoot-Suit Riots: The Psychology of Symbolic Annihilation. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1984.
Meyer, Jean A. The Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People Between Church and State 1926
-1929. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Meyer, Jean. El sinarquismo: un fascismo mexicano? Mexico City: Editorial J. Mortiz, 1979.
Meyer, Jean. El sinarquismo, el cardenismo y la iglesia :1937-1947. Barcelona: Tusquet
Editores, 2003.

286
Mijares Sánchez, Mario Raúl. Mexico: the Genesis of Its Political Decomposition. Bloomington:
Palibrio, 2013.
Miller, Michael Nelson. Red, White, and Green: The Maturing of Mexicanidad, 1940-1946. El
Paso: Texas Western Press, 1998.
Minian, Ana. Undocumented Lives: The Untold Story of Mexican Migration. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2018.
Monroy, Douglas. Rebirth: Mexican Los Angeles from the Great Migration to the Great
Depression. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
Montoya, Benjamin C. Risking Immeasurable Harm: Immigration Restriction and U.S.-Mexican
Diplomatic Relations, 1924-1932. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2020.
Navarro, Aaron W. Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.
Newcomer, Daniel. Reconciling modernity: urban state formation in 1940s León, Mexico.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.
Ngai, Mae. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004.
O’Toole, James M. The Faithful: A History of Catholics in America. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2009.
Orozco, José. Receive our memories: the letters of Luz Moreno, 1950-1952. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017.
Pagán, Eduardo Obregón. Murder at the Sleepy Lagoon: Zoot Suits, Race, and Riot in Wartime
Los Angeles. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
Paz, María Emilia. Strategy, Security, and Spies. University Park: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1997.
Paxton, Robert. The Anatomy of Fascism. New York: Vintage Books, 2004.
Payne, Stanley. A History of Fascism, 1914-1945. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1995.
Purnell, Jennie. Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico: the
Agraristas and Cristeros of Michoacán. Durham and London: Duke University Press,
1999.
Ramirez, Catherine S. The Woman in the Zoot Suit: Gender, Nationalism, and the Cultural
Politics of Memory. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.

287
Rankin, Monica A. ¡México, la patria!: Propaganda and Production during World War II.
Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2009.
Rath, Thomas. Myths of Demilitarization in Postrevolutionary Mexico, 1920-1960. Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 2013.
Redinger, Matthew A. American Catholics and the Mexican Revolution, 1924-1936. Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005.
Romo, David Dorado. Ringside Seat to a Revolution: An Underground Cultural History of El
Paso and Juárez, 1893-1923. El Paso: Cinco Puntos, 2005.
Rubenstein, Anne. Bad Language, Naked Ladies, and Other Threats to the Nation. Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 1998.
Sánchez, George J. Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano
Los Angeles, 1900-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Savarino, Franco y Joao Fabio Bertonha, Eds. El Fascismo en Brasil y América Latina. Mexico
City: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes/Instituto Nacional de Antropología e
Historia, 2013.
Schuler, Friedrich E. Mexico Between Hitler and Roosevelt: Mexican Foreign Relations in the
Age of Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934-1940. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1998.
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